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Résumé
Cette thése relie trois articles sur l’économie politique. Ces articles ana-
lysent à la fois théoriquement et empiriquement si, et dans quelle mesure,
trois phénomènes politiques différents (les partis politiques, les guerres ci-
viles et les menaces externes), et leur interaction, influent sur les résultats
économiques.
Le premier chapitre étudie l’impact de la présence au pouvoir des politi-
ciens de nouveaux partis politiques sur la taille du gouvernement. Le chapitre
se concentre sur les municipalités colombiennes, où les nouveaux partis po-
litiques ont été nombreux et fructueux au cours des dernières années. Les
estimations par régressions sur discontinuité montrent que les dépenses pu-
bliques et les recettes fiscales sont significativement plus élevées dans les mu-
nicipalités gouvernées par un maire d’un nouveau parti politique. En utilisant
des informations sur la politique locale et des caractéristiques des nouveaux
partis, je soutiens que ce résultat peut être expliqué par le fait qu’il y a
moins d’information sur les politiciens de nouveaux partis que les politiciens
des partis traditionnels.
Le deuxième chapitre développe une nouvelle explication de l’impact des
guerres civiles et des conflits interétatiques sur le state-building qui repose sur
l’idée que les protagonistes de ces deux types de conflits peuvent avoir un lien
(ethnique ou idéologique). Un premier résultat montre que la force de ce lien
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détermine si les conflits contre des adversaires internes (i.e. guerres civiles)
ou des ennemis externes (i.e. conflits interétatiques) sont complémentaires
ou se substituent, conduisant à plus ou moins d’investissement en capacité
fiscale. La théorie prédit également un rôle non trivial de la stabilité poli-
tique dans la relation entre les deux types de conflits et la capacité fiscale :
un deuxième résultat montre que, bien que la stabilité politique se traduit
par moins de capacité fiscale, plus de stabilité n’implique pas plus de state-
building. Leur équivalence dépend du niveau de cohésion des institutions.
Un nouveau mécanisme par lequel plus de stabilité politique peut impliquer
moins de state-building est proposé. En outre, il est démontré que des corré-
lations dans les données cross-country sont compatibles avec la théorie.
Le troisième chapitre examine la relation entre la probabilité d’occurrence
d’un conflit intérieur violent et le risque qu’un tel conflit “s’externalise" (c’est
à dire se propage dans un autre pays en devenant un conflit interétatique).
Je considère une situation dans laquelle un conflit interne entre un gouver-
nement et un groupe rebelle peut s’externaliser. Je montre que le risque
d’externalisation augmente la probabilité d’un accord de paix, mais seule-
ment si le gouvernement est suffisamment puissant par rapport aux rebelles,
et si le risque d’externalisation est suffisamment élevé. Je montre comment
ce modèle aide à comprendre les récents pourparlers de paix entre le gouver-
nement colombien et le groupe le plus puissant des rebelles dans le pays, les
FARC.
Mots-clés : nouveaux partis politiques, taille du gouvernement, gouverne-
ments locaux, capacité fiscale, stabilité politique, conflit interétatique, guerre
civile, externalisation, pourparlers de paix
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Abstract
This dissertation ties together three papers on political economy. These
papers explore both theoretically and empirically whether, and to what
extent, three different political phenomena (political parties, civil wars and
external threats), and their interaction, affect economic outcomes.
The first chapter investigates the impact of the presence in power of
politicians from new parties on the size of government. The chapter focuses
on Colombian municipalities, where new parties have been numerous and
successful in recent years. Regression discontinuity estimates show that public
spending and tax revenue are significantly higher in municipalities governed
by a mayor from a new party. Using information about local politics and the
features of the new parties, as well as a model of political incumbency, I argue
that this result can be explained by the fact that there is less information on
politicians from new parties than on politicians from traditional parties.
The second chapter develops an novel explanation of the impact of both
civil war and interstate disputes on state building based on the idea that the
protagonists of these two types of conflicts might have an link (ethnic or ideo-
logical). A first result shows that the strength of this link determines whether
conflicts fought against internal adversaries (i.e. civil wars) or external ene-
mies (i.e. interstate disputes) complement or substitute each other, leading
to larger or smaller investments in fiscal capacity. The theory also predicts a
v
non trivial role of political stability in channelling the relation between both
kinds of conflicts and fiscal capacity : a second result shows that while less
political stability translates into less fiscal capacity, more stability does not
automatically imply more state building. Whether or not they are equivalent
depends on how cohesive institutions are. A novel mechanism through which
more political stability might imply less state building is proposed. Additio-
nally, it is shown that some correlations in cross-country data are consistent
with the theory.
The third chapter investigates the relationship between the likelihood of
a violent domestic conflict and the risk that such a conflict “externalizes”
(i.e. spreads to another country by becoming an international dispute). I
consider a situation in which a domestic conflict between a government and
a rebel group externalizes. I show that the risk of externalization increases
the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, but only if the government is sufficiently
powerful relative to the rebels, and if the risk of externalization is sufficiently
high. I show how this model helps to understand recent intriguing peace talks
between the Colombian government and the most powerful rebel group in the
country, the FARC.
Keywords : New parties, size of government, local governments, fiscal ca-
pacity, political stability, interstate conflicts, civil war, externalization, peace
talks
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Chapitre 1
New parties and policy outcomes :
theory and evidence from
Colombian local governments 1
1.1 Introduction
During the last two decades in both developing and established demo-
cracies, new political parties have increased in popularity and power. 2 These
parties differ along many dimensions, such as their degree of personalism and
their ideological views. However, what is common is their lack (or absence) of
experience in government. If this lack of experience implies, as some authors
have argued (see for example Grynaviski, 2006, 2010, Aldrich and Gryna-
1. I thank seminar participants at the Université of Montréal, Université du Québec à
Montréal, CEA and SCSE annual conferences, the hospitality of CREST and the Ecole
Polytechnique, where part of this work was written, and Arianna Degan, Marina Dodlova,
Thomas Fujiwara, Bariş Kaymak, Benjamin Nyblade, and Manasa Patnam for discussions.
2. For a detailed discussion of the recent rise in importance of non-traditional parties,
see Meguid (2008) for Western Europe, Tavits (2007) for Eastern Europe, and Bejarano,
Mainwaring, and Pizarro (2006) for Latin America.
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viski, 2010), that voters have less information about the members of these
parties, and if this information allows citizens to hold politicians accountable
(see Fiorina, 1980, Cox and McCubbins, 2005, Besley, 2006, Aldrich, 2011),
then one would expect new parties to have an effect on policy outcomes.
In this chapter I study the impact of the presence in power of politicians
from new parties on the size of government and other policy outcomes. In
spite of its relevance, to my knowledge this question has not yet been addres-
sed in the empirical literature. Since in many countries increasing political
competition has brought new parties into the political arena, understanding
the policy consequences of new parties might improve the understanding of
the effect of increasing political competition (see Lizzeri and Persico, 2005,
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2005, 2010).
The study focuses on Colombian local governments, where the presence in
power of new parties has been strong in recent years. The Colombian case is
attractive because of the quantity, heterogeneity and success of these parties
and, most importantly, because new parties are particularly easy to identify.
These parties are essentially political movements created within months of
an election and without any experience in power in the municipalities and
period studied. The opponents of these new movements are two very old
political parties : the Colombian Liberal Party (left-wing) and Colombian
Conservative Party (right-wing). These two parties, which were founded in
1848 and 1849 respectively, have split the bulk of power in power in every
municipality for more than a century. Only recently, partly as a result of
new laws favouring political competition, have these two traditional parties
started to lose significant power (around the 41% of all local elections).
This study begins by proposing a theoretical framework based on a career-
concern model. The main prediction of the model is that when a government
is led by a politician from a new party, the size of government (spending
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and taxes) is higher. The argument is the following. Once in office, and ir-
respectively of his political party, a politician concerned about his career
faces the following trade-off : on the one hand, a bigger government allows
for the extraction of larger political rents, but on the other hand, it will be
interpreted by voters as a indication of dishonesty, decreasing his chances of
future reappointment and future political rents. In the solution of this trade-
off, the ex-ante uncertainty about the politician’s honesty is crucial : more
uncertainty means that the actions of the politician are less informative. As
a result, increasing the size of government has a smaller electoral cost. Since
we expect that the uncertainty about the honesty of politicians belonging to
a new party will be higher, my model implies that relative to a politician
from an old party, a politician from a new party will choose higher levels of
spending and taxes when he is in power.
This model is consistent with the qualitative literature on the role of poli-
tical parties in Colombian local governments and with the empirical findings
from the second part of the chapter. This evidence consists of a comparison of
fiscal outcomes in municipalities with governments controlled by new parties
and municipalities with governments controlled by old parties from 1997 to
2011. New parties are defined as parties that had never won an election in
a municipality, while the Liberals and Conservatives are defined as the old
parties. To isolate the causal impact of governments on new parties, I employ
a regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares municipalities where
candidates from new parties barely won an election to municipalities where
candidates from new parties barely lost. The RD estimates show that public
spending is significantly higher in municipalities where a mayor from a new
party is in power, and that this difference is due to a corresponding difference
in local taxes, for which local authorities are directly responsible. In addi-
tion, analysis using information on local politics and on the characteristics
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of new parties suggest that it is a party’s newness that plausibly explains
the difference. More specifically, in order to capture the degree of knowledge
that voters have about the parties, I compute the number of years that have
passed since the party’s first participation in an election. I find that the effect
of a new party on spending is larger for parties that have never participated
in any municipal election and decreases with the party’s age.
To shed further light on the plausibility of my explanation, I also consider
other mechanisms that could explain why new parties spend more. First, I
examine whether the ideology of new parties is a factor explaining why they
spend more. I find that the size of government is larger in municipalities
governed by new parties, regardless of whether the opposition party is left-
wing (Liberal). Second, I examine the possibility that new parties spend
more because they have a smaller majority on a municipal council. I find the
same results regardless of whether the winner holds a majority on the local
council. Finally, using measures of transparency at municipal levels, I find
that local governments led by new parties do not take more measure in order
to improve the transparency of their actions than those led by old parties.
This study contributes to an increasing literature that empirically exa-
mines the role of partisan affiliation in determining policy outcomes. Several
studies have examined this question at either state or national levels. For
example, Besley and Case (2003) use a fixed effects framework to show that,
for U.S. state legislatures, a higher fraction of Democrat party seats is as-
sociated with significantly higher state spending. Lee, Moretti, and Butler
(2004) use a regression discontinuity design and find that partisan affilia-
tion explains a very large proportion of the variation in the U.S. congres-
sional voting behavior. At the municipal level, the evidence is inconclusive :
while Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) finds that marginally elected left-wing local
governments impose significantly higher taxes and spend more than their
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right-wing counterparts in Sweden, for the U.S. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)
fail to find any differences in the size of government under marginally elected
Democrat and Republican mayors. None of these papers analyze the impact
of new or inexperienced political parties on policy outcomes.
Since new parties can be characterized as weak party organizations, this
study is also related to Primo and Snyder (2010) in examining the link bet-
ween party strength and public finance outcomes. Although Primo and Sny-
der focus on a different level of governance (U.S. states) and use a different
methodology (difference-in-differences estimation), I also find that weak par-
ties increase the size of government. My argument is, however, different : in
their model, a party is weak if its internal structure and role in candidate
nominations is not well defined. In my model, a weak party is a political
organization whose label is not very informative. My argument is therefore
close to the literature on party labels as “brand names" (Snyder and Ting,
2002; Grynaviski, 2006, 2010). In particular, it is consistent with the fin-
ding that less informative party labels lead to more extreme policy outcomes
(Snyder and Ting, 2002). However, in contrast with Snyder and Ting (2002),
and consistent with Grynaviski (2006, 2010), I argue that the informational
value of party labels mostly depends on a party’s past behavior in office,
as opposed to the capacity of the parties to restrict access to their label.
However, none of these papers discuss new parties. Additionally, they all
propose general spatial models of party competition, whereas I use a politi-
cal career-concerns framework (Holmstrom, 1999, Dewatripont, Jewitt, and
Tirole, 1999, Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
This study is also related to the literature of multiparty competition with
free entry. Palfrey (1984), Osborne (2000) and Callander (2005) propose spa-
tial models of electoral competition where two dominant parties, competing
simultaneously with each other, face the possibility that third parties enter
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the competition after they have chosen their policy positions. They are all
interested in the equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, they find that
when third parties enter and win, the policies that they choose are either
moderate (Osborne) or extreme (Callander). In all these models the third
parties can be interpreted as new parties relative to the established two-
party system ; however, since the voters have the same information about all
the parties, their notion of third party is fundamentally different than mine.
Finally, as previously noted, this study contributes to the literature on
the impact of political competition on policy outcomes (Lizzeri and Persico,
2005, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2005, 2010).
Lizzeri and Persico (2005) find that a high degree of political competition
(defined as the number of parties participating in an electoral competition)
may reduce welfare by channelling resources into targeted transfers rather
than general-interest public goods. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model
political competition as the inverse of the expected cost of replacement of
the incumbent, and find that political competition affects no monotonically
institutional development by intensifying political instability and affecting
the incentive for incumbents to implement growth-enhancing reforms. Bes-
ley, Persson, and Sturm (2005, 2010) measure political competition by the
dominance of U.S. Republicans or Democrats, and find that higher political
competition is associated with more pro-growth policies ; they also test this
prediction using panel data for U.S. states. Since a high degree of political
competition (whatever the definition of political competition is) makes it
more likely that new parties will compete and win, this study contributes to
the literature by proposing a new drawback to political competition : new
parties are less known to voters, which may cause an overprovision of public
goods when they are in power by allowing these governments to extract large
political rents without being punished in subsequent elections.
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The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 describes the career-
concern model of political-incumbent policy choice. Section 1.3 describes the
political and economical context of Colombian local governments. Section 1.4
discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section 1.5 presents the empirical
results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
1.2.1 Model
In this section I present a model of career concerns in which I apply
the insights from the political agency literature to the context of Colombian
municipalities. 3 Consider a two-period economy. In each period t, a politician
in power must decide public spending and the tax rate, denoted by gt and
xt, respectively. Between periods there is an election in which voters choose
between the incumbent and a challenger. Each period the winning politician
faces a balanced budget constraint 4
gt + r = η(xty + T ) (1.1)
where r > 0 is a fixed parameter that can be interpreted as a fixed cost
or the prior obligations that must be met, y denotes the taxable revenue
assumed to be constant and equal to one, T are the transfers from the central
3. The literature contains many career-concerns models of political incumbency ; see
Besley (2006) for a review. Mine is built on Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 4.5).
4. It is reasonable to assume a balanced budget constraint for Colombian municipalities.
Although some municipalities are allowed to run deficits, Colombian legislation (Law 358
of 1997) allows the central government to effectively limit the debt burden of municipalities
according to their past performance, their own revenue, and to the implementation of a
fiscal adjustment plan. These measures have proven to be very effective from 2000 onward
(for instance, from 2000 to 2008, regional and local authorities averaged a fiscal surplus of
0.3% of GDP ; see DAF (2009)).
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government, 5 and η ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that measures the level of honesty
or integrity of the government.
The parameter η will be crucial to the analysis : it is the proportion of
revenue not extracted as political rents during the period the politician is
in power. I assume that it is determined randomly by nature, 6 following a
uniform distribution between 1
ξ
− 1
2ψ
and 1
ξ
+ 1
2ψ
. The parameter ψ can be
interpreted as a measure of how precise the information about η is. 7 This
parameter is what distinguishes politicians belonging to new and old parties.
Crucially, I assume that old and new parties have different ψ. 8 In particular,
I make the following assumption :
ASSUMPTION 1. The precision of the information that voters have about
η (as captured by the parameter ψ) is lower when the government is led by a
politician from a new party
A possible justification is as follows. By definition, new parties have never
been in power. On the other hand, the political colleagues, bureaucracy and
interest groups close to mayors from an old party are more known to voters :
these parties have been in power before, for many years, and these structures
usually persist. Since governments’ honesty depends on these structures, then
5. I assumed T > 0 if xt > 0 and T = 0 if xt = 0. This assumption helps to guarantee an
interior solution and is consistent with the capacity of the Colombian central government
to punish municipalities with poor performance in collecting their own resources. See
footnote 4
6. In Colombia, most of the corruption is done through the so-called “serrucho" (jigsaw)
or “mordida” (bite). It corresponds to a percentage of the public good expenditures which is
kept by members of the government in order to expedite or influence the licensing process.
Usually this percentage is the outcome of bargaining between members of the government
and contractors. For an empirical assessment of the most popular forms of corruption in
Colombia see Transparencia por Colombia (2008, 2010, 2012).
7. Note that var(η) = 112ψ2 ; thus, a bigger ψ implies a lower var(η).
8. I assume that new and old parties do not differ about ξ. This, however, is without a
loss of generality, since, as discussed at the end of this section, public spending does not
depend on ξ.
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it is clear that when an old party is in power, relative to a new party, voters
have more precise information about their level of honesty. 9
Voters’ one-period utility is quasi-linear, given by
w(gt, xt) = (1− xt) +H(gt) (1.2)
where H is a strictly concave, increasing function satisfying limx→0H ′(x) =
+∞ and representing the utility from consumption of public goods. For a
given η, replacing (1.1) in (1.2), we get
w(gt; η) = 1− (gt + r)η−1 + T +H(gt) (1.3)
It follows from (3) that for a given gt, voters prefer a politician with high η.
The utility of a politician leading a government with honesty parameter η is
given by
v(gt; η) = w(gt; η) +R + (gt + r)(1− η)η−1 (1.4)
where w(gt, η) is his utility as citizen, R is his utility from being in office,
and
(gt + r)(1− η)η−1 = (1− η)(xt + T ) (1.5)
are the rents he gets while in office. If the politician is not elected, his utility
9. This assumption is especially true in Colombia. There are three main reasons : (i)
the shared control that Liberals and Conservatives had of almost all the elected positions
and public offices for more than a century, (ii) the candidate selection mechanism employed
by these parties, usually based on the number and strength of the candidates’ connections
(see Pizarro, 2002, 2006), and (iii) their bureaucracy, usually composed of people from
their own party (or “family") (see Gutierrez and Ramirez, 2002). The assumption is also
consistent with the recognized correlation between the presence in power of politicians from
new parties and the presence in the region of interest groups other than those associated
with the traditional parties, mostly paramilitaries (see Gutierrez, 2007, Valencia, 2007,
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, 2010).
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simply coincides with the utility of voters.
The timing of the game is as follows :
1. The politician in power at time t = 1 chooses a policy g1 ∈ R+.
2. η is realized and observed by the politician, and the taxes xt are resi-
dually determined so as to satisfy the government budget constraint.
3. Voters observe x1, but neither η nor gt.
4. Elections take place, and each voter either supports the incumbent or
the contender. If the incumbent loses, an opponent is appointed with
an honesty parameter η′ drawn at random from a uniform distribution
between 1
ξ
− 1
2ψ′ and
1
ξ
+ 1
2ψ′ .
5. The politician in power at time t = 2 (the incumbent or a newly elected
politician) chooses a policy g2 ∈ R+. Payoffs are realized.
Two important assumptions here are that the politician does not know η when
setting policy in period 1, and that g1 is not directly observed by the voters.
A possible justification for the first one is that η could depend on the qualities
of the members of the government, or on demands from interest groups. It is
reasonable to assume that the incumbent does not have perfect information
about this. 10 With respect to the second assumption, voters may not know
exactly when the public goods are provided, or their final characteristics. 11
10. This assumption also simplifies the analysis, as there is no possibility of signaling.
This is also assumed in Holmstrom (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 4.5), Ashworth
(2005) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008).
11. In addition to these assumptions, to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium, it
must be that
κ(x) = −xH
′′(x)
H ′(x)
≥ 1 for all x ≥ 0 (1.6)
This assumption basically states that the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the voters
relative to the consumption of the public good is greater than 1. See more about this
assumption in Esteban and Ray (2001), who also introduce it.
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1.2.2 Analysis of the Model
As a solution concept I focus on a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
I proceed by backward induction. For details and derivations, I refer to the
Annex A. At t = 2, the politician in power solves a static problem : he
maximizes his utility (1.4) and chooses
g∗2 = H
′−1 (1) and x∗2 = η
−1 (H ′−1 (1) + r)− T (1.7)
I now move to period 1. The politician chooses spending without knowing η,
in order to maximize his two-period utility. At the time of the election, the
voters know x1 and make a conjecture about spending, denoted by g˜1. Hence,
using (1.1), they form an estimate of the incumbent’s honesty, η˜, given by
η˜ =
g˜1 + r
x1 + T
(1.8)
Note that g˜1 does not depend on η because voters know that spending is
chosen by the politician before observing η. In equilibrium, voters’ expecta-
tions are correct : g˜1 coincides with the actual spending level chosen by the
politician.
The voters’ behavior can be described as follows : from (1.3) and (1.7),
note that voters’ utility in the second period is increasing in η. Then, the
incumbent is re-elected only if his estimated honesty exceeds his opponent’s
11
expected honesty. 12 If his opponent’s honesty is η′, he is re-elected if
η˜ > E[η′] =
1
ξ
(1.9)
One can now compute the probability of winning the election as perceived
by the incumbent at the beginning of period 1. By assumption, he does not
yet know his own η. The incumbent sets g1, knowing that x1 is residually
determined from (1.1). Combining (1.1) with (1.8), (1.9) is equivalent to
η >
g1 + r
ξ(g˜1 + r)
(1.10)
From the point of view of the incumbent politician, the probability of winning
the election is the probability that this inequality is satisfied. Under the
assumption that the distribution of η is uniform, this probability is given by
Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ
)
=
1
2
+ ψ
(
1
ξ
− g1 + r
ξ(g˜1 + r)
)
(1.11)
The expression in (1.11) is crucial for the analysis : it shows that a variation
of g1 has a differential effect on the probability of incumbent reelection de-
pending on ψ. Specifically, it shows that the smaller ψ is, the more sensitive
this probability is to changes in g1.
At t = 1, given g˜1, a politician with an honesty parameter η solves the
12. Note that the fact that only the expected value of η (and not its variance) is what
matters when deciding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent (i.e., newness of the
parties does not directly influence voters’ decisions) explains why candidates from new
parties have a positive probability of being re-elected. A question that this model does not
address is why candidates from new parties are elected for the first time.
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problem
max
g1≥0
E[v(g1; η)] + Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ
)
E[v(g∗2; η)] +
(
1− Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ
))
E[w(g∗2; η
′)]
(1.12)
subject to (1.1), (1.7) and (1.11), where η′ is the honesty parameter of the
opponent.
It is clear from (1.11) and (1.12) that the politician faces the following
trade-off. He can choose a high level of spending, which implies high taxes
and large political rents but a lower probability of re-election and the corres-
ponding future political rents, through a decrease in voters’ perception of his
honesty. Alternatively, he can choose lower spending today, in the hope of
winning re-election and gaining larger future political rents. The solution to
this trade-off, and the corresponding equilibrium, is given by (1.12), where
the voters’ estimate of g1, g˜1 coincides with this solution. It is possible to
show (see proposition 1 below) that this solution is implicitly given by
H ′(g∗1)− 1−
(
R +
(
H ′−1 (1) + r
)
(ξ − 1))( ψ
ξ(g∗1 + r)
)
= 0 (1.13)
where we have used the equilibrium condition g˜1 = g∗1. It is easy to see in
(2.38) that H ′(g∗1)− 1 > 0, or equivalently, g∗1 < H ′−1 (1) = g∗2. This relation
shows how politicians solve the aforementioned trade-off : they will choose
lower levels of spending and taxes relative to what they would choose if their
political future was not an issue. This first result is stated in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. In the unique SPE equilibrium of the game described
above, spending in the first period is given by (2.38), and spending in the
second period is given by (1.7).
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Démonstration. See Annexe A.
The following corollary will be crucial in relating the size of government
chosen by the politician in the first period with his political party.
COROLLARY 1. A decrease in ψ increases the size of government chosen
by the politician in the first period.
Corollary 1 states that the information about the honesty of politicians
is crucial. The mechanism is the following : less precise information (lower
ψ) means that the actions of the politicians in power in period 1 are less
informative, which decreases the politician’s incentives to please the voters.
This results in greater levels of spending in period 1. 13 The important point
about this corollary is that it allows us to establish the impact of the presence
of a politician from a new party in power : given that, by Assumption 1, for
these politicians the information about their qualities is less precise, they
choose in the first period higher levels of spending and taxes relative to what
a politician from an old party would have chosen.
Since new parties often have anti-corruption platforms, readers may won-
der whether Corollary 1 still holds if we assume that politicians from new
parties are more honest on average (i.e., they have higher ξ). As shown in the
proof of Proposition 1, g∗1 in reality does not depend on the level of honesty
of the incumbent, ξ, but only that of the challenger. Thus, even if we assume
that politicians from new parties are ex ante more honest, 14 we would still
have that new parties spend more than old parties.
Related to this last point note that from equation (1.5) the level of rents
captured by politicians depends on η (a primitive of our analysis) and on
13. Note that since the politician (as well as the voters) does not know η when setting
policy in period 1, the result in Corollary 1 admits the interpretation of a politician
choosing greater levels of spending as insurance against non-reelection.
14. As I argue in Section 5.3., this seems to be the case for Colombia, at least relative
to the traditional forms of corruption.
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government’s size (which is determined in equilibrium). In particular, note
that if we assume that new and old parties mayors have the same ξ, the
model implies that new parties mayors would capture more rents since they
spend more. However, if new party mayors have a lower ξ, expected rents in
municipalities run by new party mayors might actually be lower. 15
In the rest of the chapter I test the prediction that in municipalities
governed by a new party, spending and taxes are higher than in municipalities
governed by an old party. In addition, I perform robustness checks to confirm
that the difference is due to the political party of the incumbent, and I try to
verify that this difference depends on the level of information that voters have
about their mayors, as stated by Corollary 1. I start with a description of
the context, and then I present the data, the specification and the empirical
results.
1.3 Context : Colombian Local Governments
The study of Colombian local governments is appealing for three main rea-
sons : their homogeneity relative to the institutional rules and prerogatives,
their high level of operational independence, and the existence of numerous
and heterogeneous new political parties successfully competing against two
well-defined traditional parties.
Colombian municipalities are the smallest and most fundamental admi-
nistrative units in the country. As of June 2012, there are 1,103 municipalities
15. To see this note that in equilibrium the expected rents captured by the incumbent
are given by (ξ−1)(g∗1+r), where g∗1 is given by (2.38). As shown in the proof of Proposition
1, in the strict sense, g∗1 is not a function of ξ, but of the average level of ex ante honesty
of the challenger. Thus if ξ is sufficient close to 1, i.e., if voters ex ante think that an
incumbent from a new party is sufficiently honest, then even if he spend more that a
incumbent from an old party, expected rents captured by new party governments can be
similar or even lower than those captured by old party governments.
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in Colombia. They are governed by a mayor, who is elected by popular vote
for a period of four years. 16 While immediate re-election is not possible, offi-
cials usually run for re-election in the same post in the future, or for election
to other posts in later years. 17 Thus, I expect that the model in Section 2 is
a good approximation of policy making by Colombian mayors. 18 At the time
of the mayoral election, voters also elect a local council, whose function is to
approve some of the mayor’s proposals, including the city’s budget. Several
commentators have argued that councils have now a limited role in Colom-
bia and that mayors can easily pass their proposals. 19 The rules that govern
elections and the duties of these elected officials are set in national law and
apply uniformly across all municipalities.
Colombian local governments are characterized by a relatively high level
of operational independence. This independence is the result of a process of
economic decentralization, which started in the late ’80s, reached its peak
with the 1991 constitutional reform and was completed in the late ’90s. This
process can be divided in two stages : first, a stage of restructuring of tax
structures, which allowed municipalities to define tariff rates and exemp-
tion mechanisms (see Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner, 2002, Faguet and
16. Mayors were elected initially for a period of two years (from 1988 to 1993), subse-
quently increased to three (from 1994 to 1997) and, since 2004, to four-year terms.
17. According to my calculations, more than 30% of the mayors elected for the period
1997-2000 run for reelection in same post for the periods 2003-2007 or 2007-2011, and
this percentage is certainty much higher if we include other posts (as municipal councils,
department or provincial assemblies, governorships, and seats in the Congress).
18. See Moreno and Escobar-Lemmon (2008) for evidence of individualistic career
concerns in Colombia during the period 1958-2002. See Drazen and Eslava (2010) for
a re-election concerns model used to explain the existence of political budget cycles in
Colombian municipalities.
19. According to Transparencia por Colombia, Transparency International’s chapter in
Colombia, the mayor is almost the only focus of attention of voters, and the only source
of local political leadership (see Transparencia por Colombia, 2007). A similar thesis is
defended by Gutierrez (2010).
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Sanchez, 2008, 2009), 20 and second, a stage of expansion of the responsi-
bilities assigned to municipalities regarding the provision of public services
and social investment, made possible by an increase in transfers from the
central government to municipalities (see Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner,
2002, Faguet and Sanchez, 2008, 2009). 21 The aggregate effect of these fiscal
reforms was a large increase in the political authority and operational inde-
pendence of municipal governments, which was accompanied by a huge rise in
the resources they controlled. In the period considered in this chapter (1997-
2011), Colombian municipalities funded their expenditures (investment and
current spending) partly with resources collected by the central government
and transferred to them and with royalties from the extraction of natural re-
sources (around 60% of municipalities’ revenues) and partly with local taxes
(around 40% of municipalities’ revenues). The largest municipalities are allo-
wed to run deficits, although this is heavily controlled by central authorities.
Municipalities are completely autonomous in how to use revenues from local
taxes, and in how to spend an important percentage of resources transferred
from the central government.
The third and most interesting feature of Colombian local politics is the
existence of a large quantity of ephemeral and very successful new politi-
20. Today, Colombian municipalities are autonomous in defining and collecting five types
of taxes : industry, commerce and advertising tax, unified property tax, tax on automotive
vehicles, urban demarcation tax and surplus value tax. Additionally, they can collect a
surcharge on gasoline (see DNP-DDTS, 2005). Although there are limits defined by law,
municipalities have significant flexibility in setting tax rates.
21. Part of these resources is earmarked by the central government to be spent on edu-
cation and health. The determination of the transferred funds and the percentage earmar-
ked is complex, and involves two different sources : (i) “municipal participation", which
uses municipal population adjusted for poverty level, unmet basic needs, own-source fiscal
contribution and administrative efficiency indicators ; and (ii) “situado fiscal", based partly
on equal allocations to all departments and municipalities and partly on a per capita for-
mula. At least the 20% of these resources can be freely allocated by municipalities (see
Echavarria, Renteria, and Steiner, 2002).
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cal parties competing against two very old and powerful traditional parties.
This phenomenon has been explained as the result of two reforms that oc-
curred simultaneously to the process of economic decentralization described
in the previous paragraph : the introduction of direct popular election for
mayors, and an important reduction to the costs of creating new parties. 22
With respect to the first reform, since mayors were previously appointed and
dismissed by the president, popular elections made local politicians less de-
pendent on traditional parties (see Duque, 2006; Gutierrez, 2007; Dargent
and Munoz, 2011). The second reform allowed different kinds of associations
or movements, and even independent candidates, to participate in elections
and receive partial public funding (see Pizarro, 2006; Duque, 2006, 2010;
Gutierrez, 2007; Rubio, 2010; Dargent and Munoz, 2011).
The Colombian party system is one of the oldest and most institutio-
nalized in Latin America (see Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). It has been
dominated by two parties, the Liberal and Conservative parties, funded in
1848 and 1849 respectively, and which maintained the monopoly of power at
all levels of government for more than a century. As as example of this, in
1958, as a mechanism to end the partisan violence that ravaged the country
for more than a decade, Liberals and Conservatives signed a pact, known
as the National Front, which guaranteed equal shares of elected positions
and public officers for four presidential terms. Although this pact expired in
22. According to the law applicable to the period studied (Article 108 of the 1991 Consti-
tution and Article 3 of Law of 1994), Colombian political actors are defined as those parties,
political movements, social movements, or significant groups of citizens able to participate
in elections through endorsement, the creation of a party or movement recognized by
the National Electoral Council, or payment of a registration fee. The National Electoral
Council grants legal status to those political parties or movements that can prove their
existence with at least 50,000 signatures, or that obtained at least this same number of
votes in the last elections, or that attained representation in the National Congress. This
new legislation has been accused of being particularly responsible for having “opened the
floodgates" for new political forces (see Pizarro (2006))
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1974, some authors have argued that it had important consequences for the
current Colombian political system and its party structure. First, it allowed
traditional parties to enhance their bases of support and to exclude local
independent politicians (see Archer and Shugart, 1997; Pizarro, 1997; Beja-
rano and Pizarro, 2005; Gutierrez, 2007; Dargent and Munoz, 2011). Second,
it weakened inter-party competition and encouraged intra-party competition
and regional factionalism, which made irrelevant, at least at the local level,
the classic left-versus-right conflict (see Boudon, 2000; Pizarro, 2002, 2006;
Gutierrez, 2002; Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005; Roland and Zapata, 2005; Bo-
tero, Losada, and Wills, 2011).
It was in this context that the reforms mentioned before were implemen-
ted. The popular elections for local authorities, the reduction of the costs
of creating new parties, the greater operational independence of the munici-
palities and a party system with high levels of intra-party competition were
accompanied by a spectacular increase in political competition. Relatively
small parties and movements constituted credible third-party options. This
change did not imply, however, a complete collapse of the traditional party
system : the Liberals and Conservatives continued winning an important
percentage of the posts at all levels of government (more than the 50% for
the period studied), and their collective reputation did not change dramati-
cally (see Garcia, 2000; Gutierrez, 2002; Pachón, 2002; Hoyos, 2007). What
did seem to happen instead was that new and independent people were able
to run in elections, and politicians belonging to the traditional parties but
ranking low in their national hierarchies decided to become independent can-
didates under new party labels (see Taylor, 1995; Gutierrez and Davila, 2000;
Giraldo, 2003; Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005; Gutierrez, 2006a, 2007). 23
23. There is a debate about the true level of independence of the politicians that belonged
to a traditional party and then run under different party labels. In this respect I agree with
Gutierrez and Ramirez (2004) when they say that these politicians all shared a “very diffuse
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One important consequence of this rapid transformation of the party sys-
tem is that the traditional party labels lost their (already weak) ideological
content (see Pizarro, 2002; Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005, Roland and Zapata,
2005; Duque, 2006; Gutierrez, 2007). Additionally, in part as a consequence
of a series of corruption scandals affecting prominent figures of the tradi-
tional parties (see Gutierrez and Ramirez, 2004; Gutierrez, 2006b, 2007),
the qualities of the politicians, already one of the main concern of voters,
started to be associated with the distinction between traditional and new
parties. While politicians running under new party labels emphasized their
independence from the traditional (and corrupt) bureaucratic structures (see
Gutierrez, 2003; Gutierrez and Ramirez, 2004; Gutierrez, 2006b, 2007), poli-
ticians running under traditional party labels emphasized their connections
and experience in past (and, in some cases, honest) governments (see Gutier-
rez, 2003, 2006a, 2007; Pizarro, 2006). This does not imply that politicians
running under traditional party labels were always associated with corrupt
governments (although it was often the case), and politicians from new par-
ties were a priori considered as honest. However, as stated in Section 2, what
seems to be clear is that while traditional party labels provided relatively re-
liable information about this quality (given the well known reputation of their
past governments), new party labels, insofar as they informed only about the
independence of the candidates from the traditional structures, did not.
identity [...] a sense of independence, and access to resources independent of the centre of
the party, all of which distances them from the traditional world of party dissidents" (see
Gutierrez and Ramirez, 2004, p. 237 ; see also Gutierrez and Davila, 2000).
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1.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Data
The analysis uses data on fiscal and electoral outcomes in Colombian
municipalities. The electoral outcomes were obtained from the Colombian
Electoral Agency and correspond to the period 1997 to 2007. I focus on
mayoral elections. Four sets of elections took place during this period, in 1997,
2000, 2003 and 2007. Although mayoral elections were first implemented in
Colombia in 1988, 24 the electoral data covering the period from 1988 to
1997 has important limitations : for instance, it is not possible to identify,
for an important number of municipalities, 25 the candidates participating in
each election, their political party, and the number or percentage of votes
that each candidate obtained. This is why my analysis starts in 1997. This,
however, does not imply a significant loss : the participation and success of
non-traditional parties is not very prevalent before the 1997 election. 26
For every municipality and election year (between 1997 and 2007) for
which there is available data, I compiled the number of votes received by each
candidate and the name of the political party or movement each candidate
belongs to. In total, I have data for 3,892 elections. I then identified the
elections in which a candidate from a new party won and a candidate from
a traditional party placed second, and those in which a candidate from a
new party placed second and a candidate from a traditional party won. This
24. Since then, nine elections have taken place : 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003,
2007 and 2011.
25. The complete information is available only for the capitals of the departments and
“Ciudades Zonificadas" (with borough mayors), which represent less than the 10% of mu-
nicipalities.
26. According to my calculations, for the elections occurred between 1988 and 1994, only
17 parties other than the two traditional parties won at least once in any municipality.
These victories constituted the 15% of all the elections that occurred during this period.
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happened in 1,608 elections, which corresponds to 41.3% of elections. It is on
these elections that I focus the analysis. 27
It is important to discuss the criterium that I use to distinguish new from
traditional parties. Although not very homogeneous internally, 28 the Liberals
and Conservatives have relatively solid and unitary structures, and are affi-
liated with bureaucracies and interest groups that are relatively well-known
to voters. I classify these two parties as old. 29 New parties are numerous
and successful. In the 1997-2007 period, at least 240 different non-traditional
parties participated in elections in at least one municipality (and ended 1st
or 2nd), and at least 164 new parties won at least one election. New parties
won 1,456 elections, which amounts to 37% of the total number of elections.
Additionally, the origin of these parties is very diverse, with 170 being local
political movements (participating in only one municipality). Among the new
parties, it is not possible to identify a party that was much more successful
than the others. No party won more than 10% of the elections won by new
parties ; 13 different parties have won between the 1% and 10%. 30 These
27. In the rest of the elections, the first two positions were occupied either by two
candidates from old parties (33.8%) or by two candidates from new parties (17.3%). There
were also elections with only one candidate participated (2.3%), or where at least one of
the first two positions was occupied by a candidate from a coalition formed by new and
old parties (5.3%).
28. During the period I focus on, the Conservative party had some known factions,
which were recognized as its constituent parts. Following Roll (2002), Pachón (2002) and
Hoyos (2007) (who got the information directly from the Conservative party registers), the
political movements that I classified as factions are : Movimiento Humbertista, Conserva-
tismo Independiente, Movimiento de Salvacion Nacional, Movimiento Nacional Conserva-
dor, Movimiento Fuerza Progresista, Nueva Fuerza Democratica, Movimiento Unionista,
Movimiento Progresismo Democratico, Vamos Colombia. In addition to this list of fac-
tions, I classified as factions all the coalitions between these factions and the Conservative
party.
29. There are also cases of coalitions that include one of the two old parties and one
or more new parties. Since for these cases I cannot identify clearly whether they are new
or old parties, I eliminate these observations, which account for about 5.3% of all the
observations.
30. As previously noted, new parties victories in municipal elections have been conti-
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parties also have no experience in government, confirming that their classi-
fication as new is appropriate. In the 1997-2007 period, around 11% of the
non-traditional parties (that ended 1st or 2nd) had won before in the same
municipality, representing around 10% of the elections which a candidate
from a new party and a candidate from a traditional party placed first and
second. Since it is difficult to say whether these experienced non-traditional
parties are new to voters, I eliminate observations with one of them winning
or finishing second. The results are, however, robust to their inclusion.
To summarize, throughout my study I define a party participating in a
given municipal election as new if it is not one of the two traditional parties
and if the party has never won an election in that municipality.
I merge this electoral data with municipal-level public finance variables.
In particular, I focus on capital expenditure (investment) and local taxes.
Detailed data is available starting in 1993 from the Colombian National
Planning Department (DNP). 31 This data corresponds with the figures in
the financial report each municipality files annually with local and national
agencies tasked with monitoring public finances (Contralorias Municipales
and Contraloria General de la Republica). This data is available at some
relevant disaggregated level. For this study, it is relevant to know that to-
tal spending is divided into two categories : current expenditure, composed
mainly of purchases of supplies and payments of salaries to government em-
ployees, and capital expenditure, which corresponds to investment in urban
nuously increasing. Although for the period studied no new party won more elections than
any of the two traditional parties, this situation changed in the last election (the 2011
election, not included in the sample because the data for public finances has not been pro-
duced yet). In this election, and for the fist time in history, a new party (the Partido de la
U ) won the majority of municipal elections (24% versus 18% and 16% for the traditional
parties).
31. This data is available for the period 1993-2011 ; it can be consulted here
http://www.dnp.gov.co/Programas/DesarrolloTerritorial/FinanzasP%C3%
BAblicasTerritoriales/EjecucionesPresupuestales.aspx
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infrastructure, education, health and housing projects. In the 1997-2011 per-
iod, current expenditure and capital expenditure corresponded to 19% and
81% of the total spending, respectively. Total revenue is divided into current
and capital revenue, corresponding to 41% and 59% of the total, respecti-
vely. Within the category of current revenue, local taxes correspond to the
75% of the total. 32 Capital revenue is mainly composed of transfers from
the central government (74%) and royalties from the extraction of natural
resources (20%). 33 I express all variables in thousands of 2008 pesos, and use
the CPI as deflator. 34 I use the information corresponding to the terms in
which the mayors were in office 35 and compute the averages over these terms.
In case of missing values, I use only the information available to calculate
the average. 36 Moreover, I do not use information for municipalities that do
not report total spending.
Finally, the sources of other variables used as controls and to examine
whether the sample is balanced are listed in the note to Table 1.1.
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy and Identification
I use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study the impact of new
parties on policy outcomes in Colombia’s municipal mayor elections. This
design addresses the potential endogeneity between new party mayors and
32. The other part includes charges for services provided by the municipality, and fines.
33. A small part of the capital revenue (6%) comes from donations, gains on sale of
municipal property, and municipal enterprises’ profits.
34. The CPI is provided by the Colombian National Administrative Department of Sta-
tistics.
35. That is, 1998-2000 for the mayors elected in 1997, 2001-2003 for the mayors elected
in 2000, 2004-2007 for the mayors elected in 2003, and 2008-2011 for the mayors elected
in 2007.
36. For example, if for some municipality, for the 1997-2000 period, I only have infor-
mation for 2000, I use this value as the average of this period. If I do not have information
for any year during this period, I eliminate the observation.
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policy outcomes. Regression discontinuity design relies on the existence of a
dichotomous treatment variable that is a deterministic function of a single
continuous covariate. If individuals pass some threshold level of the variable,
they are assigned to the treatment group ; otherwise, they are assigned to
the control group. Elections are an ideal situation for its use because can-
didates are only elected if their margin of victory (for example between the
candidates who got the two highest number of votes) passes the zero thre-
shold. I compare municipalities in which a politician from a new party barely
defeats a politician from a traditional party, to those municipalities where
a politician from a new party barely lost. If the final vote share includes a
continuous density, then the results of a closely contested election can be ta-
ken as random. Then, the comparison of these municipalities with respect to
a particular outcome measures the causal effect of the presence of a politician
from a new party on this outcome.
I implement the RDD strategy by restricting the sample to the elections
where one of the first- and second-place candidates is from a new party, and
the other is from an old party.
As in the standard literature on RDD (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008,
Lee and Lemieux, 2010, Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009, 2011), I consider the
following model :
Sm,t = β0 + β1Nwinm,t + P (margvicm,t ∗ β) + βXXm,t + m,t (1.14)
where Sm,t is the policy outcome of interest in municipality m in the term
immediately following election t, Nwinm,t is a dummy that takes on a value
of one if a candidate from a new party won the mayoral race in election
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t in municipality m, P (·) is a kth-order polynomial in the vote share, 37
margvicm,t is the margin of victory in election t in municipality c, defined
as the difference between the percentage of votes received by the winner and
the percentage of votes received by the second-place candidate, 38 β are the
respective vote-share coefficients, and m,t is the stochastic error term. Some
specifications also include Xm,t, a set of controls including city population
and year and region fixed effects, which are not necessary for identification,
but their inclusion improve the precision of the estimates.
Identification requires that all relevant factors other than treatment vary
smoothly at the threshold between a new party victory and a new party loss.
That is, letting S1 and S0 denote potential outcomes under a new party vic-
tory and new party loss, respectively, andmargvic denote the new party mar-
gin of victory, identification requires that E[S1|margvic] and E[S0|margvic]
are continuous at the new party win-loss threshold. This assumption is nee-
ded for municipalities where a new party barely wins to be an appropriate
counterfactual for municipalities where a new party barely loses.
37. As in standard literature, if k=3, P (·) has the form :
P (margvicm,t ∗ β) = βm,teta2margvicm,t + β3margvic2m,t + β4margvic3m,t
+β5margvicm,t ∗Nwinm,t + β6margvic2m,t ∗Nwinm,t + β7margvic3m,t ∗Nwinm,t
I consider different values of k, which correspond to different bandwidths (see Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
38. As in Ferreira and Gyourko (2009, 2011), I use margin of victory instead of vote
share in order to facilitate comparison across elections, as in general there are more than
two candidates in each election.
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Table 1.1: Baseline characteristics
5% vote spread T-stat on SE on
New party New party means RD RD
won lost difference estimate estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public finance
Log total expenditure per capita (t-1) -2.171 -2.301 1.069 0.031 0.096
Log current expenditure per capita (t-1) -3.511 -3.632 1.235 0.115 0.110
Log capital expenditure per capita (t-1) -2.512 -2.667 1.106 0.010 0.120
Log total revenue per capita (t-1) -2.172 -2.281 0.932 0.012 0.110
Log tax revenue per capita (t-1) -4.857 -5.014 0.995 0.219 0.189
Log capital revenue per capita (t-1) -2.558 -2.460 -0.591 -0.044 0.198
Total decit per capita (t-1) 0.005 0.002 0.504 0.010 0.009
Election charactersitics
Year of the election 2003.759 2003.716 0.119 -0.000 0.000
New party incumbent 0.342 0.295 0.906 0.071 0.106
Liberal party incumbent 0.342 0.392 -0.949 -0.142 0.108
# candidates 4.146 4.091 0.256 -0.155 0.476
Demographic characteristics
Population (t-1) 33883.032 36004.139 -0.163 29806.248 21190.385
% urban/rural (t-1) 1.874 2.112 -0.456 1.160 1.112
Population density (t-1) 115.155 105.511 0.287 132.142 101.929
Economic characteristics
% unsatisfied basic needs (1993-2005) 48.825 49.547 -0.320 1.572 6.207
Institutional characteristics
Total courts (1997) 3.150 3.267 -0.102 2.700 2.051
Total bank branches (1997) 1.692 1.873 -0.301 1.108 1.003
otal hospitals (1997) 0.842 0.896 -0.193 0.510 0.472
Total schools (1997) 10.938 12.628 -0.426 7.017 6.860
Total community organizations (1997) 150.686 139.178 0.413 88.362 60.686
Conflict and Crime
Annual homicide rate per 10000 inhab. (t-1) 0.535 0.517 0.312 0.041 0.105
Forced displaced rate per 10000 inhab. (t-1) 2.609 2.533 0.160 1.624 1.015
Presence of Guerrilla (t-1) 0.551 0.534 0.302 0.107 0.109
Presence of Paramilitares (t-1) 0.304 0.290 0.279 -0.027 0.100
Geographic characteristics
Surface area km2 694.748 1053.526 -1.687 -472.120 468.163
% municipalities in the atlantic coast 0.171 0.199 -0.655 -0.114 0.075
% municipalities in the pacific coast 0.165 0.125 1.027 0.063 0.111
% municipalities in the central region 0.139 0.205 -1.574 0.086 0.087
% municipalities in the eastern region 0.361 0.335 0.488 -0.054 0.106
% municipalities in the amazon region 0.038 0.040 -0.085 -0.016 0.047
% municipalities in Antioquia 0.120 0.097 0.695 0.025 0.040
Notes : Data on municipal public finance are from the National Planning Department (DNP). Electoral
data are from the Electoral Agency. Data on population, proportion of urban to rural population, population
density and proportion of people with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (used as a proxy for poverty) are from the
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Data on the number of courts, bank branches,
hospitals, schools and community organization are from a non-profit civil foundation, the Social Foundation
(Fundacion Social). Data on homicides are from the National Police and data on conflict are from the Conflict
Analysis Resource Center (CERAC). Data on forced migrant households are from the Presidential Agency
for Social Action (Accion Social). Data on surface area are from the Colombian Federation of Municipalities.
Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between municipalities where a new party won
and where it barely lost. Column (4) reports the coefficient on new party win (Nwin) from equation (1.14)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and column (5) reports the RD standard
errors.
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To assess the plausibility of this assumption, Table 1.1 compares muni-
cipal spending, revenue, transfers, deficit, political, economic, demographic,
institutional, geographic and crime and conflict characteristics in municipa-
lities where a new party barely lost to those in municipalities where it barely
won. Size-of-government characteristics include all the components of spen-
ding, revenue and deficit in the term before the new party mayor was in office.
As political characteristics, I consider dummies for the party of the mayoral
incumbent and the number of candidates. Demographic characteristics are
population, the proportion of urban to rural population and population den-
sity. Economic characteristics include the percentage of the population with
unsatisfied basic needs and institutional characteristics are the total number
of courts, bank branches, hospitals and schools. Geographic characteristics
are the percentage of municipalities belonging to the main Colombian geo-
graphic zones. Sources for these variables are listed in the note to Table 1.1.
Column (1) of Table 1.1 reports the mean value for each variable in mu-
nicipalities where a new party barely won, column (2) does the same for
municipalities where a new party barely lost, and column (3) reports the
t-statistics on the difference in means. The sample is limited to elections
with a vote spread between the winner and the runner-up of five percentage
points or less. In no case is there a statistically significant difference between
municipalities where a new party lost and municipalities where a new party
won. Moreover, I run the local linear regression specification using each of
the baseline characteristics as the dependent variable. The coefficient Nwin
is reported in column (4) and the standard errors are reported in column
(5). In no case are the coefficients„ estimated by local linear regression sta-
tistically different from zero. Overall, this evidence strongly suggests that
municipalities where a new party barely loses are a valid control group for
municipalities where they barely win.
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Finally, identification also requires the absence of selective sorting around
the new party win-loss threshold, i.e., that the results of a closely contested
election can be taken as random. Visual inspection of the density function
of the margin of victory (Figure 1.1) suggests that there is no discontinuity
of the function at the threshold. A more formal test is given by McCrary’s
test (see McCrary, 2008). With a log difference in the height of the density
function at the threshold equal to -0.128, and an standard error of 0.101 (see
Figure 1.2), I confirm that there is no discontinuity in the density at the
normalized threshold.
Figure 1.1: Density function of the margin of victory
Notes : Density function of the margin of victory between new and old party candidates
(bin width = 5%).
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Figure 1.2: McCrary’s test
Notes : Finely-gridded histogram smoothed using local linear regression, separately on
either side of the cutoff of the density function of the margin of victory between new and
old party candidates (McCrary, 2008)
1.5 Results
Panels (a)-(d) in Figure 1.3 plot capital expenditure (investment) and
current expenditure against the margin of victory for the new party. A ne-
gative margin indicates a new party loss. Each dark point represents the
average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width 0.25. The solid
line plots predicted values from a local linear regression, with separate vote
spread trends estimated on either side of the new party win-loss threshold.
The bandwidth is chosen using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selec-
tion rule (see Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009). The dependent variables in
panels (a) and (c) are the values in the term before the mayor is in office. 39
39. For all variables I compute the logarithm of the per capita values.
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The dependent variables in panels (b) and (d) are the values in the term
during which the mayor is in office. Panel (b) shows that during the term of
office there is a marked discontinuity at the threshold between a new party
loss and a new party victory. Per capita investment is higher in municipalities
governed by new party mayors than in those governed by a mayor from an
old party. As will be shown below, the difference is statistically significative.
For current spending (panel (d)), the effect is less clear. Panels (a) and (c)
show that in the period before the mayor was in office, the values were si-
milar (or statistically insignificant different) in municipalities where the new
party barely won as compared to those where they barely lost, supporting
the plausible exogeneity of close elections.
Figure 1.3: Close new parties victories and spending
(a) (b)
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(c) (d)
Notes : This figure plots municipal public finances against the new party margin of
victory, with a negative margin indicating a new party loss. The solid line plots predicted
values from a local linear regression, with separate vote spread trends estimated on
either side of the new party win-loss threshold. The bandwidth is chosen using the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009), as
implemented in the Stata ado file named rdob.ado (available on Imbens’ website).
This graphical analysis shows that capital spending is higher in munici-
palities governed by mayors from new parties. I examine this result in more
detail by reporting the estimates given by equation (1.14) in Table 1.2. Co-
lumns (1) and (2) report estimates when a linear functional form is used for
the RD polynomial, for the entire sample, with and without controls. Besides
capital and current spending, I also include total spending. My estimate in-
dicates that in municipalities where a new party mayor takes office, capital
spending (investment) is around 10 percentage points higher than in muni-
cipalities where the mayor is from an old party. Total spending is also higher
(around 8 percentage points), and current spending, although with a positive
sign, is not statistically significant.
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Linear regressions will not necessarily provide an unbiased estimate of the
magnitude of the discontinuity if the true underlying functional form is not
linear. Columns (3) through (8) explore robustness to specifying the RD using
a variety of functional forms. These columns estimate the specification using
quadratic, cubic and quartic RD polynomials, respectively. I observe that for
investment the impact is robust to all the specifications, with the coefficients
statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level. For total spending I
also find that all the coefficients are statistically significant (at either the 5%
or 10% level), and for current spending are all statistically insignificant. For
total and capital expenditure the coefficients tend to increase somewhat in
magnitude when higher order polynomials are used.
Although Table 1.2 provides robust evidence that public spending is hi-
gher when a new party is in power, it does not guarantee that the difference
reflects local governments’ decisions. Municipal expenditures are partly fun-
ded with resources collected by the central government and transferred to
local governments, and by royalties from the extraction of natural resources
(mainly oil, gas, and coal). Thus, it is possible that the observed difference in
spending depends on these resources, over which local politicians do not have
any control. To verify that higher spending by a new party government is
mainly due to local politicians’ decisions, I examine how the main sources of
funds of municipalities (local taxes, central government transfers and royal-
ties) are affected by the presence of a mayor from a new party. I present the
results in panels (b) and (d) of Figure 1.4 and in Panel A of Table 1.3. Panel
(b) of Figure 1.4 shows that local taxes are higher when a mayor from a new
party is in office ; for capital revenue I do not observe any significant disconti-
nuity. Panel A of Table 1.3 verifies this graphical evidence by using the same
specification as in Table 1.2. It also includes total revenue. We observe that
local taxes of which the mayor is directly responsible are around 30% higher
34
when a new party is in power, with a corresponding (but less statistically
significant) increase in total revenue. In contrast, the estimated coefficients
for capital revenue are small and statistically insignificant.
Figure 1.4: Close new parties victories and revenue
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes : This figure plots municipal public finances against the new party margin of
victory, with a negative margin indicating a new party loss. The solid line plots predicted
values from a local linear regression, with separate vote spread trends estimated on
either side of the new party win-loss threshold. The bandwidth is chosen using the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009), as
implemented in the Stata ado file named rdob.ado (available on Imbens’ website).
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Finally, I examine the possibility that new parties run higher deficits.
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that the deficit of the municipalities is not affected
by the presence of a new party in power (the estimated coefficients are all
small and statistically insignificant). This is possibly due to the fact that
Colombian local politicians face strong external constraints on debt issuance.
Thus, I conclude that local taxes are the main source of funding for the higher
spending, and that municipalities governed by new parties are responsible for
this difference.
1.5.1 Additional Measures of Party Newness
Although all the political organizations that I classify as new have not won
before in the respective municipality, some of them have participated before
in a municipality’s previous elections, or in elections in another municipality.
It is reasonable to expect that voters have more information about the mem-
bers of these new parties. As a result, I expect the mayors of new parties
that have participated in previous elections to spend less when compared to
mayors from new parties that have just entered the political competition.
To test this prediction, in this section I introduce four additional mea-
sures of party newness, all related to the participation of new parties in past
elections. The first measure is a dummy variable equal to one if the new party
has never participated before in the same municipality. The second measure
is a dummy variable equal to one if the new party has never participated
before in any municipality. The third and fourth are variables that measure
the number of years since the first participation of the party in the same and
any municipality. 40
40. For elections between 1988 and 1994, the data does not allow for the identification
of all participating parties. However, as I argued in Section 4.1, this does not imply a
significant loss, since the participation and success of non-traditional parties were not
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Tables 1.4-1.7 report estimates on the size of government of these four
measures of past participation. The dependent variable in all columns is
capital spending. For comparison purposes, columns (1), (3) and (5) of all
Tables report the baseline RD regression result from columns (1), (3) and
(5) of Table 1.2. Column (2) of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 examines the effect of
the first two measures, the dummy variables that distinguish between mu-
nicipalities with close elections where a new party has never participated
before in the same or any election and a new party with at least one parti-
cipation in the past. New parties that have never participated before in any
municipality are present in around 56% of the elections where new and old
parties received the two highest vote shares, and new parties that have ne-
ver participated before in the same municipality but that have participated
before in other municipalities are present in around 38% of the same kind
of elections. The specification includes the same terms as the baseline RD
specification in equation (1.14), but now also interacts Nwin, margic, and
margvic×Nwin with the first participation dummies. Columns (4) and (6)
examine the robustness of the result using a variety of functional forms. As
expected, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically
significant at either the 5% or 10% level in almost all specifications. Addi-
tionally, the estimates indicate that the effect of close new party victories on
capital spending is large for parties that have never participated before in
any election in the same municipality, and extremely large for parties that
have never participated before in any election in any municipality.
significant before the 1997 elections.
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Table 1.4: Effect of first participation in same municipality
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New party win 0.114∗∗∗ -0.107 0.141∗∗∗ -0.111 0.159∗∗∗ -0.220
(0.033) (0.093) (0.044) (0.109) (0.058) (0.161)
Nwin × dummy 1st participation 0.233∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.102) (0.120) (0.169)
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.829
Observations 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501
First participation effect 0.127∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.047) (0.061)
Notes : The dependent variable in all columns is capital spending. New party win is a dummy equal to one
if a new party candidate won the election (Nwin). First participation is a dummy equal to one if the new
party participated for the first time in any election occurred in the same municipality. Columns (1), (3)
and (5) report the baseline RD regression result from columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 1.2. Columns (2),
(4) and (6) include interactions between the margin of victory terms and the first participation dummy.
All columns included fixed effects for department and year, as well as baseline controls. Robust standard
errors clustered by year×department are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at
5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 1.5: Effect of first participation in any municipality
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New party win 0.114∗∗∗ 0.026 0.141∗∗∗ 0.072 0.159∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.033) (0.039) (0.045) (0.049) (0.058) (0.063)
Nwin × dummy 1st participation 0.160∗∗∗ 0.142∗ 0.167
(0.059) (0.078) (0.102)
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.830 0.828 0.831
Observations 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501
Notes : The dependent variable in all columns is capital spending. New party win is a dummy equal to
one if a new party candidate won the election (Nwin). First participation is a dummy equal to one if the
new party participated for the first time in any election. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the baseline RD
regression result from columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 1.2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include interactions
between the margin of victory terms and the first participation dummy. All columns included fixed effects
for department and year, as well as baseline controls. Robust standard errors clustered by year×department
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 1.6: Effect of years since first participation in same munici-
pality
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New party win 0.114∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.059)
Nwin × years since 1st partic -0.057∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.035)
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.829
Observations 1501 1496 1501 1496 1501 1496
Notes : The dependent variable in all columns is capital spending. New party win is a dummy equal
to one if a new party candidate won the election (Nwin). Years since first participation is a continuous
variable measuring the number of years since the first participation of the new party in any election
occurred in the same municipality. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the baseline RD regression result
from columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 1.2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include interactions between
the margin of victory terms and the years since the first participation variable. All columns included
fixed effects for department and year, as well as baseline controls. Robust standard errors clustered by
year×department are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%.
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Table 1.7: Effect of years since first participation in any munici-
pality
Linear Quadratic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New party win 0.114∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.044) (0.043) (0.058) (0.055)
Nwin × years since 1st partic -0.025∗∗∗ -0.016∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.828 0.830 0.828 0.831
Observations 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501 1501
Notes : The dependent variable in all columns is capital spending. New party win is a dummy equal
to one if a new party candidate won the election (Nwin). Years since first participation is a continuous
variable measuring the number of years since the first participation of the new party in any election.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the baseline RD regression result from columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table
1.2. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include interactions between the margin of victory terms and the years
since the first participation variable. All columns included fixed effects for department and year, as well
as baseline controls. Robust standard errors clustered by year×department are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 examine the effect of the second and third measures,
the number of years since the first participation of the new party in the
same and in any municipality. For the elections where new and old parties
received the two highest vote shares, the average age of the new parties is 2.9
years. The specification is the same as in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, but instead of
a participation dummy variable, it interacts Nwin, margic, and margvic×
Nwin with the years-since-last-participation variable. The estimates are also
as expected. The coefficient of the interaction term has the expected sign
(negative) and is statistically significant at either the 5% or 10% level in
all specifications. Thus, a given increase in the newness of the party yields
more public spending when a new party is in power. If more years since the
first participation implies that the party is better known by the voters, then
this finding provides additional evidence on the plausibility of the hypothesis
proposed in Section 2.
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1.5.2 New Parties and Municipal Transparency
In this section I use data on municipal transparency to analyze whether
there are significant differences between municipalities governed by mayors
from traditional and new parties. As a measure of transparency, I use the
Municipal Transparency Index (MTI), constructed by Transparencia por Co-
lombia, the local chapter of Transparency International. This index evaluates
whether the actions taken by the municipal authorities improved the access to
information by voters, the efficacy of punishment for the faults of public ser-
vants, and the controls established in order to pursue the municipal goals. 41
The index ranges from 1 to 100, with greater values indicating greater levels
of transparency. Table 1.8 reports the estimated effect of having a mayor
from a new party on this measure of municipal transparency. The dependent
variable in all columns is the MTI, and the specification includes the same
terms as the baseline specification in equation (1.14). The estimated effect is
not significant at either, 5% or 1% level, in all specifications.
Since we expect mayors extracting higher rents to have weaker incentives
to be transparent, the MTI index can be thought of as a proxy of political
rents. According to this interpretation, my empirical analysis suggests that
on average new party mayors do not extract higher rents. As discussed at
the end of Section 2, this finding is coherent with the model if we assume
that ξ for new party mayors is lower. This seems to be a reasonable as-
sumption. As noted in Section 3, new parties were created as a response to
a series of corruption scandals affecting prominent figures of the traditional
41. The data and a more detailed description of this index (in spanish Indice the Trans-
parencia Municipal (ITM)) can be consulted at http://www.transparenciacolombia.
org.co/. This measure has an important limitation : it only exists for a limited number
of municipalities. For the periods 2004-2007 and 2008-2011 there is data for 254 and 148
municipalities, respectively. Thus, the empirical results in this section should be taken
with some caution.
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Table 1.8: Close new party election and municipal transparency
index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transparency Index 3.074 4.528∗ -0.774 -0.366 1.386 2.091
(2.961) (2.397) (3.197) (2.817) (3.608) (3.034)
R-squared 0.305 0.429 0.326 0.451 0.332 0.455
Observations 216 215 216 215 216 215
Covariates no yes no yes no yes
Polynomial linear linear quadratic quadratic cubic cubic
Notes : All columns report the coefficient on new party win (Nwin) from equation (1.14)
when the Municipal Transparency Index (MTI) is used as the dependent variable. All co-
lumns included fixed effects for department and year. Robust standard errors clustered by
year×department are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
parties. Gutierrez (2007, p. 404) shows for instance how in the nineties these
corruption scandals reached unprecedented levels, and occurred at all levels
of government (from municipal deputies to the president of the republic).
In addition, he details how most of candidates running under new party
labels took advantage of this situation by denouncing the politicians from
the two traditional parties as representatives of an old and corrupt way of
doing politics, and emphasized their independence from the traditional po-
litical machines (see Gutierrez (2007, p. 405)). In particular, he shows how
these candidates emphasized that they did not have the disposition, skills or
connections required to this kind of practices (see Gutierrez (2007, p. 402)).
Thus, if candidates from new parties are expected to be more honest, and
assuming that mayors extracting higher rents have weaker incentives to be
transparent, then, consistently with the of model of Section 2, there should
not be a significant difference in the actions taken by the municipal authori-
ties in order to increase the transparency of their governments.
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1.5.3 Other Mechanisms
Finally, to shed further light on the plausibility of the model, in this
section I check whether other mechanisms could explain why new parties
spend more.
First, I investigate whether my result arises because new parties are
mainly from one side of the political spectrum. Assessing the ideology of
new parties is a daunting task. One possibility to obtain information about
a new party’s ideology is to look at the ideology of the main competitor.
Although this information is indirect because it does not say whether a new
party is challenging a traditional party from the left or the right, it can in-
form about whether new party ideology plays a role in the increase in public
expenditures in case new parties are challenging both traditional parties from
one of these sides. I therefore introduce a dummy variable that takes a value
of one if there is a close election between a new party and the Liberal party
(the traditional center-left party). Liberals were present in 60% of the elec-
tions where new and old parties received the two highest vote shares. Column
(2) of Table 1.9 examines this specification. The dependent variable is capital
spending, and the coefficients are estimated using a linear functional form
from equation (1.14). Specifically, the specification includes the same terms
as the baseline RD specification in equation (1.14), but now also interacts
Nwin, margic, and margvic×Nwin with a Liberal party opponent dummy.
For comparison purposes, column (1) of Table 1.9 reports the baseline result
from column (2) of Table 1.2. I observe that the estimated effect of a new
party mayor taking office, relative to a non-new party mayor taking office, is
large and statistically significant regardless of whether the opponent is from
the Liberal party.
Related with the possible effect of ideology on spending, I also provide
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evidence that the two traditional parties do not significantly differ, at least
when looking at fiscal outcomes. Column (4) of Table 1.9 examines close
elections where the Liberal and Conservative parties received the two highest
vote shares. The new-party-win dummy variable in the RD specification is
replaced by a Liberal-win dummy. As expected given the results in column
(2), the estimated effect is statistically insignificant. This suggests that when
looking at fiscal outcomes, the main divide in Colombian politics is between
new and traditional parties, not between the two traditional parties. Most
importantly, this could provide additional evidence that ideology does not
seem to have much effect on municipal government spending, and is consistent
with the hypothesis that local battles are probably fought over competence
or corruption.
Finally, I examine the possibility that new parties spend more because
they have a smaller majority on municipal councils. Column (3) of Table
1.9 examines a specification that distinguishes between whether the mayor’s
party holds a majority on the local council, which occurred in 51% of the
cases in my sample. I do not observe any statistically significant difference.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that it is the mayor’s party (and
not the local council or the relative strength of the mayor’s party in the local
council) that is mainly responsible for the city’s budget. This finding also
helps me to exclude a possible alternative explanation based on the weakness
of the new parties in local councils and their need to form coalitions to pass
their budget. 42
42. An explanation of why public spending is higher in coalition governments, and some
empirical evidence for 50 democracies, can be found in Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(2007).
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Table 1.9: Other Mechanisms
Elections involving new parties Alternative sample
New vs Majority Liberal vs
Baseline Liberal in Council Conservative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New party win 0.114∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.033) (0.047) (0.037)
Nwin × Liberal opponent -0.044
(0.059)
Nwin × majority in Council 0.078
(0.069)
Liberal win -0.038
(0.057)
R-squared 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.868
Observations 1501 1501 1501 464
Liberal opponent effect 0.095∗∗
(0.042)
New party majority effect 0.172∗∗∗
(0.056)
Notes : The dependent variable in all columns is capital spending. New party win is a dummy
equal to one if a new party candidate won the election (Nwin). Liberal win is a dummy equal to
one if a Liberal candidate won the election, Liberal opponent is a dummy equal to one if the new
party candidate faced a Liberal opponent, majority in council is a dummy equal to one if the party
controlling the mayorship holds a majority in the local council. All columns are estimated using
a linear functional form from equation (1.14). All columns included fixed effects for department
and year, as well as baseline controls. Column (2) also includes interactions between the margin of
victory terms and the Liberal opponent dummy, and Column (3) includes interactions between the
margin of victory terms and the Majority in council dummy. Columns (1) through (3) limit the
sample to municipalities where a new party candidate was the winner or runner-up and Column
(4) limits the sample to municipalities where Liberal and Conservative candidates received the
two highest vote shares. Robust standard errors clustered by year×department are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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1.6 Conclusion
This study examined how the presence of politicians from new parties
affects public finance outcomes. The study focuses on Colombian municipali-
ties, where new parties have recently been competing against two well-defined
old parties. Regression discontinuity estimates show that the size of govern-
ment (measured in terms of public spending and tax revenue) is higher in
municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party. Additionally, analyses
using information about local politics and the features of the new parties
show that it is the newness of these parties that plausibly causes the diffe-
rence. As a possible mechanism, the study also proposes a career-concerns
model where more ex ante uncertainty about the honesty of the incumbent
reduces the electoral cost of increasing the size of government. Since it is ex-
pected that voters have less knowledge about members of new parties than
members of traditional parties, this could explain why new party mayors
spend relatively more.
Several opportunities exist for future research. First, it has not been dis-
cussed how the larger governments chosen by politicians from new parties
affect social and economic outcomes. One could also examine the effect of
new parties on a wider set of policy outcome variables than the size of go-
vernment, including new parties’ effects on long-run policy outcomes. Finally,
there is the question of why new parties are formed and, more generally, how
to explain the stability (and change) of party systems.
47
Chapitre 2
External threats, political
stability and fiscal capacity
2.1 Introduction
There is now a large and growing literature on the impact of war on state-
building. 1 Much of this literature builds on Charles Tilly’s famous phrase
“war made the state and the state made war” (Tilly, 1975, p. 42), or, put in
economic terms, “war placed a premium on sources of taxation and created
incentives for governments to invest in revenue-raising institutions”(Besley
and Persson, 2009). In this literature, in particular, in an important series
of papers trying to unify some essential issues on state-building (Besley and
Persson, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, from now on B&P), the significance of war
relies on the assumption that threats from external enemies generate com-
1. See Tilly (1975, 1990) and more recently, the series of papers by Besley and Persson
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). See also Dincecco (2011), Dincecco and Prado (2012), Hoffman
and Rosenthal (1997), Hoffman (2012), O’Brien and Yun-Casalilla (2012) and Gennaioli
and Voth (2013) for the case of Europe, and Lopez-Alves (2000), Centeno (2002) and Thies
(2005) for the case of Latin America.
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mon interests among groups in society, leading to larger investments in state
capacity.
The idea that interstate warfare has a positive effect on state-building
because of its contribution to the provision of a public good (e.g. national
defense) has helped to explain many crucial fiscal innovations introduced in
Europe during the period 1600-1800s. 2 However, important issues remain.
Gennaioli and Voth (2013) have shown for instance that during the period
of initial European state building interstate warfare, rather than a common-
interest public good, was a private good for princes in pursuit of glory and
personal power. Pincus and Robinson (2013) have also argued against the
application of this thesis to the British State, noting that critical elements of
state building (as the monopoly of violence or an internal fiscal system) were
not associated with inter-state warfare but rather were either uncorrelated
with warfare or were associated with civil war.
2. See Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), Hoffman (2012), Dincecco (2011), O’Brien and
Yun-Casalilla (2012)
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Figure 2.1: Civil war and interstate conflicts (partial correlation)
Sources : for civil war, UCDP-PRIO ; for Interstate Conflict, Correlates of War (COW)
If we extend the hypothesis to other regions and more recent times, the
idea that interstate warfare generates common interests among groups seems
even less plausible. Though in last century a large number of countries expe-
rienced external wars, many of these countries, instead of undergoing invest-
ment in revenue-raising institutions, were also affected by factional politics
that often drove them to destructive civil wars. Figure 2.1 plots the partial
correlation between civil war and interstate conflict by plotting the share of
years with civil war in the period 1946-2000 versus the share of years with
interstate disputes in the same period. 3 The figure shows a significant po-
sitive correlation, meaning that countries that experienced more interstate
disputes also experienced more civil wars. Figure 2.2 plots the partial corre-
3. The data on civil wars is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP/PRIO),
and on interstate disputes from the Correlates of War project (COW). For a description
of these datasets, see Section 3.
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lation between civil wars and tax revenue share in GDP from 2000 onward
(that I use as a proxy of state capacity). 4 The figure shows a negative corre-
lation, suggesting that countries that experienced more civil wars in the past
tend to have less state capacity today.
Figure 2.2: Civil war and fiscal capacity
Sources : for civil war, UCDP-PRIO, for fiscal capacity, IMF
Thus, if external conflicts are correlated with internal divisions (as Figure
2.1 suggests), and if more exposure to civil wars in the past is associated with
less state capacity today (as Figure 2.2 suggests), then the effect of interstate
conflicts on state building can not be unambiguously positive. How, then, to
identify the effect ? One alternative is to assume that external and internal
disputes are two independent types of conflicts, with opposing effects on the
development of state capacity : while external conflicts would imply unity
4. The data on tax revenue is from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Section
3.
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and consensus (which facilitates investment in state capacity), internal wars
would be divisive and destructive (with a negative effect on state building).
If this is the case, a natural way to proceed is establishing some conditions
under which one of the two conflicts dominates. 5
Despite its relevance, this option is based on a very strong assumption :
that external and internal conflicts are independent or unrelated. However,
Figure 2.1 showed a pattern that might suggest otherwise. If we look at each
interstate dispute and civil war in detail, more doubts about the likelihood of
this option emerge. During the period 1946-2000, 57% of the countries that
experienced an interstate dispute also experienced a civil war. Also in 42%
of the cases, a civil war occurred the same year or within a five years window
than an interstate conflict. Thus the coincidence between inter and intra
state conflicts seems to be much less than an accident. Abundant literature
on conflict has also documented clear examples of relations between civil wars
and conflicts between states. 6
This chapter develops an alternative explanation of the impact of inter-
state conflict on state capacity based on a potential close relation between
interstate conflicts and civil wars. The chapter focuses on fiscal capacity,
conceived as the capacity of the states to raise taxes, and uses B&P ’s basic
framework. However, this framework is extended and modified in several di-
mensions. An important difference is that what matters in case of war is not
5. This is B&P ’s approach. See in particular Besley and Persson (2008). This is also
the argument proposed by Centeno (2002) to explain the low level of state capacity in
Latin America : Latin America’s political violence has occurred largely within rather than
between states, and has mainly left some form of fiscal crisis as states have failed to
adjust to the extra expenditures. See Lopez-Alves (2000) and Thies (2005) for compatible
arguments.
6. See for instance Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000); Gleditsch and Beardsley (2004);
Hegre and Sambanis (2006); Gleditsch (2007); Salehyan (2008); Gleditsch, Salehyan, and
Schultz (2008); Cunningham (2010); Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011); Morelli
and Pischedda (2013).
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the value of a common-interest public good, but the share of transfers (pro-
duct of taxing residents) that each group gets when the interstate conflict
is resolved. 7 In the explanation I suppose that a government might lose po-
wer for two reasons : because it faces a threat from a foreign country, and
also because of a threat from an internal opposition. Crucially, I consider
the possibility that the domestic opposition might have a link with the fo-
reign country. This link essentially means that the opposition might be better
off under a foreign administration. Think for instance of an opposition that
shares the same ethnicity or ideology of the foreign country, because the op-
position members mostly live in a region at the border. 8 For this opposition
it is not clear who is better : if the current government, led by people from
the same country but who are ethnically or ideologically very different, or a
foreign administration, led by people from other country, but with who they
share the same ethnicity or ideology.
In the model, the opposition has to decide whether to initiate a civil war,
knowing that a civil war may also weaken the country against an external
threat, and that, in case of interstate conflict, his chances of getting power
through a civil war increase. My first main result establishes some conditions
under which an external threat increases or decreases fiscal capacity. I find
7. This focus, besides differentiating the argument from B&P ’s, approaches it to Herbst
(2000)’s, who argued, for the case of Africa, that wars (of any kind) are not fought with
the aim of territorial conquest, but, essentially, in search of the control of populations.
8. An example could be Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, and its overthrown by Laurent-
Désiré Kabila’s ADFL, in today’s Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Mobutu’s internal
opposition would not have been strong enough without Rwanda’s sympathy, and Rwan-
da’s invasion would not have been successful without the support of Mobutu’s internal
opposition. Both types of support were sustained by the ethnic ties between the Tutsis
in Rwanda and the RDC (see Thom, 1999). Another example could be Uganda during
Amin’s regime in the 1970’s ; among all the threats this regime faced during its existence,
the most important being that led by Uganda’s former ruler, who lived in exile in Tanza-
nia but maintained important links with Amin’s internal opposition (see Ravenhill (1974,
p.247) and Acheson-Brown (2001, p. 3)).
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that when the opposition and the external country are closely tied (possibly
because they are geographically close), the opposition and foreign country’s
actions are strategic complements : the external threat makes the opposi-
tion more willing to fight, increasing the probability of civil war. This raises
instability and makes the incumbent more short-sighted, leading to smaller
investment in fiscal capacity. And when the opposition and the foreign coun-
try are not closely tied (because, for instance, the geographical distance is
large) opposition and foreign country’s actions are strategic substitutes : the
external threat makes the opposition less belligerent, increases the political
life of the incumbent government and makes him more willing to invest in
fiscal capacity.
My second main result specifies the relation between political stability and
fiscal capacity. Interestingly, I find that while less political stability translates
into less investment, more stability does not automatically imply more fiscal
capacity. Whether or not they move in the same direction depends on how
cohesive are institutions. The intuition is based on the idea that for insti-
tutions sufficiently cohesive, the fact of losing power against the domestic
opposition is not too bad for the incumbent, so the gains associated to his
support are not very high. If an external threat increases the probability that
the incumbent continues in power in the future (what I call political stability)
because the incumbent gains support from the opposition, and if institutions
are sufficiently cohesive, the gains from this greater stability might not com-
pensate the very bad outcomes from a possible foreign administration (that
can be still sufficiently likely). Thus, more stability does not translate into
more state-building. As far as I know this result is new in the literature,
contributing to the important question about whether more political stabi-
lity leads to better public policies (see Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski,
2011). This chapter provides a novel mechanism through which less power
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switches could not be state-building.
In the last part of the chapter I present some motivating empirical evi-
dence based on some cross-country correlations. My objective in this part is
to assess whether some basic correlations in the data are consistent with the
theory. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the basic intuition. They show some
partial correlations between the tax revenue share in GDP from 2000 on-
ward (that I use as a proxy of fiscal capacity), and the share of the years
between 1946 and 2000 that a country was involved in an interstate conflict
(that I use as a proxy for the past exposure to external threats). 9 Provided
an expected ambiguous effect of external threat on fiscal capacity (because
the effect would depend on the strength of the link between the domestic
opposition and external enemy), Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that if we separate
between the external threats coming from contiguous countries, and those
from non contiguous enemies, a pattern seems to emerge. Figure 2.3 shows
that those countries that during more years experienced external threats from
contiguous countries tend to be also those countries with less fiscal capacity.
Figure 2.4 shows that the opposite occurs if we look at those threats from
non contiguous countries. This pattern is coherent with the first main result
if the geographical proximity between two countries is positively correlated
with the strength of the links between a country’s opposition and its main
foreign enemy.
As previously mentioned, this chapter is related to the literature stu-
dying the impact of conflict on state-building, and uses B&P ’s framework.
However, also as stated before, this framework is extended in several dimen-
sions. In particular, it is not assumed that interstate warfare is necessarily a
common-interest public good, and, most importantly, a link between internal
9. The data on tax revenue is is from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and on
interstate disputes from COW. For a description of these datasets, see Section 3.
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Figure 2.3: Interstate disputes with contiguous enemies and fiscal capacity
(partial correlation)
Sources : for fiscal capacity, IMF ; for Interstate Conflict, Correlates of War (COW)
and external conflicts is introduced. In this second aspect, this chapter differs
from both Besley and Persson (2008) and Gennaioli and Voth (2013), the two
closest references. Besley and Persson (2008) also study the impact of war
on fiscal capacity, and focus on the relation between internal and external
conflicts. Through a model they argue that investment in fiscal capacity is
reduced by a greater risk of future internal conflict, and raised by greater
risk if future external conflict. As external conflict can also be in current
time, which reduces investment in state capacity, they argue that the proba-
bility of external conflict has an ambiguous effect. Despite the coincidences,
their model and results crucially depend on the assumption that internal and
external conflicts are independent. In particular, they assume that internal
conflicts occur only when there is no external conflict. As stated before, I
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Figure 2.4: Interstate disputes with non-contiguous enemies and fiscal ca-
pacity (partial correlation)
Sources : for fiscal capacity, IMF ; for Interstate Conflict, Correlates of War (COW)
remove this assumption, and I identify some testable conditions under which
an external conflict has a possible or negative effect on fiscal capacity.
Gennaioli and Voth (2013) also study the impact of war on fiscal capa-
city. As already mentioned, they focus on the initial European state building
(1600-1800), and unlike Besley and Persson (2008), they do no assume that
interstate warfare is necessarily a common-interest public good. By propo-
sing a model and providing some empirical evidence, they argue that war’s
impact on state capacity (that they conceive as a centralized revenue collec-
tion system) depends on the cost of war and on the initial level of political
fragmentation. In their model war does not necessarily lead to state building
when the costs of war are sufficiently low and fragmentation is sufficiently
high : in this case it is better for rulers not to invest in centralization because
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it is expensive, they would have more to lose (higher fiscal revenues) in case of
defeat, and war does not require such great investments. Although Gennaioli
and Voth (2013)’s argument has some similarities to what is proposed here,
there is one essential difference. In their model the domestic groups are not
related with other groups in other countries. As a result, those groups that
form a centralized country behave as a unity when facing a foreign threat,
and war is still a sort of common interest public good in the sense that the
losses are equally distributed when the country loses the war. In the model
here proposed the groups that form the country do not share a priori the
same negative view about the possibility of a foreign administration, and act
accordingly, reinforcing or decreasing the impact of the external threat.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents the mo-
del. Section 2.3 presents some additional empirical evidence, and Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section I develop a model that helps to understand how violent
disputes (internal and external) affect the incentive of incumbents to invest
in fiscal capacity. With this model I illustrate a number of new mechanisms
that appear to be important in understanding the links between conflict and
investment in fiscal capacity.
There are two countries, H (home) and F (foreign) and two time periods,
s = 1, 2. Country H is divided into two groups, A and B, each of which makes
up half of the population. F is homogeneous, and in both periods is ruled
by the same group, also denoted by F . The analysis focuses on H. However
F will be crucial for the analysis : through the threat of an intervention F
decisively affects the decision making in H.
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At the beginning of period 1 one of the domestic groups in H (A or B),
holds power and decides the period-1 set of policies. These policies consist
of a uniform tax rate on income, t1, only applied to individuals from groups
A and B, and a set of group-specific transfers, r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }, awarded to
everyone. The incumbent group in H also determines, through investment,
the period-2 stock of fiscal capacity, τ2. Let I1 ∈ {A,B} be the incumbent
group in period 1, and O1 ∈ {A,B} its domestic opposition. After the period-
1 policies and investment are chosen, O1 decides whether or not to contest
I1’s leadership by triggering a civil war. Irrespectively of the existence of
such a war, an interstate conflict between F and H occurs with probability
α. The outcome of the interstate conflict, the domestic dispute, and/or the
elections determine the incumbent for the second period, denoted by I2 ∈
{A,B, F}. The case I2 = F occurs when F wins the interstate conflict, and
the consequence is the establishment of a foreign administration of H by F .
In the second period, I2 decides a new set of policies t2 and r2. Since there
are only two periods, there is no investment in fiscal capacity in this period.
Turnover depends on whether O1 triggers a civil war in the shadow of
an external conflict with F . Let’s call φxyz the probability that the group
z ∈ {I1, O1, F} is in power in period 2 conditional on the existence of an
external and/or internal war (or peace), where x = a means external war,
x = p external peace, y = w internal war and y = p internal peace. 10 Note
that φxpO denotes the probability that O1 comes to power peacefully (i.e.
through elections), and φxwO is the probability that O1 wins the civil war he
has previously triggered (both conditional on x ∈ {a, p}). I assume that F
can come to power in H only violently, by winning an interstate conflict,
10. For instance φpwI represents the probability that I1 continues in power in period 2
conditional on external peace and civil war, and φapF is the probability that F is power in
period 2 in case of external conflict and domestic peace. To simplify the notation I write
φxyI instead of φ
xy
I1
and φxyO instead of φ
xy
O1
.
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which implies that φpwF = φ
pp
F = 0.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Nature decides the initial stock of fiscal capacity τ1, and I1 ∈ {A,B}.
(2) I1 chooses a set of period-1 policies {t1, r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }} and deter-
mines (through investment) the period-2 stock of fiscal capacity τ2.
(3) O1 decides whether or not to start a civil war, and, at the same time,
an interstate conflict between F and H occurs with probability α.
When in 3 :
 there was an interstate conflict and a civil war, I1 remains in
power with prob. φawI , O1 is the new incumbent with prob. φawO ,
and F establishes a foreign administration with prob. φawF , with
φawI + φ
aw
O + φ
aw
F = 1
 there was an interstate conflict but not a civil war, I1 remains in
office with prob. φapI , O1 wins the elections with prob. φ
ap
O and
F establishes a foreign administration with prob. φapF , with φ
ap
I +
φapO + φ
ap
F = 1.
 there was not an interstate conflict but there was a civil war, I1
remains in office with prob. φpwI and O1 is the new incumbent with
prob. φpwO , with φ
pw
I + φ
pw
O = 1.
 there was not an interstate conflict nor a civil war, I1 remains in
office with prob. φppI and O1 wins the elections with prob. φ
pp
O ,
with φppI + φ
pp
O = 1.
(4) I2 ∈ {A,B, F} chooses period-2 policy {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }}
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Preferences
The utility function of a typical individual of group J ∈ {A,B} in period s
is
uJs = (1− ts)w + rJs (2.1)
where w is an exogenous income, ts is the income tax and rJs is the transfer.
The utility function of a typical individual of group F in period s is
uFs = r
F
s (2.2)
where rJs is the transfer. Note that since F is a foreign group, members of F
are not taxed.
Fiscal Capacity and Government Budget
The tax income rate ts is constrained by the existing fiscal capacity τs,
such that ts ≤ τs. In addition, τs, initially set to τ1, augments by non negative
investment in period 1, with an increasing convex costs C(τ2 − τ1) where
Cτ (0) = 0. Finally, total population size in both H and F is normalized to
one. Thus, the government budget constraint is
Budget constraint ≡
t1w = C(τ2 − τ1) +
rA1 +r
B
1
2
+ rF1 in period s = 1
t2w =
rA2 +r
B
2
2
+ rF2 in period s = 2
(2.3)
Allocations of Transfers
As in B&P, I assume that the incumbent group must give a fixed share
to the opposition for any unit of transfers he awards to his own group. I
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distinguish two cases, one in which the incumbent is one of the domestic
groups, and other with F as incumbent. For the first case, I assume that
rOss = σr
Is
s (2.4)
where Is, Os ∈ {A,B}. For the second case, when F holds power in period
2, I assume that
rO12 = σ
′rF2 (2.5)
In both (2.4) and (2.5), σ and σ′ ∈ [0, 1]. The expression in (2.4) corresponds
to the case the incumbent is a domestic group, and basically states that the
incumbent, Is, must give the fixed share σ of its rents to the domestic oppo-
sition, Os. It can be interpreted as a requirement of opposition protection,
measured for instance by the existence of checks and balances on the execu-
tive. According to this interpretation, σ = 1 would mean very high executive
constraints, and σ = 0 that these constrains do not exist.
The expression in (2.5) also implies that the incumbent, in this case F ,
must give a fixed share of its rents to the domestic opposition. However, since
F ’s opposition consists of two groups (A and B), (2.5) states that F must
give a share of its rents only to O1, the group that was in the opposition in
period 1. The intuition behind (2.5) is as follows. First note that since F is a
foreign power, the existing domestic rules of opposition protection (as (2.4))
do not necessarily apply to him. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that
the share of rents that F must give to the opposition can be group specific.
Second, since H is governed by I1 when the interstate conflict between F and
H takes place, F might see I1 as its main enemy. Thus, in case of a foreign
administration, we can expect that I1 is hit the hardest. This implies that the
share of rents that F must give to O1 must be at least as big as what he must
give to I1. This situation is evident if, as suggested in the introduction, O1
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and F share the same ethnicity or ideology, and, in general, it will depend on
how closely linked are F and O1. The expression in (2.5) intends to capture
this idea, and the parameter σ′ can be seen as measuring the strength of such
link. According to this interpretation, σ′ = 1 would mean that and O1 are F
closely linked, and σ′ = 0 that such link does not exist. 11
Finally, I assume that σ′ is known by O1 and F , but not by I1, who only
knows that it is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1
ψ
], with ψ > 0 and
mean denoted by σ.
Additional Assumptions
In the text, I assume that the following inequalities hold :
 Given an interstate conflict, F is more likely to hold power if there is
a civl war :
φawF ≥ φapF (2.6)
 Given a civil war, O1 is more likely to hold power if there is interstate
conflict :
φawO ≥ φpwO (2.7)
 Absent civil war, O1 is more likely to hold power if there is no interstate
conflict :
φppO ≥ φapO (2.8)
Expressions in (2.6) and (2.7) are intuitive, and imply that both kinds of
conflicts (internal and external) reinforce each other : in terms of the proba-
bility of victory, it is a good idea for both O1 and F to be more aggressive
when their common enemy (I1) is already involved in a conflict. 12 The ex-
11. Note that the fact that I do not include a constraint on the share of its rents that
F must give to I1 implies that these two groups are not linked, which is what we would
expect from main enemies.
12. Off course this does not mean that O1 will always prefer to attack I1 in case there
is also a interstate conflict ; this decision will depend on the consequences of an eventual
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pression in (2.8) corresponds to the idea that leaders are more likely to be
reelected in case of international conflict, either because war provides them
unique opportunities to deal with their opposition (Chiozza and Goemans,
2004), or because they engage in a “gamble for resurrection” (Downs and
Rocke, 1994).
In order to simplify the notation, let’s define
∆φF ≡ φawF − φapF (2.9)
∆φxy ≡ φxwy − φxpy (2.10)
for x ∈ {a, p} and y ∈ {I, O}. Note that (2.6) implies that ∆φF ≥ 0, and
(2.7) and (2.8) imply that ∆φaO −∆φpO ≥ 0.
2.2.1 Analysis of the Model
In this section I solve the game. As usual, this will be done by backward
induction. I start with a given stock of fiscal capacity, and then I characterize
policy choices. After this characterization, I go to the earlier stages of the
game, where I determine O1’s decision about whether or not to start a civil
war (stage 3), and I1’s decision about the period-2 stock of fiscal capacity
(stage 2). Between stages 3 and 2, I include a subsection in which I study
the impact of war on political stability ; this allows me to present the main
results of the chapter (Propositions 2 and 3) in a more concise way.
Policymaking in period 2 (stage 4)
I study the optimal policy chosen by the incumbent in period 2 (stage
4). We have two cases : one in which the incumbent is one of the domestic
foreign administration.
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groups (i.e. I2 ∈ {A,B}), and other in which the incumbent is the foreign
power (i.e. I2 = F ).
For I2 ∈ {A,B}, I2 chooses {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }} to maximize (2.1)
subject to (2.3), (2.4) and t2 ≤ τ2. It is easy to see that we have a corner
solution with t2 = τ2, rF2 = 0, r
O2
2 = σr
I2
2 and
rI22 = 2(1 + σ)
−1τ2w (2.11)
For I2 = F , F chooses {t2, r2 = {rA2 , rB2 , rF2 }} to maximize (2.2) subject to
t2 ≤ τ2, (2.3) and (2.5). In this case we have that t2 = τ2, rI12 = 0, rO12 = σ′rF2 ,
and
rF2 = 2τ2w(2 + σ
′)−1 (2.12)
Civil war (stage 3)
Now I study O1’s decision about whether or not to start a civil war. First,
I compute O1’s period-2 indirect utility for the cases of a domestic incumbent
(i.e. I2 ∈ {A,B}) and a foreign administration (i.e. I2 = F ). Then, I compute
O1’s expected (indirect) utility in case of triggering or not a civil war. Finally,
I compare the two expressions and establish the conditions under which O1
chooses war (or peace).
For I2 ∈ {A,B}, replacing (2.11) and rO22 = σrI22 in (2.1), we have that :
 O1’s period-2 indirect utility in case O1 is the incumbent in period 2
(i.e. I2 = O1) is
WO1(τ2, κ
I) = (1− τ2)w + κIτ2w (2.13)
where κI = 2(1 + σ)−1.
 O1’s period-2 indirect utility in case I1 is the incumbent in period 2
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(i.e. I2 = I1) is
WO1(τ2, κ
O) = (1− τ2)w + κOτ2w (2.14)
where κO = 2σ(1 + σ)−1.
For I2 = F , replacing (2.12) in rO12 = σ′rF2 , and the result in (2.1), we have
that
 O1’s period-2 indirect utility is
WO1(τ2, κ
F ) = (1− τ2)w + κF τ2w (2.15)
where κF = 2σ′(2 + σ′)−1.
When deciding whether or not to trigger a civil war, O1 compares its
expected (indirect) utility in each case. Crucially, O1 takes into account that
if he chooses war, H will be weaker in case of an interstate conflict with F ,
which, as previously mentioned, implies a higher probability of having F as
incumbent in s = 2.
Let’s compute O1’s expected utility. Combining (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15),
recalling that α is the probability of interstate conflict, we have that O1’s
expected utility (in period 2) in case of civil war is
α
[
φawO W
O1(τ2, κ
I) + φawI W
O1(τ2, κ
O) + φawF W
O1(τ2, κ
F )
]
+(1− α)
[
φpwO W
O1(τ2, κ
I) + φpwI W
O1(τ2, κ
O)
] (2.16)
and in case of internal peace,
α
[
φapOW
O1(τ2, κ
I) + φapI W
O1(τ2, κ
O) + φapF W
O1(τ2, κ
F )
]
+(1− α)
[
φppOW
O1(τ2, κ
I) + φppI W
O1(τ2, κ
O)
] (2.17)
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Note that O1 decides whether or not to trigger a civil war by comparing
(2.16) and (2.17). Replacing φawI + φawO + φawF = 1, φ
ap
I + φ
ap
O + φ
ap
F = 1,
φpwI + φ
pw
O = 1, φ
pp
I + φ
pp
O = 1, and (2.9) and (2.10) in (2.16) and (2.17), and
rearranging, we have that O1 triggers a civil war when
(α∆φaO+(1−α)∆φpO)
[
WO1(τ2, κ
I)−WO1(τ2, κO)
]
> α∆φF
[
WO1(τ2, κ
O)−WO1(τ2, κF )
]
(2.18)
Note that the sign of the right side of (2.18) depends on the sign ofWO1(τ2, κO)−
WO1(τ2, κ
F ), which measures the difference in welfare that O1 experiments
in case of having I1 or F as incumbent in period 2. Note that WO1(τ2, κO) <
WO1(τ2, κ
F ) means that O1 is better in a regime of foreign intervention than
in a regime in which I1 continues in power. 13
Since I am interested in how the possibility of civil war affects the in-
centives of I1 to invest in fiscal capacity, and given that I1 does not observe
the current value of σ′, let’s find the probability of civil war. To simplify
the notation, let’s define the unconditional probability of the change in the
chances of turnover favouring O1 as a consequence of a civil war, as
E[∆tO] ≡ α∆φaO + (1− α)∆φpO (2.19)
Note that E[∆tO] ≷ 0 depending on whether ∆φaO ≷ 0 and ∆φpO ≷ 0.
Let’s define now the probability of civil war, i.e. the probability that (2.18)
is satisfied. This probability is denoted by p. Replacing (2.13), (2.14), (2.15)
and (2.19) in (2.18), and rearranging, we have that
p = Pr
(
σ′ >
2(ασ∆φF − (1− σ)E[∆tO])
α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO]
)
(2.20)
13. Note also thatWO1(τ2, κO) < WO1(τ2, κF ) implies that O1 always decides to trigger
a civil conflict.
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provided that α∆φF +(1−σ)E[∆tO] > 0. When α∆φF +(1−σ)E[∆tO] ≤ 0,
p = 0.
In (2.20) note that when σ = 0, p = 1. Thus, internal peace is only
possible for σ > 0. Note also that when σ = 1, p = 0, so when institutions
are perfectly cohesive, we should never expect civil war. Since these cases are
no realistic, we focus on σ ∈ (0, 1). 14
As previously noted, I assume that σ′, as seen by I1, is uniformly distri-
buted with support in the interval [0, 1
ψ
], with ψ > 1 and E[σ′] = σ = 1
2ψ
.
Adding the necessary conditions guaranteeing that p is well defined, 15 we
have that (2.20) is equivalent to
p = 1− 1
σ
[ασ∆φF − (1− σ)E[∆tO]
α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO]
]
(2.21)
Unconditional probability of turnover
In this subsection I study how turnover depends on the risk of an external
intervention. Let’s define by φ ≡ φ(α, p, φO, φF ) the unconditional probability
of turnover, i.e. I2 6= I1, where φO ≡ {φawO , φpwO , φapO , φppO } and φF ≡ {φwF , φpF}.
Note that I2 6= I1 if (i) O1 wins the internal conflict (in case of having
triggered a civil war), (ii) O1 wins the democratic elections (in case having
14. For this case note in (2.20) that a civil war is more likely for low values of σ.
The intuition for this relation is straightforward : more checks and balances reduce the
incentives of O1 to trigger an internal conflict because this conflict is costly and the gains
will be distributed more equally in case any domestic group wins. In support of this
relation, note that countries with high checks and balances tend to be less prone to civil
war (Reynal-Querol, 2002, 2005).
15. For p ∈ (0, 1) we need
ασ∆φF > (1− σ)E[∆tO] > (σ − σ
1 + σ
)∆φF
Otherwise, we just have that p = 0 or p = 1. Clearly, we are interested in the case p ∈ (0, 1).
Note that it is always the case that σ > σ−σ1+σ , thus there is always a p such that p ∈ (0, 1).
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chose to act democratically), or (iii) F establishes a foreign administration.
Computing the probability of turnover in each case, we have that
φ = α[p(φawO +φ
aw
F ) + (1− p)(φapO +φapF )] + (1−α)[pφpwO + (1− p)φppO ] (2.22)
where the term αp(φawO +φawF ) represents the probability of turnover in case of
internal an external conflict, α(1− p)(φapO + φapF ) the probability of turnover
in case of internal peace and interstate conflict, and (1 − α)[pφpwO + (1 −
p)φppO ] is the probably of turnover in the absence of interstate conflict. Since
my interest is in how the probability of turnover depends on the risk of an
external intervention, I focus on how φ(α, p, φO, φF ) responds to a change in
α.
Let’s define the unconditional probability that turnover (t) is favourable
to F , as
E[tF ] ≡ pφawF + (1− p)φapF (2.23)
Differentiating (2.22) with respect to α, and rearranging, we have that
∂φ
∂α
= p(φawO −φpwO )+(1−p)(φapO −φppO )+E[tF ]+(α∆φF +E[∆tO])
∂p
∂α
(2.24)
Differentiating (3.6) with respect to α, replacing this expression, (3.6)
and (2.23) in (2.24), and rearranging (see proof of Proposition 1 in annexe
B), we get that for p ∈ (0, 1),
∂φ
∂α
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ σ ≷ σβκ− γ (2.25)
where β = β(φF , φO) is
β(φF , φO) ≡ ∆φF
φawO − φpwO + φawF
(2.26)
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and κ = κ(σ, α, φF , φO) given by
κ(σ, α, φF , φO) ≡ 1 + α
2(1 + σ)(∆φaO −∆φpO)∆φF + (1− σ2)(E[∆tO])2
(α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO])2
(2.27)
and γ = γ(φF , φO) by
γ(φF , φO) ≡ (∆φ
a
O −∆φpO)
(φawO − φpwO + φawF )
(2.28)
The functions β, κ and γ are defined in order to facilitate the comparison
among the results. Note that under assumptions (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), β ≥ 0,
γ ≥ 0 and κ ≥ 1.
Now we can formulate a first main result. It basically establishes the
conditions under which an increase in the risk of an external intervention
increases or decreases political stability, as defined by the probability of tur-
nover φ. It states that there is a unique threshold value of σ, denoted by
Σ0(σ, α, β, κ) and given by
Σ0(α, σ, φF , φO) ≡ σβ(φF , φO)κ(σ, α, φF , φO)− γ(φF , φO) (2.29)
below which the effect of an external intervention increases political stability,
and above which stability decreases.
PROPOSITION 1. For the the case p ∈ (0, 1), there is a unique threshold
value of σ given by (2.29) such that
(1.A) if σ < Σ0(α, σ, φF , φO), an increase in the risk of an external interven-
tion increases political stability.
(1.B) if σ > Σ0(α, σ, φF , φO), an increase in the risk of an external interven-
tion decreases political stability.
For the case p = 1, an increase in the risk of an external intervention always
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decreases political stability, and for p = 0, stability increases if and only if
φapF < φ
pp
O − φapO .
Démonstration. See Annexe B.
The intuition for (1.A) is that, from the point of view of I1, if the share
of transfers he expects the domestic opposition to receive from the foreign
country is sufficient small (i.e., if the domestic opposition and the foreign
government are not sufficient close), interstate warfare increases the political
life of the incumbent. The intuition for (1.B) is that if this share is instead
sufficient large (i.e., if the domestic opposition and the foreign government
are very close), then interstate warfare leads to less political stability.
Policymaking in period 1 and investment (stage 2)
Finally I study optimal policy chosen by the incumbent in period 1, as
well as his decision to invest in fiscal capacity.
Policymaking in period 1 Relative to the optimal policy, the results
are very similar to those in subsection 2.2.1. The only difference is that the
budget constraint includes now the costs associated with investment. In this
case we have that I1 chooses {t1, r1 = {rA1 , rB1 , rF1 }} to maximize (2.1) subject
to (2.3), (2.4) and t1 ≤ τ1. It is easy to see that here we have a corner solution,
with t1 = τ1, rF1 = 0, r
O1
1 = σr
I1
1 and
rI11 = 2(1 + σ)
−1[τ1w − C(τ2 − τ1)] (2.30)
Investment in fiscal capacity Now I study the decision to invest in fiscal
capacity. First let’s compute I1’s first and second period indirect utilities :
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 I1’s period-2 utility in case I1 is also the incumbent in period 2 (i.e.
I2 = I1) is
W I1(τ2, κ
I) = (1− τ2)w + κIτ2w (2.31)
where κI = 2(1 + σ)−1.
 I1’s period-2 utility in caseO1 is the incumbent in period 2 (i.e. I2 = O1)
is
W I1(τ2, κ
O) = (1− τ2)w + κOτ2w (2.32)
where κO = 2σ(1 + σ)−1.
 I1’s period-2 indirect utility in case F is the incumbent in period 2 (i.e.
I2 = F ) is
W I1(τ2) = (1− τ2)w (2.33)
Relative to I1’s first period indirect utility, replacing (2.30) in (2.1), we
get
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1), κI) = (1− τ1)w + 2(1 + σ)−1[τ1w − C(τ2 − τ1)] (2.34)
Now let’s calculate I1’s expected utility. Combining (2.31), (2.32), (2.33)
and (2.34), we have that I1’s expected utility when there is no civil war is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1), κI) + α
[
φapI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φapOW
I1(τ2, κ
O) + φapF W
I1(τ2)
]
+(1− α)
[
φppI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φppOW
I1(τ2, κ
O)
]
(2.35)
and in case of civil war is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1), κI) + α
[
φawI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φawO W
I1(τ2, κ
O) + φawF W
I1(τ2)
]
+(1− α)
[
φpwI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φpwO W
I1(τ2, κ
O)
]
(2.36)
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Combining the two last expressions, and recalling that p is the probability of
civil war, we have that I1’s expected utility as seen from period 1 is
W I1(τ1, C(τ2 − τ1), κI) + p
[
α
(
φawI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φawO W
I1(τ2, κ
O) + φawF W
I1(τ2)
)
+(1− α)
(
φpwI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φpwO W
I1(τ2, κ
O)
)]
+(1− p)
[
α
(
φapI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φapOW
I1(τ2, κ
O) + φapF W
I1(τ2)
)
+(1− α)
(
φppI W
I1(τ2, κ
I) + φppOW
I1(τ2, κ
O)
)]
(2.37)
At the beginning of period 1, I1 chooses τ2 by maximizing (2.37). Differentia-
ting (2.37) with respect to τ2, and equalizing to zero, the first order condition
is
−W I1C (τ1, C(τ∗2 − τ1), κI)Cτ (τ∗2 − τ1) ≥ p
[
α
(
φawI W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
I) + φawO W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
O) + φawF W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 )
)
+(1− α)
(
φpwI W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
I) + φpwO W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
O)
)]
+(1− p)
[
α
(
φapI W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
I) + φapO W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
O) + φapF W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 )
)
+(1− α)
(
φppI W
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
I) + φppOW
I1
τ (τ
∗
2 , κ
O)
)]
(2.38)
subject to τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0.
In order to simplify the notation and analysis, let’s define the uncondi-
tional probability of turnover favouring O1 as
E[tO] ≡ α(pφawO + (1− p)φapO ) + (1− α)(pφpwO + (1− p)φppO ) (2.39)
Let’s also define the following expression :
E[λ] ≡ 2(1 + σ)−1
[
1− φ+ σE[tO]
]
(2.40)
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Where φ = φ(α, p, φO, φF ) is given by (2.22) and E[tO] by (2.39). E[λ] is
the expected value of transfer spending viewed from the perspective of a
period-1 incumbent who does not know whether her group will be in office
in period 2. The expression for E[λ] in (2.39) has two parts. The first one,
2(1 + σ)−1(1− φ), is the expected utility of the incumbent in case he is still
in power in period 2. 16 The second part, 2σ(1 + σ)−1E[tO], corresponds to
the expected transfers to I1 from O1 in case O1 is in power in period 2.
Now we can have a tractable expression for (2.38). As shown in the annexe
B (see proof of Proposition 2), if we differentiate (2.31), (2.32), (2.33) and
(2.34), and replace these expression, as well as (2.40), in (2.38), and rearrange,
we have that (2.38) is equivalent to
2(1 + σ)−1Cτ (τ2 − τ1) ≥ w (E[λ]− 1) (2.41)
subject to τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0. The interpretation of (2.41) is straightforward. The
left-hand side is the marginal cost weighted by 2(1 + σ)−1 representing the
marginal value of forgone period-1 tax revenue. The right-and side is the
marginal benefit of fiscal capacity, which has two parts : −w, the loss of
private earnings because taxation has increased, and wE[λ], the future value
of public revenue due to increased fiscal capacity.
Note that (2.41) can be written as
τ2 = C
−1
τ
(
w
[
−φ+ σE[tO] + (1− σ)
2
])
+ τ1 (2.42)
16. Note that (1−φ) is the probability that the period-1 incumbent is in power in period
2.
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Thus it is easy to find an explicit form for ∂τ2
∂α
. Differentiating (2.42) and
rearranging, we have that the sign of ∂τ2
∂α
depends on the sign of the expression
− ∂φ
∂α
+ σ
∂E[tO]
∂α
(2.43)
Combining (2.22) and (2.39), we have that
E[tO] = φ− αE[tF ] (2.44)
where E[tF ] is given by (2.23). Replacing (2.44) in (2.43), we have that (2.43)
is equivalent to
− (1− σ)∂φ
∂α
− σE[tF ]− σα∆φF ∂p
∂α
(2.45)
Replacing (2.24) in (2.45) and rearranging, we have that (2.43) is equivalent
to
−(1−σ)[p(φawO −φpwO )+(1−p)(φapO −φppO )]−E[tF ]−
[
α∆φF+(1−σ)E[∆tO]
] ∂p
∂α
(2.46)
As shown in the annexe B (see proof of Proposition 2), differentiating (3.6)
with respect to α, replacing this expression in (2.46), as well as (3.6) and
(2.24), and rearranging, we have, for p ∈ (0, 1), that (2.46) is
−σ((1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF ) + σ∆φF − (1− σ)(∆φaO −∆φpO)
σ
(2.47)
Thus we can conclude that ∂τ2
∂α
≷ 0 if and only if the expression in (2.47) is
≷ 0, or, equivalently
∂τ2
∂α
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ σ ≶ σβσ − γ1 (2.48)
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where βσ = βσ(σ, φF , φO) is given by
βσ(σ, φF , φO) ≡ ∆φF
(1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF
(2.49)
and γσ = γσ(σ, φF , φO) by
γσ(σ, φF , φO) ≡ (1− σ)(∆φ
a
O −∆φpO)
(1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF
(2.50)
Note that under assumptions (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), βσ ≥ 0 and γσ ≥ 1.
This allows us to formulate a second result. It establishes the conditions
under which an increase in the risk of an external intervention increases
or decreases investment in fiscal capacity. It states that there is a unique
threshold value of σ, denoted by Σ0(σ, α, β, κ) and given by
Σ1(α, σ, φF , φO) ≡ σβσ(σ, φF , φO)− γσ(σ, φF , φO) (2.51)
below which the effect of an external intervention increases political stability,
and above which stability decreases.
PROPOSITION 2. For the the case p ∈ (0, 1), there is a unique threshold
value of σ given by (2.51) such that
(2.A) if σ < Σ1(α, σ, φF , φO), an increase in the risk of an external interven-
tion increases investment in fiscal capacity
(2.B) if σ > Σ1(α, σ, φF , φO), an increase in the risk of an external interven-
tion decreases investment in fiscal capacity
For the case p = 1, an increase in the risk of an external intervention always
decreases investment in fiscal capacity, and for p = 0, fiscal capacity increases
if and only if φapF < (1− σ)(φppO − φapO ).
Démonstration. See Annexe B.
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This proposition basically states that, from the point of view of I1, if the
expected share of transfers the domestic opposition would receive from the
foreign country is sufficient small, interstate warfare increases investment in
fiscal capacity. Importantly, assumptions (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) imply that 17
∂Σ1
∂σ
≥ 0 (2.53)
Note that (2.53) implies that when institutions are very cohesive, it is less
likely that a foreign administration gives to the opposition more than what
they expect to receive in case the current state quo persists. In this situation
we should expect that an increase in the external threat is state building. In
addition, (2.53) implies that when institutions are not cohesive, it is more
likely that the members of the domestic opposition expect to receive not
less from the foreign administration than what they expect to receive if the
current state quo persists. In this case we should expect that an external
threat is not state building.
2.2.2 Political stability and investment in fiscal capacity
A particularly interesting question is whether an increase in political sta-
bility caused by a more likely external threat implies an increase in investment
in fiscal capacity, and if a decrease in political stability results in a decrease
in investment. In this subsection
Propositions 1 and 2 established the existence of two thresholds for σ,
17. Just note that
∂Σ1
∂σ
=
∆φF (φ
aw
O − φpwO + φawF ) + (∆φaO −∆φpO)φawF
[(1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF ]2
(2.52)
which is positive since ∆φF ≥ 0 and φawO − φpwO ≥ 0, as assumed in (2.6) and (2.7), and
∆φaO −∆φpO > 0, implied by assumptions (2.7) and (2.8)
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denoted by Σ0 (in Prop. 1) and Σ1 (in Prop. 2), below which the effect of
an increase in the risk of an external intervention increases political stabi-
lity (Prop. 1) and encourages in fiscal capacity (Prop. 2), and above which
stability and fiscal capacity should decrease. However, the thresholds are not
identical. This shows that although political stability plays a crucial role in
explaining the impact of external threats on fiscal capacity, it is not the only
factor. In particular, it implies that more political stability does not always
translate in more investment in fiscal capacity.
In the next Proposition I establish some conditions under which Σ0 ≥ Σ1,
i.e., that a change in political stability caused by an external threat implies
a decrease or increase in fiscal capacity.
PROPOSITION 3. For the case p ∈ [0, 1), there is a σ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that
for all σ ≥ σ∗, if an increase in the risk of an foreign intervention implies
(3.A) a decrease in political stability, then it also implies a decrease in invest-
ment in fiscal capacity.
(3.B) an increase in political stability, then it does not necessarily imply an
increase in investment in fiscal capacity.
For the case p = 1, an increase in the risk of an external intervention always
implies a decrease in political stability and in investment in fiscal capacity.
Démonstration. See Annexe B.
The result in (3.A) states that if as a consequence of an increase in the risk
of an external intervention, the chances that the first-period incumbent conti-
nues in power in period 2 fall, then this group has less incentives to increase
the capacity of the state for the next period. The intuition is straightfor-
ward : more fiscal capacity implies that the group in power in period 2 will
be able to capture more rents, which now come in greater proportion from
the first-period incumbent (as he will more likely be in opposition).
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Amore interesting and less intuitive result is established in (3.B). It states
that if as a result of an increase in the risk of an external intervention, the
chances that the incumbent stays in power increase, it is not always the case
that he decides to invest in more state capacity. The intuition behind this
new result crucially depends on the condition that σ is sufficiently high. The
argument is as follows. First, note that the immediate effect of an external
threat is to increase the probability that a foreigner is in power, but that
this does not mean that the probability that the incumbent continues in
power (i.e. the overall political stability) decreases. This probability can in
fact increase, if, as a consequence of this threat, the incumbent receives the
support of the domestic opposition : if this support is big enough, the decrease
in the probability that the domestic opposition is in power can compensate
the higher risk of a foreign administration, making the overall probability of
turnover smaller.
However, note that the probability that the foreign country is in power
can still be very big, and could have been increased with the higher risk of an
external intervention. Thus, although the overall probability of turnover is
smaller, the worst scenario for the incumbent (a foreign administration) can
still be more likely, and can make him less willing to invest in fiscal capacity.
How bad a foreign administration is depends on σ, and if sufficiently bad, it
will explain why more political stability could translate into less investment.
To see this note that a big σ means that the domestic opposition will share
a very large portion of his rents with the incumbent in case of being in power
in period 2. Since in the same situation the foreign power will set this portion
to zero, relative to a government led by the domestic opposition, a foreign
administration will be a very bad scenario for the first-period incumbent. In
addition, note that a big σ implies that the support that the domestic op-
position gives to the incumbent, key for political stability, could not be very
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valuable to the incumbent (insofar as being in the opposition is not very bad
if institutions are very cohesive), and could not compensate the expected loss
that the incumbent will suffer in case of a foreign administration. Thus, if σ
is sufficient big, the expected loss associated to a more likely foreign admi-
nistration might not being compensating with the expected gains associated
to a higher stability, and when this happens, the first-period incumbent has
no incentives to increase the second-period fiscal capacity.
To shed more light about this result, it is useful to consider the case p = 0
(i.e. the probability of civil war is zero), for which an stronger result can be
established. For this case we found in propositions 1 and 2 that an increase
in the risk of an external intervention increases stability if and only if φapF <
φppO −φapO (Prop. 1), and increases fiscal capacity when φapF < (1−σ)(φppO −φapO )
(Prop. 2). Note that stability and investment increases when φppO − φapO is big
enough, i.e. when the chances that the opposition gets power (democratically)
decrease enough in case of an external threat (for instance when the existence
of an external threat provides leaders more instruments to deal with the
opposition). In addition, note that 18
(φppO − φapO ) > (1− σ)(φppO − φapO ) (2.54)
Inspection of (2.54) allows us to say that
(i) If an increase in the risk of an external intervention decreases political
stability (i.e. φapF > φ
pp
O −φapO ) then it also decreases investment in fiscal
capacity (i.e. φapF > (1 − σ)(φppO − φapO )). As previously mentioned, the
intuition behind this result is straightforward.
(ii) If an increase in the risk of an external intervention increases political
stability (i.e. φapF < φ
pp
O − φapO ), then how fiscal capacity is affected (i.e.
18. Recall that by (2.8), φppO − φapO ≥ 0.
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φapF ≷ (1 − σ)(φppO − φapO )) depends on σ. Let’s define σ∗ such that
φapF = (1− σ∗)(φppO − φapO ), or, equivalently,
σ∗ = 1− φ
ap
F
φppO − φapO
(2.55)
Thus, for all σ ≥ σ∗, we have that φpF > (1−σ)(φppO −φapO ), which implies
a decrease in fiscal capacity. In addition, we have that for all σ < σ∗,
φpF < (1− σ)(φppO − φapO ), which means an increase in fiscal capacity. 19.
In (2.55), note that σ∗ is negatively related to φapF , the probability that
the foreign country is in power in case there is no civil war. Note that
the bigger this probability, the more likely the possibility that more
stability translates into less investment. The intuition behind this result
is based on the idea that in order to have investment, incumbent’s
expected gain from the domestic opposition’s support (that makes a
civil war very unlikely and increases political stability) must be big
enough to compensate the loss associated to a foreign administration.
The higher the probability of a foreign administration, the bigger this
gain must be, and this gain is bigger when institutions are not cohesive
(because in that case political stability matters more).
Proposition 3 can be related with the literature studying the relation
between political stability and better public policies, and, in particular, with
an interesting recent result by Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2011) :
that greater persistence might harm the party in power because when power
finally deviates away from current incumbent, the new incumbent is more
likely to remain in power, getting a bigger transfer and leaving less to the
former incumbent after he has left power. Part (3.B) contributes to this
idea by providing a novel mechanism through which more persistence in the
19. This last result is true only for the case p = 0.
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identity of the party in power might be associated with worse outcomes : the
greater persistence, being the result of an increase in the risk of a foreign
administration, opens the door to a situation for the incumbent when he
leaves power that, if institution are sufficiently cohesive, is significantly worse
than that with more power switches but with less risk of a foreign mandate.
2.3 Some Empirical Evidence
As previously noted, the key prediction of the model is that national fis-
cal systems are affected differently by the threats countries face from foreign
enemies. Specifically, the model predicts that the impact of external threats
on fiscal capacity depends on the proximity between the foreign enemy and
the domestic opposition. In this section, I empirically examine some mea-
sures of tax structure, exploring some conditional correlations between these
outcome variables and the determinants suggested by the theory. The intui-
tion behind these correlations was already presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4,
described in the introduction. This section complements this analysis condi-
tioning the effect of external threats on fiscal capacity on more covariates and
in a more precise way. The data and proxies used are also described in more
detail. This section can be seen as a complement and extension of the em-
pirical findings that B&P present in support of their theoretical framework.
As them, I do not intent to make any claims of capturing causal relations,
but rather to assess whether the basic correlations in the data are consistent
with the theory.
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2.3.1 Data and Parameters
To measure fiscal capacity (the variable τ in the model) I use data on fiscal
revenues per capita from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 20 This
data is available for more than 163 countries from 1975 onwards. 21 Absent
direct data on past investments in fiscal capacity (before 1975), I focus on the
historical incidence of some determinants suggested by the model on today’s
fiscal capacity. 22 I take the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP. Since the model
is about building the capacity to charge an income tax, I also use the share
of income tax revenue on GDP. This data is expressed as an average from
2000 onward. As B&P argue, might be highly correlated with fiscal capacity.
Following the previous literature on interstate conflicts (see Martin, Mayer,
and Thoenig, 2008, 2012; Baliga, Lucca, and Sjöström, 2011; Conconi, Sahu-
guet, and Zanardi, 2014) I use the (annual) Correlates of War (COW) data
to measure the historical incidence of external threats. 23 I look at whether
a given country is engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) of high
intensity in a given year. 24 I create a measure of how large a share of the
20. See Baunsgaard and Keen (2005, 2010) for a description of the data.
21. For some countries the data is available from 2000 onwards.
22. The fact of looking at the incidence of past determinants on today’s fiscal capacity
(as external threats, inclusiveness of political institutions and civil wars) helps to partially
solve the problem of endogeny of these determinants.
23. http ://www.correlatesofwar.org/
24. I use the dyadic form of the data from Maoz (2005), http ://va-
nity.dss.ucdavis.edu/ maoz/dyadmid.html. This dataset lists all bilateral interstate
conflicts from 1816 to 2001, and quantifies their intensity on a 1 to 5. Each MID is coded
with a hostility level ranging from 1 to 5, where 1= No militarized action, 2 = Threat to
use force, 3 = of force, 4 = Use of force, and 5 = War, defined as a conflict with at least
1,000 deaths of military personnel. I follow the practice common in the empirical literature
of interstate conflicts (e.g. Maoz and Russett (1993) ; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008,
2012) ; Baliga, Lucca, and Sjöström (2011), Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2014)) using
a broad definition of conflicts which includes display of force, use of force, and war itself.
These are all government-approved and non-accidental decisions.
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years between 1946, 25 or the year of independence (if later), and 2000 that
a country was involved in a MID. I hypothesize that the historical incidence
of this kind of disputes serves as a proxy for the past exposure to external
threats.
The model has the nontrivial implication that the historical incidence of
violent conflict should be correlated with fiscal capacity today, but that this
correlation should depend on the proximity between the foreign enemy and
the domestic opposition (the variable σ in the model). I hypothesize that
the geographical distance among the countries in conflict, and, in particular,
whether the main enemy of a country in a year is contiguous, serves as proxy
for this proximity. As previously mentioned, we can think for instance of an
opposition that shares the same ethnicity of the foreign country because the
opposition members mostly live in a region at the border. If the data support
the theory, I should find that external threats from contiguous countries (i.e.
big σ) are systematically associated with lower fiscal capacity, and threats
from non-contiguous countries (i.e. small σ) are associated with higher fiscal
capacity. To measure contiguity, I use annual data from the COW project.
This database identifies all direct contiguity relationships between states in
the international system from 1816 through 2006. I combine this dataset with
the information on MIDs. 26
25. This year corresponds to the first year there is data on civil wars. The results are
however robust to the inclusion of information for the period 1816-1945.
26. The classification system consists of five categories, one for land contiguity and
four for water contiguity. The four water contiguity categories are : i) contiguous for
up to 12 miles of water ; ii) contiguous for 13-24 miles of water ; iii) contiguous for 25-
150 miles of water ; iv) contiguous for 151-400 miles of water. As in Baliga, Lucca, and
Sjöström (2011), I say that two countries are contiguous they are land or water contiguous.
Since these conflicts were for the different countries in some years against contiguous
enemies, and in other years against non contiguous, I constructed two different measures
of past exposure to conflicts according to the contiguity with the different enemies. I
say that a country was in conflict with a (non)contiguous enemy during a year if during
that year the country experimented at least one dispute of high intensity (display of
force) with at least one (non)contiguous country. As a percentage of the total number of
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As other common determinants of the fiscal capacity outcomes, I include
several sets of independent variables. First I include a measure of political ins-
titutions. The theory predicts that the inclusiveness of political institutions
(the parameter σ in the model) is one of the key factors shaping invest-
ments in fiscal capacity. As a proxy for σ I compute for each country the
average value of from 1946 (or independence) to 2000 for its constraints on
the executive, as coded in the Polity IV dataset. 27 Second, I include data on
civil wars. The possibility of a civil conflict is crucial in the theory, having
a negative impact on fiscal capacity trough its effect on political stability.
Although it is endogenously determined by the external threats, I only test
its historical incidence on fiscal capacity. I use data from the UCDP-PRIO, 28
looking at whether a given country is engaged in a civil war in a given year
and computing the average value of from 1946 (or independence) to 2000.
Third, I include a measure of ethnic heterogeneity, from Fearon (2003), 29 as a
proxy for internal fragmentation. As previously suggested, heterogeneity wi-
thin a country, if correlated with heterogeneity among countries, might alter
the mechanism through with external threats affect incumbent’s decisions. 30
Fourth, in order to control for the possibility that my proxy for the historical
incidence of external threats is mainly capturing colonial power, I include a
measure of relative military capacity based on the Composite Index of Natio-
nal Capability (CINC) from the COW project. This index reflects the extent
and depth of the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances
disputes experimented by all countries in the period 1946-2000, in 59% of cases a country
experimented a conflict against contiguous countries only, in the 22% of cases the conflict
were against non-contiguous countries only, and in 19% of cases against both kinds of
enemies.
27. http ://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
28. http ://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/
29. http ://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html
30. According to (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), it might also hinder state building
directly.
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of militarized disputes. 31 First I compute for each year, the average of the
CINC for those countries classified as major powers by the COW that year.
Then I compute, for each country-year, the ratio between their CINC and
this average. Finally, I compute for each country the average of this measure
from 1946 (or independence) to 2000. Fifth, for income (the parameter w
in the model), I use the logarithm of GDP per capita measured in the year
2000 according to the Penn World Tables (Variable "Real GDP par capita in
constant 2005 international prices", in version 6.3). Finally, I include a set of
indicators for legal origins, as in many recent studies of institutions following
La Porta et al. (1998); La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
2.3.2 Cross-Sectional Correlations
Table 2.1 presents the basic correlations. In columns (1)-(4) the dependent
variable is the tax revenue share in GDP, and in columns (5)-(8) the income
tax revenue share in GDP. Each column corresponds to different specifica-
tions, with different set of controls. Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(7) show that,
as expected from the theory, the proxies for external threats are significantly
correlated with both measures of fiscal capacity. Crucially, as predicted by
the theory, the correlation is positive only when the disputes are between
non-contiguous countries. For disputes between contiguous countries,the cor-
relation is negative. 32 This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for
31. Specifically, the CINC measures a nation’s material capabilities and combines values
for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption,
military personnel, and military expenditure.
32. The sizes of the coefficients can be interpreted as follows. In columns (1)-(3), the
estimated coefficient for the prevalence of conflicts with contiguous countries fluctuates
around −1. This means that a country that entails 50% rather than 0% of the last 50
years (or the time since independence) spent in wartime is associated with lower fiscal
capacity in the present by about half a standard deviations in the sample. By a similar
calculation, the estimated coefficient for the prevalence of conflicts with non-contiguous
countries fluctuates around 1.5, which means that a country with a 50% of the last 50
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political institutions, ethnic heterogeneity and historical incidence of civil
war. When controls for national capacity and income are added, the coeffi-
cients are barely statistical significant (at least at 10%). 33
As an additional argument in support of the relevance of the division
between contiguous and non contiguous interstate conflicts, in Table 2.2 I
examine whether fiscal capacity and external threats are correlated when I
do not separate between these two kind of disputes. As expected, the proxy
for the historical incidence of (all kind of) external threats is statistically
insignificant. This provides more evidence that the geographical proximity
between the countries in conflict is key.
An important prediction of the theory is that the differentiated effect of
external threats on fiscal capacity depends on how cohesive are institutions
(σ in the model), and the probability of civil war (p in the model). The model
predicts that external threats from contiguous and non contiguous countries
affect differently fiscal capacity only if there is uncertainly about the onset of
a civil conflict (i.e. p ∈ (0, 1)). Additionally, the theory predicts that the effect
depends on σ. The results in Table 2.1 in some way supports this prediction :
when, in columns (2),(3),(6) and (7), proxies for cohesive institutions and risk
of civil war are included, the effect of external threats (both from contiguous
and non contiguous enemies) is smaller and less statistically significant.
A more direct way to examine this hypothesis is to look at those coun-
tries with high (or low) risk of civil war and very cohesive (or non cohesive)
institutions. Thus, I construct two new variables. First, a dummy variable
equal to one for low risk of civil war (less than the average) ; I call it no civil
war. Second, for cohesive institutions, another dummy equal to one for high
years pent in wartime is associated with a higher present fiscal capacity of about one and
a half standard deviation in the sample.
33. As shown below, the results will be robust to the inclusion of these covariates for
countries with non cohesive institutions and high incidence of civil war.
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Table 2.3: Fiscal capacity and external threats from conti-
guous and non-contiguous enemies : interaction with executive
constraints and civil war
Tax revenue share in GDP Income tax revenue share in GDP
(average 2000-2010) (average 2000-2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ext.threats (cont) 1946-2000 -3.061∗∗ -3.380∗∗ -3.226∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(1.427) (1.518) (1.531) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Ext.threats (non-cont) 1946-2000 4.947∗∗∗ 5.082∗∗∗ 4.730∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(1.858) (1.873) (1.951) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
High exec. constraints -0.598 -1.016 -1.169∗ -0.007 -0.010∗ -0.010∗
(0.673) (0.719) (0.701) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ext.threats (cont) × exec.constr 2.853∗ 3.013∗ 2.980∗ 0.023∗ 0.021 0.022∗
(1.580) (1.670) (1.666) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Ext.threats (non-cont) × exec.constr -3.073 -2.885 -2.468 -0.029 -0.026 -0.027
(2.233) (2.326) (2.333) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
No civil war -1.030 -1.251 -1.178 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.699) (0.758) (0.791) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Av.ext.threats(contiguous) × no.civwar 2.283 2.937∗ 2.804∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.023∗
(1.508) (1.586) (1.606) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Ext.threats (non-contig.) × no.civwar -3.002 -4.126∗ -3.799∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.038∗∗
(2.132) (2.097) (2.071) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
No.civwar × exec.constr 1.194∗ 1.219 1.290∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.010∗
(0.711) (0.750) (0.736) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Ext.threats(cont) × no.civwar × exc.costr -2.611 -2.996 -2.884 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021
(1.747) (1.841) (1.834) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ext.threats(non-cont) × no.civwar × exc.costr 1.914 2.831 2.461 0.024 0.026 0.028
(2.499) (2.531) (2.504) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Exec. constraints 1946-2000 0.460 0.941 0.890 0.004 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.528) (0.573) (0.666) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Civil War 1946-2000 -1.609∗∗ -1.499∗ -1.136 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.692) (0.760) (0.832) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Ext.threats (cont) if exc.costr&civwar -0.208 -0.368 -0.246 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.662) (0.683) (0.672) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ext.threats (non-cont) if exc.costr&civwar 1.875 2.197 2.262∗ 0.017 0.019 0.018
(1.318) (1.390) (1.267) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Ext.threats (cont) if exc.costr&no.civwar -0.536 -0.426 -0.326 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.518) (0.551) (0.526) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Ext.threats (non-cont) if exc.costr&no.civwar 0.787∗ 0.902∗ 0.923∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.450) (0.509) (0.520) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Ext.threats (cont) if no.exc.costr&no.civwar -0.778 -0.443 -0.422 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.496) (0.454) (0.489) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ext.threats (non-cont) if no.exc.costr&no.civwar 1.945∗ 0.956 0.931 0.011∗ 0.007 0.008
(1.047) (0.892) (1.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared 0.322 0.444 0.440 0.378 0.576 0.589
Observations 150 137 136 145 135 134
Ethnic fractionalization N Y Y N Y Y
Dummies for legal origin N Y Y N Y Y
Relatv. Nal. Cap. (CINC) 1946-2000 N N Y N N Y
Log(GDP percapita) in 2000 N N Y N N Y
Notes : The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the tax revenue share in GDP, and in columns (4)-(6) the share of income tax
revenue on GDP, in both cases expressed as an average from 2000 onward. Dependent variables are standardized. All columns report OLS
estimates. Ext.threats (cont) 1946-2000 and Ext.threats (non-cont) 1946-2000 correspond to the share of the years that a country was
involved in a militarized interstate dispute of high intensity with a contiguous and a non-contiguous enemy. High exec. constraints is a
dummy equal to one if the average value of each country’s constraints on the executive is above the average (used as a proxy for high
executive constraint), and No civil war is a dummy equal to one if the proportion of years with civil war over the years without civil
war is below the average (used as a proxy for low risk of civil war). exc.costr and no.exc.costr mean high and low executive constraints
respectively, and civwar and no.civwar mean high and low risk of civil war, respectively. For the other controls, and sources see Table 2.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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executive constraints (higher than the average). I interact these dummies
with my proxies for the historical incidence of external threats. The results
are shown in Table 2.3. In the first two lines, the coefficients for external
threats from contiguous and non contiguous enemies represent the effect in
the case the risk of civil war is above the average, and institutions are not
cohesive (low σ). As expected, for the case of contiguous threats (high σ)
the effect is negative, and for non-contiguous threats (high σ), the effect is
positive. Interestingly, this result is now robust to all specifications. At the
bottom of the table, I present the effect of both kind of external threats for
the other possible combinations. Also as predicted by the theory, for the case
of cohesive institutions (high σ), the only effect that exists is positive (for no
civil wars), confirming the hypothesis that when institutions are cohesive, an
external threat contributes to state-building because it is more more difficult
that the domestic opposition prefers as incumbent the foreign power.
Of course, as previously stated, these cross-sectional correlations are not
reliable enough for any meaningful test of the theory. However, it is encou-
raging that the basic correlations in the data are consistent with the theory.
One of the main drawbacks of this analysis is that countries experimenting
conflicts with contiguous and non contiguous enemies differ in many institu-
tional, policy, historical and cultural aspects. In particular, past fiscal capa-
city, for which I do not have data, may be highly correlated with present fiscal
capacity, and may have been an important driver of a country’s decision to
engage in interstate conflicts. Thus cross-country regressions are unlikely to
reveal the causal effect of external threats on fiscal capacity. More convincing
test for the theory should exploit time-series variation.
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2.4 Conclusion
In most of the recent literature on state capacity the significance of inter-
state wars in state-building relies on the assumption that threats from exter-
nal enemies generate common interests among groups in society, leading to
larger investments in state capacity. In addition, external and internal dis-
putes are conceived in this literature as two distinct and independent types
of conflicts. However, a large number of cases and some cross-country correla-
tions suggest that this might not be the case for last century’s conflicts, most
of them occurring in developing countries. This chapter contributes to these
literature by developing an alternative explanation based on the possibility
of a close relation between interstate conflicts and civil wars, and in which
interstate warfare is not a common-interest public good.
In the theoretical analysis a government must face two kind of threats,
one from a foreign country, and other from an internal opposition. Crucially,
the model admits a possible link between the internal opposition and the fo-
reign country. A first main result establishes that in equilibrium, investment
in fiscal capacity depends on the strength of this link : when it is strong,
the opposition and foreign country’s actions are strategic complements and
reinforce each other, leading to higher probability of civil war, which raises in-
stability and leads to smaller investment in fiscal capacity. And when the link
between the opposition and the foreign country is weak, opposition and fo-
reign country’s actions are strategic substitutes, so the external threat makes
the opposition less belligerent, increases the political life of the incumbent
government making him more willing to invest in fiscal capacity.
The interplay between political stability and investment in fiscal capacity
that supports the relation between external threat and fiscal capacity leads
to an additional and important result : while less political stability trans-
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lates into less fiscal capacity, more stability does not automatically imply
more state building. Whether or not they are equivalent depends on how
cohesive are institutions : for institutions sufficient cohesive, the gains from
the higher stability might not compensate the bad outcomes from a more
probable foreign administration, an then more stability translates into less
state-building.
A rough inspection of the data suggests that some basic correlations are
consistent with the theory. In particular, using as a proxy for the strength of
the link between a country’s internal oppositions its foreign enemy the fact
that the countries in conflict are or not contiguous, it is found that those
countries that during more years experienced external threats from conti-
guous countries tend to be also those countries with less fiscal capacity. The
opposite occurs by looking at those threats from non contiguous countries.
This pattern is coherent with the first main result if the geographical proxi-
mity between two countries is positively correlated with the strength of the
links between a country’s opposition and its main foreign enemy.
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Chapitre 3
Conflict externalization and
negotiation : theory and case
evidence from Colombia
3.1 Introduction
Existing theoretical literature on civil wars often assumes that a group’s
decision of whether or not to fight depends exclusively on the domestic
context, i.e. on other domestic groups’ decisions. 1 However, as increasing
empirical literature on conflict is demonstrating, the regional context also
has an important effect on domestic conflicts. 2 The contemporary conscious-
1. See Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Jackson and Morelli (2011) for reviews of the
literature. See Kydd (2010) (and below in this introduction) for a review of some of the
few exceptions in formal models.
2. See Mason, Weingarten, and Fett (1999), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Gleditsch
(2007), Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) and Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch,
and Salehyan (2009); Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2011) for evidence showing
that the regional context (e.g. a conflict in a neighboring country, a highly autocratic
region, trans-boundary ethnic groups, or direct intervention of external parties) matters
for the onset, incidence and duration of civil war.
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ness is well aware of the regional dimensions of conflicts in Burma, Nicaragua,
Kosovo, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, for example. 3 At the time of writing, mi-
litary tensions in the Ukraine between pro-Russian rebels and pro-Western
leaders were occurring, and an understanding of this conflict is clearly im-
possible without seriously considering its regional dimensions. 4
To fill this gap, I develop a simple model of conflict externalization, and
provide new case-study evidence from Colombia. The objective of the model
is not merely to formalize an already existing theory, but to also propose a
new mechanism through which the possibility that an external party parti-
cipates in an internal conflict could significantly affect the outcome of the
conflict. Besides illustrating the applicability of the model, the Colombian
case provides new evidence on this topic.
In the model, a government and a group of rebels simultaneously choose
whether or not to use violence against each other. Violence is costly, but can
also decrease the opponent’s military resources, which increases the proba-
bility of victory for the aggressor. Crucially, the use of violence might cause
a third (foreign) actor to join in the conflict. When this happens, I say that
the domestic conflict “externalizes.”
This externalization changes the power dynamic between the two domes-
tic actors. I assume that only the government’s use of violence can trigger
such externalization. For example, consider a group of rebels strategically
located along a porous border, where the neighboring country shares the
same ideology or ethnicity as the rebels. Given the porosity of the border,
an attack on the rebels by the domestic government might imply a violation
3. See South (2008) for the conflict in Burma, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2004) for the
Nicaragua-Contras conflict, Crawford (2001); Kuperman (2008) for Kosovo, Ali, Elbadawi,
and El-Batahani (2005) for Sudan, Bouckaert and Houry (2007) for Lebanon, and Gunter
(2008) and Morelli and Pischedda (2013) for the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict.
4. See The Guardian (2014b, April 13) and Gorodnichenko, Mylovanov, and Talavera
(2014).
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of the sovereignty of the neighboring country. Given the sympathies between
the rebels and the neighboring country’s government, the aggression could
motivate a military response, starting a conflict spiral that might lead to an
international war. 5
In case of an external conflict, the domestic government faces an addi-
tional decrease in its military resources, which indirectly favours the rebels.
I take the probability of participation by the external party as given, and
focus on how the threat of an external intervention affects the likelihood of
peace. The first main contribution of the chapter is to show that the risk of
externalization increases the likelihood of peace, but that this only happens
if the domestic government is sufficiently powerful relative to the rebels, and
if the risk of externalization is sufficiently high. The intuition is as follows.
When a government is very powerful, the rebels know they cannot win with a
violent attack without a simultaneous attack by a foreign government. Thus,
when the domestic government prefers peace, and there is no risk of externa-
lization, the rebels’ best response is also peace. From the government’s point
of view, the choice depends on how great the risk of externalization is. If it is
low, it is optimal for them to attack when attacked ; by attacking, they can
guarantee a victory. In this scenario, peace is very unlikely. However, when
the risk of externalization is high, the story is different : the government
knows that an attack can trigger an external conflict, with which its chances
of victory significantly decrease. Thus, since an attack by the rebels won’t
make the government lose the internal conflict, the government prefers to
tolerate an attack (from the rebels). This strategy, combined with the rebels’
interest in a peace settlement, makes peace very likely.
5. As I will argue later, this situation perfectly matches the recent dynamic of the
Colombian internal conflict, but it is not exclusive to this case. Burma-Thailand border
clashes prompted by Burma’s pursuit of Karen National Liberation Army rebels across
the border into Thailand is another example. See South (2008, 2012).
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The second main contribution of the chapter is to provide new case-study
evidence from Colombia. Colombia has suffered the longest-running internal
conflict in the world. Although many armed groups have participated in the
conflict, the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has
been the largest non-government actor. The conflict has been accompanied
by a permanent process of government negotiations with all groups, including
three failed peace talks with the FARC. In September 2012, after an all-out
military campaign against the FARC during which this group suffered the
worst blows in its history, the Colombian government announced the start
of new peace negotiations. This announcement surprised many analysts and
national leaders, who expected a few more years of war, ending with a go-
vernment victory. At the time of writing, both the FARC and the Colombian
government were expressing their optimism, announcing that these peace
talks have gone significantly further than ever before.
Despite its relevance, to the best of my knowledge no rationalist expla-
nation has been proposed to account for both the onset and development of
Colombia’s ongoing peace talks. I show that the risk of externalization of the
Colombian conflict (particularly intervention by Venezuela) is at the root of
the peace negotiations, creating what some literature on conflict has called
a “ripe for resolution” situation. 6
In the years preceding the peace talks, the geography of the Colombian
conflict changed dramatically : the FARC lost presence in regions in the
interior of the country, and strategically moved toward border areas with
Venezuela and Ecuador. An ideological affinity between the FARC and these
two countries’ governments, as well as the porosity of the borders in these re-
gions, was crucial to the government’s decision to engage in peace talks. The
movement of the FARC opened the door to an externalization of the conflict :
6. See Zartman (2000) and Pruitt (2005).
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a violation of the Venezuelan territorial sovereignty by the Colombian army
was very likely if the conflict continued, as well as a military response from
Venezuela if this aggression were to occur. Once aware of the high risk of
interstate war, the Colombian government changed its strategy : the pre-
sence in Venezuela of the FARC’s top leaders would be tolerated, and peace
talks would be encouraged. This decision was optimal from the government’s
perspective, given that a FARC defeat was impossible without risking a war
with Venezuela, and that a revolution was very unlikely. Since for the FARC
a peace settlement was also the best response given its limited chance of
victory, the context was very favourable for a peaceful outcome.
Clearly, my proposed explanation about the recent developments of the
Colombian internal conflict is not the only one, and the risk of externalization
is not the only factor that could explain the onset and evolution of the ongoing
peace talks. Less ideological extremism and less militarism from both parties
could also have played a crucial role (see Medina, 2012). However, the risk of
externalization should be taken into account in any discussion on the issue.
My model can be best described as a model of third party intervention,
and it is related to the few but increasing theoretical studies on this topic
(see Fearon, 1998; Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Werner, 2000; Crawford,
2003; Carment and Rowlands, 2006; Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2007; Grigo-
ryan, 2010; Yuen, 2009; Kydd and Straus, 2013). The model is consistent
with what this literature calls the “deterrence” hypothesis : the idea that an
external party can play a crucial role in the outcome of an internal conflict
by deterring one of the domestic parties from making a decision that harms
his opponent (see Fearon, 1998; Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Werner, 2000;
Crawford, 2003). In the model, peace is possible because the risk of externa-
lization deters the government from attacking the rebels, given that it could
prompt externalization that could make rebels stronger. Although the argu-
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ment does not account for “moral hazard” — that an external intervention
biased in favour of one party might make this party more belligerent 7 — the
model can be easily extended to include this possibility. 8 However, in the
context of the Colombian conflict, this phenomenon does not seem to play
an important role, and despite its simplicity, the model is able to provide
non-trivial and new and empirical predictions. In particular, as in Kydd and
Straus (2013), I find that the fact that a biased external intervention makes
war less likely depends on whether power is balanced, but unlike them, I
find that peace is more likely when the government is stronger, even if an
intervention strengthens the rebel group.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present the
model. Section 3.4 presents and analyzes the case study based on the model.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
In this section, I develop a simple model that illustrates how the risk of a
domestic conflict externalizing can affect the outcome of the conflict. In the
model, the world is composed of two countries, H (home) and F (foreign),
possibly neighbors. The population of H is divided between two groups : one
in power (G, for government), the other in opposition (R, for rebels). It is
assumed that F is homogeneous in its composition.
The government and rebels play a simultaneous-move game in which each
7. See (Carment and Rowlands, 2006; Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2007; Yuen, 2009; Gri-
goryan, 2010; Kydd and Straus, 2013).
8. As I will discuss later, it is enough to assume that the costs of using violence are
different for the government and rebels. In this case, a high risk of externalization will give
the rebels more incentives to attack when attacked. The inclusion of this possibility does
not change the key findings.
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group decides whether or not to use violence against the other. The model
focuses on this interaction, taking the probability of action by F (provided
that the government uses violence) as given. However, F will be crucial for the
analysis : an eventual conflict between G and R might externalize, forcing
F to intervene. The game has two possible outcomes : a violent conflict
or peace. In both cases, the outcome depends on the relative resources or
military strength of each party, which (with some abuse of notation) are
initially set to G, R and F for the government, rebels and foreign country,
respectively.
A violent conflict occurs if either G or R decides to attack the other party.
When both parties decide not to attack, peace occurs and no party incurs a
cost. The outcome of the game in determined by the initial strength of each
party.
The use of violence implies a fixed cost C > 0 for both parties. In addition,
if either G or R attacks, the resources of the attacked party decreases by
some amount L > 0. L can be interpreted as the relative gain (in resources
or power) for attacking. 9
Crucially, the use of violence creates the possibility that the conflict ex-
ternalizes, which means that F enters the game as an additional enemy of
G. This happens with probability φ, and can occur only if G attacks. The
consequence of F entering the game is an interstate dispute between G and
F . An interstate conflict favours R by decreasing G’s resources or power by
(with some abuse of notation) F . Consider, for example, an internal conflict
where some members of the opposition are located close to a border that H
shares with F (see Figure 3.1). Then, given the proximity of R to F , and the
9. The assumption that C and L are the same for both the government and the rebels
seem restrictive. However, when properly constrained, the results are robust to a pos-
sible difference. This assumption simplifies the analysis, and allows one to focus on more
interesting results.
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mobility of R between the two countries because of either porous borders or
sympathy from F , an offensive action by G in R’s controlled territory might
harm the citizens of F or be interpreted by F as a violation of its sovereignty.
G R
FH
Figure 3.1: Possible scenario of civil war externalization
I assume that all players knowG, F and L, but have imperfect information
about R. In particular, I make the following assumption about R :
ASSUMPTION 2. R is a continuous random variable with domain R,
cumulative distribution function Z, density z, and mean R. In addition, Z ′′ <
0, and Z(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0.
In other words, the resources or power of the opposition are unknown to
both the opposition and the government. 10 It intends to capture the idea
that the opposition is somewhat informal, in the sense that its resources (in
terms of arms or troops) are less known than those of the government. This is
particularly true when borders are porous, and if there is uncertainty about
how effectively F surveils its border, as the level of arms or troops flowing in
from F is unknown.
Finally, I assume the most simple and natural technology of conflict, that
the domestic group with the most power wins the game. This means that if
the resources of the government and rebels are A and B, respectively, the
government’s probability of victory is Pr[A > B]. 11
10. Note that I assume that all R is unknown. This is without a loss of generality ; the
results do not change if I instead assume that a part of these resources is random.
11. Note that although this assumption could make the war technology very sensitive
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Timing
The timing of the game is as follows :
1. G and R decide simultaneously whether to attack each other ; if either
decides to attack, a conflict occurs.
2. If neither party attacks, peace occurs ; in this case, a party wins with
a probability that depends on its relative initial resources.
3. If there is a violent conflict, there are some exogenous costs C > 0 for
both parties. In addition, the resources of a party decrease in L if it is
attacked by its domestic opponent.
4. If G decides to attack R, the conflict externalizes with a probability φ.
If this occurs, an interstate conflict between G and F begins ; if that
happens, the resources of G reduce by F .
5. The conflict ends. Each group gets its payoff according to the outcome.
Payoffs
As previously noted, the outcome of the game (and payoffs) when either
peace or conflict occurs depends on the relative resources or power of each
party. These resources determine the probability of victory in either case.
Once the conflict is resolved, the winner gets V and the loser gets W , where
V > W . Thus, if both G and R decide to attack, G expects to get
V
[
φPr[G− L− F > R− L] + (1− φ)Pr[G− L > R− L]
]
+W
[
φPr[G− L− F < R− L] + (1− φ)Pr[G− L < R− L]
]
− C
(3.1)
to the resources of the parties, it seems a reasonable modelling given that the resources
of only one of the parties has a stochastic component. For a discussion on the theoretical
foundations of conflict technologies and, in particular, their stochastic derivations, see Jia
(2008) and Jia and Skaperdas (2012). As Jia (2008) shows, if I instead assume that the
resources of both parties have an stochastic component, a more natural choice would be a
proportional form (i.e. f(A)f(A)+f(B) ).
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The first line in (3.1) represents G’s payoff in the event of victory, with
φPr[G− L− F > R− L] representing its probability of victory in the event
that the conflict externalizes, and (1−φ)Pr[G−L < R−L] representing the
probability of victory in the event that the conflict does not externalize. In
the second line of (3.1), φPr[G− L− F < R − L] is the probability that R
wins if F intervenes, and (1− φ)Pr[G− L < R − L] is the probability that
there is no such intervention. In order to simplify the notation, and without a
loss of generality, I assume that V = 1 andW = 0. Note that by Assumption
2, Pr[X < R] = Z(X). Thus, by replacing these expressions in (3.1) and
rearranging, it is easy to see that (3.1) is equivalent to
φZ(G− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G)− C (3.2)
Let us use a to denote a decision to use violence (i.e. attack), and let
p represent a decision not to use violence (i.e. peace). Then, let us use g,
r and f to denote the actions taken by G, R and F respectively, where
g, r, f ∈ {a, p}.
The payoffs for all the cases, after having rearranged and omitting some
constants, are given in Table 3.1.
r = a r = p
g = a G : φZ(G− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G)− C G : φZ(G+ L− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G+ L)− C
R : −[φZ(G− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G)]− C R : −[φZ(G+ L− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G+ L)]− C
g = p G : Z(G− L)− C G : Z(G)
R : −Z(G− L)− C R : −Z(G)
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix : general case
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3.3 Equilibrium
I now solve the model, focussing on pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE). I
start with a few remarks about the best-response functions. Then I consider
a baseline case with no externalization, and study the general case.
3.3.1 Best Responses
Let us use g(y) to denote the best response of G given that R plays r = y,
and r(x) to denote the best response of R given that G plays g = x. Note
that for x, y ∈ {a, p}, (x, y) is a NE if and only if g(y) = x and r(x) = y.
Note first that it is always the case that
r(a) = a (3.3)
This follows directly from Table 3.1, observing that given g = a, R always
prefers to play r = a under the assumption that L > 0 and Z ′ > 0. The in-
tuition is that once g = a, an attack by R is costless (since g = a implies that
C > 0 for both parties), and by playing r = a, R can increase its probability
of victory. Note that (3.3) implies that (a, p) cannot be an equilibrium.
Now I introduce an assumption that rules out the possibility that violence
is a strictly dominant strategy for both parties.
ASSUMPTION 3. (i) G > L and (ii) Pr[R > L] ≥ (1−C).
Assumption 3 states that the harm that R and G can cause by using
violence is limited by their own resources. Part (i) says that the harm that G
can cause cannot exceed its own resources. The intuition behind this assump-
tion is that governments experience important constraints in the proportion
of their resources they can spend on warfare. Part (ii) captures the idea that
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rebels are informal armies and therefore have fewer constraints about the
methods they can employ, but they also have some resource limitations. Spe-
cifically, part (ii) states that although the probability that R is greater than
L is not 1 (which would be the case if they operated like the government),
this probability is lower bounded. This bound decreases with C, which means
that when R has more to lose (greater C), R’s constraints are more severe.
This threshold also guarantees that C is not too small to make a violent
conflict unavoidable.
Crucially, Assumption 3 implies that r(p) = p. 12 That r(p) = p is always
true could make Assumption 3 to look too strong, since in reality there may be
circumstances in which rebels attack even if they are not attacked. However,
this assumption is not essential for the main result, and helps us to eliminate
some uninteresting cases. For instance, without Assumption 3, C can be large
enough to make r = a a strictly dominant strategy for the rebels (i.e. that
r(x) = a for x ∈ {a, p}). Under these circumstances, peace is not possible.
It is easy to see that r = a occurs for a sufficiently small G (but G > L),
which is also true in my main result. Thus, instead of saying that peace is
impossible for a sufficiently small G, I say that where G is small, peace is
very unlikely. 13
Summarizing, Assumptions 2 and 3 result in r(a) = a and r(p) = p. In
next two subsections I will identify g(a) and g(p).
12. See “Proof of Proposition 1" in the Annex. C
13. The fact that r(a) = a and r(p) = p for all φ implies that R’s actions are insensitive to
the likelihood of an external intervention. This rules out the possibility of “moral hazard,”
i.e., that an external intervention biased in favour of the rebels motivates them to be more
belligerent. This result depends on the assumption that the costs of violence are the same
for the government and rebels. This allows us to focus on more interesting results.
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3.3.2 No Externalization
In this subsection I examine the case where φ = 0, which serves as a
baseline model for the study of the impact of the risk of externalization on
the outcome of conflict. Table 3.2 shows the payoff matrix for this case, which
results from replacing φ = 0 in Table 3.1.
r = a r = p
g = a G : Z(G)− C G : Z(G+ L)− C
R : −Z(G)− C R : −Z(G+ L)− C
g = p G : Z(G− L)− C G : Z(G)
R : −Z(G− L)− C R : −Z(G)
Table 3.2: Payoff matrix : case of no externalization
I examine g(a) and g(p) (from last subsection, we have that r(a) = a and
r(p) = p). First, note from Table 3.2 that it is always true that g(a) = a.
This follows directly from Assumption 2, Assumption 3.(i) and the fact that
L > 0. 14 Since by (3.3) we also have that r(a) = a, this implies that (a, a)
is always a NE. The intuition behind this result is that if there is no risk of
externalization, G always prefers to attack when attacked ; by attacking, G
increases its probability of victory without increasing the costs of violence,
given that these costs are already present because of R’s action.
Second, it is also possible to show from Table 3.2 that g(p) = p. This new
finding, combined with r(p) = p, implies that (p, p) is also an equilibrium.
These results are summarized in the following proposition :
PROPOSITION 1. If Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, for the case φ = 0, both
peace and war are potential outcomes of the game.
14. By Assumption 2 and the fact that L > 0, Z(G) ≥ Z(G − L), and by Assumption
3.(ii), G > L > 0, so Z(G) > Z(G− L).
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Démonstration. See Annex C.
This proposition essentially says that if φ = 0, we have a stag-hunt game
with two strict equilibria, (a, a) and (p, p). Note that Assumption 3 is crucial
for the existence of two equilibria. If we instead assume that C can be very
small and L very large, the only equilibrium is (a, a) and we have a prisoner’s
dilemma. As mentioned previously, the assumption that C is not too small
to make a violent conflict unavoidable allows us to focus on more interesting
cases.
3.3.3 General Case
I now study the case where 1 ≥ φ ≥ 0. For this situation to occur, a
potential externalization and corresponding attack by F must be able to
effectively harm G. However, the harm doesn’t have to be catastrophic ; it is
enough that an attack by F causes more harm to G than that caused by R.
More formally, we need :
ASSUMPTION 4. F > L
The intuition for this condition and its relevance is the following. If F ≤ L,
the payoff that G gets when attacking and when externalization occurs is
greater that the payoff it gets when G does not attack, but is attacked by the
rebels. In other words, when F ≤ L, attacking is a strictly dominant strategy
for G, because the harm it suffers from F in the worst-case scenario (where
it is attacked by F ) is smaller than the harm he can suffer from R in the
worst-case scenario (where R attacks). Thus, when F ≤ L, the outcome of
the game is the same regardless of the risk of externalization, so φ can only
have an impact when F > L.
I can now establish a first simple result, which only requires Assumptions
2, 3 and 4 :
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PROPOSITION 2. As φ→ 1, there is always peace.
Démonstration. See Annex C.
I now explore what happens when φ < 1. I introduce the following as-
sumption about F ; although it is not required for the main result, it simplifies
the proof, and does not alter the main argument.
ASSUMPTION 5. F ≥ G
This assumption states that the foreign country is at least as powerful as
the domestic government.
I can now establish the main result. It includes the following threshold :
φ = 1− Z(F − L)
Z(F )
(3.4)
PROPOSITION 3. If Assumptions 2 to 5 hold, we have that :
(1) If φ > φ, there exists a unique threshold G(φ, L, F ) defined by
φZ(G− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G)− Z(G− L) = 0 (3.5)
such that
(1.1) Peace is the only outcome of the game if G > G(φ, L, F )
(1.2) Both peace and war are potential outcomes of the game if G ≤
G(φ, L, F )
(2) If φ ≤ φ, both peace and war are outcomes of the game regardless of G.
Démonstration. See Annex C.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. The risk of externalization
increases the tolerance of the government to an attack from rebels : when this
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tolerance is sufficiently large, such that the costs of a violent response are
too high, peace is chosen. This is coherent with the “deterrence” hypothesis
referred to in the introduction.
What is interesting about this simple mechanism is that the risk of ex-
ternalization affects the level of tolerance only when the government is suf-
ficiently powerful. A weak government, when attacked by the rebels, can be
seriously harmed, so it prefers to attack too, even if the risk of externaliza-
tion is very high. In this case, peace is unlikely and the risk of intervention
is irrelevant. Conversely, a strong government will not lose a lot when atta-
cked only by the rebels, so it prefers to tolerate this violence rather than risk
serious harm in the event of externalization.
To the best of my knowledge, this result is new in the literature. In Sec-
tion 4, I show that it is crucial to understanding recent, intriguing peace
talks between the Colombian government and the FARC. First, however, I
expand on the implications of Proposition 3, and establish some additional
consequences from comparative statics.
How powerful must the government be to ensure peace ?
In Proposition 3, we have that peace is the only outcome if the government
is sufficiently powerful relative to a threshold, denoted by G and implicitly
defined in (3.5). However, it is not clear what this threshold means and, in
particular, how is it related to the strength of the government’s main enemy.
In the following proposition, I compare G with the expected power of the
rebels, that in Assumption 2 was denoted by R. Crucially, the result depends
on whether L ≷ R.
PROPOSITION 4. For L ≥ R, it is always the case that G > R. For
L ≤ R, there exists a φ′ ≥ φ > 0 such that G < R for all φ > φ′ and G ≥ R
for all φ ≤ φ′.
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Démonstration. See Annex C.
Proposition 4 states that whether or not the government must be signifi-
cantly more powerful than the rebels in order to ensure peace depends on the
relation between L and R. On the one hand, when L > R, the government
must be significantly more powerful than the rebels (such that G > G > R).
On the other hand, when L ≤ R, provided that the risk of externalization
is large enough, the government does not need to be more powerful (i.e.
G ∼ R > G), and could even be slightly weaker (such that R > G > G).
3.3.4 Comparative statics
In this subsection I characterize φ and G as defined in (3.4) and (3.5), and
establish some comparative statics. First, by implicitly differentiating (3.5),
we have the following important consequence :
COROLLARY 1. ∂G
∂φ
< 0
Démonstration. See Annex C.
Corollary 1, together with Proposition 1, allows us to characterize the
different equilibria as a function of G and φ. This is shown in Figure 3.2.
Peace is the only outcome of the game when both φ and G are large enough.
Otherwise, as in the case of no externalization, peace and war are both pos-
sible. With a sufficiently small G, an increase in the risk of externalization
does not affect the probability of peace.
The following corollary establishes the dependence of G and φ on F and
L.
COROLLARY 2. (i) ∂φ
∂F
< 0 ; (ii) ∂G
∂L
> 0 ; (iii) ∂φ
∂L
> 0
Démonstration. See Annex C.
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Figure 3.2: Comparative statics : government strength versus probability of
externalization
1.5
0
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G
φ
(p,p) and (a,a)
(p,p)
E [R ]
← G
φ
L
Strenght of Government (G) versus risk of externalization (φ). The graph is a numerical
simulation corresponding to R ∼ exp(λ), Z(x) = 1 − exp(−λx), E[R] = R = λ−1 = 0.9,
L = 0.6, F = 1.5, C = 0.8 and M = 1
Part (i) of Corollary 2 says that an increase in the resources of the foreign
country makes peace more likely by decreasing the risk of externalization
necessary to ensure peace. Parts (ii) and (iii) state that an increase in the
efficiency of attacks makes peace less likely by increasing both the risk of
externalization and the strength of government necessary to ensure peace.
3.4 Case study evidence from Colombia
In this section, I provide case-study evidence from Colombia, a country
recently exemplifying the dynamics of my model. 15 I use information from
15. Reports from Colombia’s Historical Memory Group provide useful background. For
a general overview, refer to Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013b), and for information on
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the main actors in the Colombian conflict, as well as from the secondary
academic literature. The evidence suggests that in the ongoing peace nego-
tiations between Colombia and the FARC, the risk of an interstate conflict
with Venezuela and Ecuador, caused by an strategic retreat of the FARC
to Colombia’s border regions, played a crucial role. In this section, I argue
that the mechanism through which the risk of such interstate conflicts affects
decisions is that proposed in my model.
3.4.1 Background
The current Colombian conflict dates back to the late 1950s. Its origins
have been associated with the founding of the FARC, which is currently Co-
lombia’s largest and best-equipped rebel group. 16 The FARC was not affilia-
ted with either of Colombia’s two main political parties (Liberal or Conser-
vative), but was ideologically aligned with the Communist Party. 17 Other
smaller rebel groups, also independent of the party system, have participated
in Colombia’s conflict since then. These include other left-wing insurgents,
and right-wing paramilitaries. 18 Between 1958 and 2012, the conflict claimed
at least 220,000 lives, 19 and its roots have been associated with struggles for
land, labor conditions and tributary extraction. 20
Since the 1980s, the Colombian conflict has been accompanied by a per-
manent process of negotiation with all groups, including three failed peace
the FARC, see Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013a). For a good analysis of the Colombian
conflict in recent years, see Medina (2010)
16. See Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013b, Cap. 2).
17. See Palacios and Safford (2002, p. 355) and Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013a, p.
62).
18. The most important left-wing insurgent other than the FARC is the National Libe-
ration Army (ELN), and among the right-wing paramilitaries, the main group was the the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which officially demobilized in 2006.
19. See Grupo de Memoria Histórica (2013b, p. 31).
20. See Sanchez (2001).
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talks with the FARC. 21 The most recent attempt, known as the “Caguán”
peace process, took place from 1998 to 2002 between the government and the
FARC. These talks resoundingly failed. A relatively strong rebel group, ama-
teurish bargaining teams and spoilers (actors who use violence to undermine
peace talks) are some of the explanations given for Caguán’s failure. 22 The
breakdown of the Caguán peace process led to the election of a relatively
new hawkish and far-right president, Alvaro Uribe, and started a period of
intense war between the government and the FARC.
Government empowerment
During the 2000s and early 2010s, Colombia’s government pursued an
all-out military effort against the FARC. Due to an increase in defense spen-
ding and a significant improvement in military effectiveness, the Colombian
government achieved relative success : during this period, the FARC suffe-
red the worst blows in its history. According to the Colombian Ministry of
Defense, 39856 FARC members were captured or killed from 2002 to 2011.
In the same period around 17343 members demobilized. The same ministry
estimates that during this period the number of FARC combatants was hal-
ved. 23 The government’s military victories also included the killing of several
FARC leaders, including its top leader, in a action characterized by the Co-
lombian president as “the most devastating blow that this group has suffered
in its history.” 24 These actions were deeply resented by the FARC. 25
21. See Sanchez (2001), Chernick (2009) and Nasi (2006, 2009).
22. See Nasi (2006, 2009) and Kline (2007).
23. See Ministerio de Defensa (2009) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
vnuqZOwOBoo. The exact number of FARC members captured, killed and deserting have
been debated by analysts (Avila, 2013; Rico, 2013) and the FARC (FARC-EP, 2013b, Fe-
bruary 12), but analysts agree with the government that the number of combatants fell
by roughly a half during the 2000s.
24. Translation by the author from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UI0CJzJLsxU.
25. See http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=138858.
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During this period, the FARC lost presence in key regions in the center
of the country (i.e. in the departments of Cundinamarca, Tolima, Boyacá
and Santander) and retreated to border areas with Venezuela and Ecuador
(i.e. to the departments of Nariño, Cauca, Caquetá, Norte de Santander and
Arauca). 26 FARC’s decision to move to the periphery of the country was
strategic, given ideological similarities between the FARC and Venezuela’s
and Ecuador’s governments, and the porosity of the borders with these two
countries. The FARC’s decision, combined with a hawkish military strategy
by the Colombian government, brought the three countries to the brink of
war. I argue that it also raised the likelihood of a peaceful solution.
On the brink of war
In March 2008, Colombian security forces crossed the border into Ecua-
dor to assault an outpost of the FARC. More than two dozen rebels were
killed, including a high-ranking rebel leader thought by many to be FARC’s
second-in-command. The Colombian government also captured computers
with documents indicating that Venezuela had been supporting the FARC. 27
The assault caused a serious diplomatic incident between Colombia and
Ecuador. Ecuador immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia.
Venezuela, in solidarity with Ecuador, expelled Colombia’s ambassador and
other diplomats. 28 Venezuela and Ecuador also sent troops to the Colombian
border, advising that any additional violations of their sovereignty would re-
sult in war. 29 The highest point of tension was in reached in July 2010 when,
some weeks before a change in Colombia’s government, the Colombian press
secretary provided evidence of a FARC presence in Venezuela to international
26. See IISS (2011) and, in particular, Avila (2013).
27. See IISS (2011).
28. See The New York Times (2008, March 4)
29. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xp7Gs1-tm1w.
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authorities. 30
In the following days, the Colombian Ambassador to the Organization
of American States (OAS) presented a series of photographs, maps, coordi-
nates, and videos proving the presence of illegal armed groups in Venezuelan
territory. 31 Venezuela reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with Co-
lombia, sending more troops to the border and ordering them to be on full
alert. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said :
To maintain our dignity, we do not have any other option but
to sever diplomatic ties with Colombia ... We will be on alert —
I have ordered the maximum alert along our border ... Uribe is
a threat for peace. He is even able to establish a fake camp in
our territory and raid it to start a war (Hugo Chávez, July 22,
2010) 32
The Colombian government was aware of the high risk of war, particularly
if it violated a neighbor’s sovereignty. The Colombian Minister of Defense at
the time, said :
I say privately to President Uribe, “If you authorize, I bring Mar-
quez and everyone who are there [in Venezuela], without troops,
and I guarantee that these people are in Colombia [...] he did not
authorize. He said it was too risky for the country and for natio-
nal security ... I do believe that a war with Venezuela was very
30. According to the Colombian press secretary, “For six years the Colombian govern-
ment sustained a patient dialogue with the Venezuelan government, on various occasions
providing it information on the location of terrorists in that territory. All was unsuccess-
ful with respect to terrorist leaders. We must once again consider taking the matter to
international authorities.” See Presidencia de Colombia (2010, July 16).
31. See OAS (2010, July 22) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2W0EO27yEQ.
32. Translation of the author from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ql_AFMvwg9U.
See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_pMDx1ihhQo
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close” (Gabriel Silva, 2013) 33
A moment in history
In July 2010, Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Two
weeks later, a new Colombian president, Juan Manuel Santos, took office.
Elected with a mandate to continue Uribe’s hard-line policies, and closely
associated with Uribe’s successful military campaigns against the FARC,
Santos was known for his strategic pragmatism. 34
From his early days in office, Santos combined an extremely aggressive
campaign against the FARC with an effort to improve diplomatic relations
with Venezuela. Ten days after he was sworn in, diplomatic relations with
Venezuela were restored, 35 and approximately one month later, Santos an-
nounced the death of the FARC’s second-in-command and leader of its stron-
gest fighting division. One year later, the FARC’s top leader, who went by
the nom de guerre of Alfonso Cano, was killed. The FARC’s choice for Cano’s
replacement, whose nom de guerre was Timochenko, was also influential in
the future of the conflict : Timochenko was known for operating along the
border with Venezuela, 36 and for having lived there previously. 37 In addition,
many people had raised concerns about the close ties between Timochenko
and important figures in the Venezuelan government. 38
In September 2012, almost one year after Timochenko had become FARC’s
leader, the Colombian president announced that his government and the
33. See Davila (2014, p. 89-91).
34. See Revista Semana (2010, June 12).
35. This decision would lead to a rupture in Santos’s relationship with Uribe (Davila,
2014, p. 90).
36. See El Tiempo (2011b, November 15).
37. See El Tiempo (2011a, November 19).
38. Timochenko has been called the FARC’s “ambassador” to Venezuela (see Caracol
Noticias, 2010, March 2).
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FARC had agreed to start a peace process. The announcement surprised
analysts and important national leaders. 39 These peace talks were the first
open negotiations in a decade. After one-and-a-half years of talks, both the
FARC 40 and the Colombian government 41 expressed their optimism, an-
nouncing that these peace talks have gone significantly further than any
previous talks.
3.4.2 Analysis
Why did the FARC and the Colombian government decide to pursue
peace ? I suggest that the risk of externalization of the Colombian conflict to
Venezuela is at the root of the peace talks, creating what some literature on
conflict has called a “ripe for resolution” situation. 42
FARC’s motivations for the new attempt at peace are relatively clear : the
significant blows suffered between 2002 and 2011 seem to be key. 43 FARC’s
top leader has recognized to the relevance of these blows : “I can’t deny
we’ve received serious blows — and extremely painful ones. The deaths of
four members of the National Secretariat can’t be minimized [...] it’s obvious
that conditions of today are not the same as those a decade ago.” 44 FARC’s
prior losses mean that its costs to continue the conflict would be very high.
In terms of the model proposed in this chapter, FARC’s best response
to peace is peace (i.e., r(p) = p)). It is possible that this had always been
FARC’s strategy. 45 In any case, the FARC are clearly aware of the costs
39. See Revista Semana (2012, September 3) for initial reactions.
40. See FARC-EP (2014, April 30).
41. See The Guardian (2014a, March 16).
42. See Zartman (2000) and Pruitt (2005).
43. See Pardo (2012), Vargas (2012) and Aljazeera (2012, August 30).
44. See Carlos Lozano’s website (2012, September 19, 2012), translation of the author.
45. According to the FARC’s leader, the FARC “negotiate because a political solution has
always been our objective, and also that of the people’s movement.” (See Carlos Lozano’s
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of their actions. Asked for the reasons why they decided to negotiate with
Santos, the FARC’s top leader, Timochenko, said :
Whatever may come, persistant conflict will entail many more
deaths and great destruction, more sorrow and tears, more po-
verty and misery for some and greater wealth for others. Imagine
the lives that could have been saved these 10 years. That’s why we
seek negotiations, a solution without blood, and an understanding
through political routes (Timochenko, September 19, 2012) 46
This awareness was also recognized by FARC’s representative of the peace
delegation, Pablo Catatumbo :
We are ready to start preparing the way that will lead us towards
the expression of our regret for what has happened [...] No doubt
there have also been harshness and pain caused from our side
(Pablo Catatumbo, August 20, 2013) 47
The Colombian government’s motivations for negotiating with the FARC
are less apparent. A first element that has been highlighted by both analysts
and the Colombian government is the increase in the power of Colombian
forces relative to those of the FARC. As Colombia’s president Santos said,
“If we can talk about peace now [...] it is because of the effectiveness of our
armed forces.” 48
But if the Colombian government was winning the war, why wouldn’t
it continue fighting the FARC for a few more years, as advocated for by
former president Uribe ? 49 War is costly and unpredictable, so rational agents
should have incentives to reach peaceful settlements that all would prefer to
website (2012, September 19, 2012), translation of the author).
46. See Carlos Lozano’s website (2012, September 19, 2012), translation of the author.
47. See FARC-EP (2013a).
48. See Presidencia de Colombia (2012b, October 25, 2012), translation of the author.
49. See Caracol Noticias (2012, October 28, 2012).
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the war. 50 However, from the point of view of the majority of the Colombian
population, media, and important leaders (mostly from the right), just before
the peace talks were made public, the FARC were close to being defeated.
Thus, the government’s cost of war could be perceived as being very low.
In fact, at the time, a peace process seemed politically riskier. 51 I argue
that the reason the government chose peace is because of a high risk of an
international conflict with Venezuela.
In the terms of the model, it is clear that just before the start of the peace
talks, the strength of the government, G, was significantly greater than the
strength of the rebels, R (i.e G R). According to Proposition 4, this should
be sufficient for having G > G. In Proposition 3, I showed that having G > G
is not a sufficient condition for peace. There also needs to exist a possibility
that the domestic conflict could externalize, and that the risk of such event,
φ, is sufficiently high. The evidence suggests that these conditions existed in
Colombia.
In subsection 3.4.1, I showed that just before Santos took power, the
risk of an interstate conflict between Colombia and Venezuela was extremely
high. This risk was directly related to the presence of the FARC in Venezuelan
territory, the very likely possibility that Colombia might violate Venezuelan
sovereignty to pursue the rebels, and Venezuela’s determination to respond
in the event this happened. Thus, in terms of the model, it is clear that φ
was very high just before the start of the peace talks.
The theory proposed in Sections 2 and 3 is supported by the fact that Ve-
nezuela has played an important role in the peace process. Although four dif-
50. See Fearon (1995) and Jackson and Morelli (2011).
51. In the speech announcing the opening of peace talks, Santos said, “There comes a
moment in history when you have to take risks to arrive at a solution.... This is one of
those moments." (See (Presidencia de Colombia, 2012a, September 4, 2012), translation
of the author).
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ferent countries are officially “accompanying the process,” 52 both the FARC
and the Colombian government have recognized that Venezuela played a cru-
cial role. 53 “Venezuela’s role here has been fundamental,” a member of the
FARC peace delegation said. “Had it not been for Commander Chávez, the
FARC would not have had the necessary confidence to talk.” 54
This “confidence” was so important that any difference between the the
two countries’ governments might put the talks in jeopardy. When the Ve-
nezuelan government announced that it might “rethink” its role in the peace
process after a meeting between the Venezuelan opposition leader and the
Colombian president, the peace process was in crisis ; the FARC expressed
very serious concerns about the future of negotiations, and the leader of the
Colombian delegation said that the situation was “very worrying.” 55
But how did Venezuela give the FARC “confidence” ? The source is li-
kely not solely Venezuela’s ideological support. Cuba also participated in
the process and is ideologically very close to the FARC, but has not been
as influential. Given the precedents described in subsection 3.4.1, geographi-
cal proximity is likely what mattered. Colombian intelligence documents re-
cently leaked are consistent with this hypothesis. 56 These documents, which
Colombian government officials would have been aware of, show that the
improvement in the relations between Colombia and Venezuela did not im-
52. The countries are Cuba, Chile, Norway and Venezuela (see Presidencia de Colombia
2013b, November 7, 2013).
53. The Colombian president stated, “If we go into a solid peace project, with clear
and concrete progress, progress achieved ever before with the FARC, is also due to the
dedication and commitment of Chavez and the government of Venezuela.” (see Presidencia
de Colombia (2013a, March 5, 2013)). The FARC also emphasized the role played by
Venezuela : “We ought to recognize the invaluable cooperation of the government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at the head of Mister President Hugo Rafael Chávez
Frías, which has been decisive to come to this Agreement.” (see FARC-EP, 2012).
54. See Semanario voz (2013, March 11), translation of the author.
55. See Caracol Noticias (2013).
56. See Davila (2014).
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ply a deterioration in relations between Venezuela and the FARC ; many
of the FARC’s top leaders, including Timochenko, may still being living in
Venezuela. Also, an important number of FARC fronts still move along the
border. 57 According to the same leak, the Venezuelan government was also
aware of this information.
Thus, Venezuela’s role in building the FARC’s confidence is probably
based on its support, which is not only ideological, but mostly material,
given the geography of the conflict. This support makes it very difficult and
extremely risky for the Colombian government to capture FARC leaders, as
well as fight rebels moving along the border. The Colombian government
knows this and, in particular, knows that despite its strength (i.e. G > G),
a victory for the government necessarily implies a risk of a conflict with
Venezuela. Given Venezuela’s commitment to respond to a violation of its
sovereignty, this risk is very high (i.e. φ > φ). Thus, the best response for the
Colombian government is to tolerate the activities of the FARC along the
border (i.e. g(x) = p for x ∈ {a, p}) ; its probability of losing power is very
low, provided that there is not an interstate conflict with Venezuela. Thus,
as shown in Sections 2 and 3, this implies a peaceful outcome.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I develop a simple model of conflict externalization and
provide new evidence from Colombia. The main contribution of the chapter
is to show that the risk of externalization of a domestic conflict increases
the likelihood of peace, but that this only happens if, on the one hand, the
domestic government is sufficiently powerful relative to its opposition, and
on the other hand, the risk of a foreign party intervening is sufficiently high.
57. See Davila (2014, p. 103-116).
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In the second part of the chapter, I use the model to examine the recent
developments of the Colombian internal conflict. I focus on an attempt at
peace negotiations, started in 2012, between the Colombian government and
the FARC. I show that the risk of externalization of the conflict to Venezuela
played crucial role in the onset and evolution of these peace talks.
Although the theory is inspired by the Colombian conflict, its applica-
tion is not limited to this case. The argument can be applied to any internal
conflict in which governments, undertaking cross-border counterinsurgency
actions, initiate military actions against neighboring states. While other ex-
planations exist to explain how Colombian peace talks evolved, such as less
ideological extremism and less militarism from both parties, I argue that
there is enough evidence to believe that the possibility of externalization
should be taken into account in any discussion of the issue.
122
Bibliographie
Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov, and A. Tsyvinski. 2011. “Power fluctuations and
political economy.” Journal of Economic Theory 146 :1009–1041.
Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson. 2006. “Economic Backwardness in Political
Perspective.” American Political Science Review 100 :126í30.
Acemoglu, D., J.A. Robinson, and R. Santos. 2010. “The Monopoly of Vio-
lence : Evidence from Colombia.” Nber working papers, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc, Dec.
Acheson-Brown, D.G. 2001. “The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda : A Just
War ?” International Third World Studies Journal and Review , pp. 1–11.
Aldrich, J., and J. Grynaviski. 2010. “Theories of Political Parties.” In S. Mai-
sel and J. Berry, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Parties and Interest
Groups . Oxford University Press.
Aldrich, J.H. 2011. Why Parties ? : A Second Look . University Of Chicago
Press.
Alesina, A., and E. La Ferrara. 2000. “Participation In Heterogeneous Com-
munities.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 :847–904.
123
Ali, A.A., I.A. Elbadawi, and A. El-Batahani. 2005. “Sudan’s Civil War. Why
Has It Prevailed for So Long ?” In P. Collier and N. Sambanis, eds. Un-
derstanding Civil War. Evidence and Analysis. Volume 1 : Africa. World
Bank, pp. 193–219.
Aljazeera. 2012. “Is Colombia’s conflict coming to an end ?”
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/
2012/08/201283010395107836.html.
Amegashie, J.A., and E. Kutsoati. 2007. “(Non)intervention in intra-state
conflicts.” European Journal of Political Economy 23 :754–767.
Archer, R., and M. Shugart. 1997. “The unrealized potential of presidential
dominance in Colombia.” In S. Mainwaring and M. Shugart, eds. Presi-
dentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press,
pp. 110–159.
Ashworth, S. 2005. “Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers.” Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 21 :441–466.
Ashworth, S., and E. Bueno de Mesquita. 2008. “Electoral Selection, Strategic
Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage.” The Journal of Politics
70 :1006í1025.
Avila, A.F. 2013. “Del Caguán a la Habana.” Informe, Corporacion Nuevo
Arco iris.
Balch-Lindsay, D., A.J. Enterline, and K.A. Joyce. 2008. “Third-Party Inter-
vention and the Civil War Process.” Journal of Peace Research 45 :345–363.
Baliga, S., D.O. Lucca, and T. Sjöström. 2011. “Domestic Political Survival
and International Conflict : Is Democracy Good for Peace ?” Review of
Economic Studies 78 :458–486.
124
Baunsgaard, T., and M. Keen. 2005. “Tax Revenue and (or ?) Trade Libera-
lization.” IMF Working Papers No. 05/112, International Monetary Fund,
Jun.
—. 2010. “Tax revenue and (or ?) trade liberalization.” Journal of Public
Economics 94 :563–577.
Bejarano, A., S. Mainwaring, and E. Pizarro. 2006. “The Crisis of Democratic
Representation in the Andes : An Overview.” In A. Bejarano, S. Mainwa-
ring, and E. Pizarro, eds. The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the
Andes . Stanford University Press, pp. 1–44.
Bejarano, A., and E. Pizarro. 2005. “From ’Restricted’ to ’ Besieged’ : The
Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia.” In M. Scott
and F. Hagopian, eds. Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Demo-
cratization in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
Besley, T. 2006. Principled Agents ? : The Political Economy of Good Go-
vernment . Oxford University Press.
Besley, T., and A. Case. 2003. “Political Institutions and Policy Choices :
Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature 41 :7–
73.
Besley, T., and T. Persson. 2009. “The Origins of State Capacity : Property
Rights, Taxation, and Politics.” American Economic Review 99 :1218–44.
—. 2011. Pillars of Prosperity : The Political Economics of Development
Clusters . Princeton University Press.
—. 2010. “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development.” Econometrica 78 :1–
34.
125
—. 2008. “Wars and State Capacity.” Journal of the European Economic
Association 6 :522–530.
Besley, T., T. Persson, and D. Sturm. 2005. “Political Competition and Eco-
nomic Performance : Theory and Evidence from the United States.” Nber
working papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Jul.
Besley, T., T. Persson, and D.M. Sturm. 2010. “Political Competition, Policy
and Growth : Theory and Evidence from the U.S.” Review of Economic
Studies 77 :1329–1352.
Blattman, C., and E. Miguel. 2010. “Civil War.” Journal of Economic Lite-
rature 48 :3–57.
Botero, F., R. Losada, and L. Wills. 2011. “Sistema de partidos en Colombia
1974-2010 : la evolución hacia el multipartidismo ?” In M. Alcantara and
F. Freidenberg, eds. Estabilidad y cambio en los sistemas de partidos en
America Latina (1978-2010). Gipsal/Alacip.
Bouckaert, P., and N. Houry. 2007. Why They Died : Civilian Casualties in
Lebanon During the 2006 War . Human Rights Watch.
Boudon, L. 2000. “Party System Deinstitutionalization : The 1997-98 Colom-
bian Elections in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs , pp. .
Callander, S. 2005. “Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 113 :1116–1145.
Caracol Noticias. 2010. “Alias ‘Timochenko’ era el embaja-
dor de las Farc en Venezuela, según computadores de ‘Raúl
Reyes’.” http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/judiciales/
126
alias-timochenko-era-el-embajador-de-las-farc-en-venezuela/
-segun-computadores-de-raul-reyes/20100302/nota/961616.aspx,
Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
—. 2013. “El papel de Venezuela en proceso de paz es impor-
tante : Humberto de la Calle.” www.noticiascaracol.com/nacion/
video-295622-el-papel-de-venezuela-proceso-de-paz-importante/
-humberto-de-la-calle, Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
—. 2012. “Lea aquí el discurso completo del expresidente Al-
varo Uribe.” http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/actualidad/
lea-aqui-el-discurso-completo-del-expresidente-alvaro-uribe/
20121028/nota/1786666.aspx, Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
Carlos Lozano’s website. 2012. “Comandante Timoleón Jiménez : “Hemos es-
tado dispuestos a la búsqueda de la Paz”.” http://carloslozanoguillen.
blogspot.ca/2012/09/comandante-timoleon-jimenez-hemos.html,
Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
Carment, D., and D. Rowlands. 2006. “Force and Bias : Towards a Predictive
Model of Effective Third-Party Intervention.” Defence and Peace Econo-
mics 17 :435–456.
—. 1998. “Three’s Company : Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intras-
tate Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 :572–599.
Centeno, M.A. 2002. Blood and Debt : War and the Nation-State in Latin
America. Penn State University Press.
Chernick, M. 2009. “The FARC at the Negotiating Table.” In V. M. Bouvier,
ed. Colombia : Building Peace in a Time of War . United States Institute
of Peace Press.
127
Chiozza, G., and H.E. Goemans. 2004. “International Conflict and the Te-
nure of Leaders : Is War Still "Ex Post" Inefficient ?” American Journal of
Political Science 48 :pp. 604–619.
Conconi, P., N. Sahuguet, and M. Zanardi. 2014. “Democratic Peace and
Electoral Accountability.” Journal of the European Economic Association,
pp. n/a–n/a.
Cox, G.W., and M.D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda : Responsible
Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives . Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Crawford, T.W. 2001. “Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War : Why the
Holbrooke Agreement Failed.” Political Science Quarterly 116 :pp. 499–
523.
—. 2003. Pivotal Deterrence : Third-party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace.
Cornell University Press.
Cunningham, D.E. 2010. “Blocking resolution : How external states can pro-
long civil wars.” Journal of Peace Research 47 :115–127.
Cunningham, D.E., K.S. Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan. 2011. “Explaining Ex-
ternal Support for Insurgent Groups.” International Organization 65 :709–
744.
Cunningham, D.E., K. Skrede Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes
Two : A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 53 :570–597.
DAF. 2009. “10 anos de Transformacion Fiscal Territorial en Colombia 1998-
-2008.” Working paper, Direccion de Apoyo Fiscal, DAF, Minhacienda,
Bogota.
128
Dargent, E., and P. Munoz. 2011. “Democracy Against Parties ? Party System
Deinstitutionalization in Colombia.” Journal of Politics in Latin America
3 :43–71.
Davila, V. 2014. Enemigos : Santos y Uribe ¿Por qué se odian ? , G. Sanchez,
ed. Editorial CAMM.
Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole. 1999. “The Economics of Career
Concerns, Part I : Comparing Information Structures.” Review of Econo-
mic Studies 66 :183–98.
Dincecco, M. 2011. Political Transformations and Public Finances. Europe,
1650-1913 . Cambridge University Press.
Dincecco, M., and M. Prado. 2012. “Warfare, fiscal capacity, and perfor-
mance.” Journal of Economic Growth 17 :171–203.
DNP-DDTS. 2005. “Capacidad Fiscal de los Gobiernos Territoriales Colom-
bianos.” Working paper, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.
Downs, G., and D.M. Rocke. 1994. “Conflict, Agency and Gambling for Re-
surrection : The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War.” American Journal
of Political Science 38 :362–380.
Drazen, A., and M. Eslava. 2010. “Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly
spending : Theory and evidence.” Journal of Development Economics
92 :39–52.
Duque, J. 2010. “Institucionalizacion organizativa y procesos de seleccion
de candidatos presidenciales en los partidos Colombianos : 1974-2006.”
Working paper, Universidad del Valle Colombia.
129
—. 2006. “Partidos divididos, dirigencia fragmentada. Los partidos Liberal y
Conservador colombianos 1974-2006.” Convergencia : Revista de Ciencias
Sociales, UNAM , Agosto, pp. 173–209.
Echavarria, J.J., C. Renteria, and R. Steiner. 2002. “Decentralization and
Bailouts in Colombia.” Informes de Investigacion No. 002252, Fedesarrollo,
Jan.
El Tiempo. 2011a. “Búsqueda de ‘Timochenko’, ‘papa caliente’
para Colombia y Venezuela.” http://m.eltiempo.com/justicia/
bsqueda-de-timochenko-y-relaciones-colombia-y-venezuela/
10795385, Online ; consulted 1 May 2014.
—. 2011b. “ ‘Timochenko’, otro radical en la jefa-
tura de las Farc.” http://m.eltiempo.com/justicia/
timochenko-nuevo-jefe-mximo-de-las-farc/10767905, Online ;
consulted 1 May 2014.
Elbadawi, I.A., and N. Sambanis. 2000. “External interventions and the du-
ration of civil wars.” Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 2433, The
World Bank, Sep.
Esteban, J., and D. Ray. 2001. “Collective action and the group size paradox.”
American Political Science Review 95 :663–672.
Faguet, J.P., and F. Sanchez. 2009. “Decentralization and Access to Social
Services in Colombia.” Center for latin american studies working paper
series, University of California Berkeley, Feb.
—. 2008. “Decentralization’s Effects on Educational Outcomes in Bolivia and
Colombia.” World Development 36 :1294–1316.
130
FARC-EP. 2013a. “The Conversation Table, a triumph of the national
clamor for peace and the political solution.” http://farc-epeace.
org/index.php/communiques/communiques-peace-delegation/
item/38-the-conversation-table-a-triumph-of-the-national-/
clamor-for-peace-and-the-political-solution.html, Online ;
consulted 1 April 2014.
—. 2013b. “El ‘tope’ de las FARC-EP.” https://anncol.eu/index.php/
opinion/allende-de-paz/1656-feb-12-el-tope-de-las-farc-ep,
Online ; consulted 1 May 2014.
—. 2014. “Entrevista con dos comandantes guerrilleros optimis-
tas, Iván Márquez y Jesús Santrich de las FARC-EP.” http:
//anncol.eu/index.php/colombia/proceso-de-paz-en-colombia/
6779-entrevista-con-dos-comandantes-guerrileros-optimistas/
-ivan-marquez-y-jesus-santrich-de-las-farc-ep, Online ; consul-
ted 1 May 2014.
—. 2012. “The historical truth II.” http://
farc-epeace.org/index.php/blogs/guests/item/
128-20-august-2013-the-historical-truth-ii.html, Online ; consul-
ted 1 April 2014.
Fearon, J.D. 1998. “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic
Conflict.”, pp. 107–126.
—. 2003. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic
Growth 8 :195–222.
—. 1995. “Rationalist explanations for war.” International Organization
49 :379–414.
131
Ferreira, F., and J. Gyourko. 2009. “Do Political Parties Matter ? Evidence
from U.S. Cities.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 :399–422.
—. 2011. “Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership ? The Case of U.S.
Mayors.” NBER Working Papers No. 17671, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, Dec.
Fiorina, M. 1980. “The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Po-
liticsPrinceton.” Daedalus 109 :25–45.
Garcia, M. 2000. “Elección popular de alcaldes y terceras fuerzas. El sistema
de partidos en el ámbito municipal. 1988-1997.” Analisis Político, pp. .
Gennaioli, N., and H.J. Voth. 2013. “State Capacity and Military Conflict.”
Working Papers No. 593, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Oct.
Giraldo, F. 2003. Sistema de partidos políticos en Colombia. Centro Editorial
Javeriano, CEJA.
Gleditsch, K.S. 2007. “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War.” Journal of
Peace Research 44 :293–309.
Gleditsch, K.S., and K. Beardsley. 2004. “Nosy Neighbors : Third-Party Ac-
tors in Central American Conflicts.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution
48 :pp. 379–402.
Gleditsch, K.S., I. Salehyan, and K. Schultz. 2008. “Fighting at Home, Figh-
ting Abroad : How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 52 :479–506.
Gorodnichenko, Y., T. Mylovanov, and O. Talavera. 2014. “VoxUkraine.”
http://voxukraine.blogspot.ca/.
132
Grigoryan, A. 2010. “Third-Party Intervention and the Escalation of State-
Minority Conflicts.” International Studies Quarterly 54 :1143–1174.
Grupo de Memoria Histórica. 2013a. Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayectoria
de las FARC 1949-2013 , G. Sanchez, ed. Imprenta Nacional.
—. 2013b. ¡Basta ya ! Colombia : memorias de guerra y dignidad. Informe
General , G. Sanchez, ed. Imprenta Nacional.
Grynaviski, J. 2006. “A Bayesian Learning Model with Applications to Party
Identification.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 18 :323–346.
—. 2010. Partisan Bonds : Political Reputations and Legislative Accountabi-
lity . Cambridge University Press.
Gunter, M.M. 2008. The Kurds Ascending : The Evolving Solution to the
Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey . Palgrave Macmillan.
Gutierrez, F. 2006a. “Estrenando sistema de partidos.” Analisis Político, pp.
.
—. 2003. “Fragmentación, Congreso y Sistema Politico.” In A. Mason and
L. J. Orjuela, eds. La crisis política colombiana. Mas que un conflicto ar-
mado y un proceso de paz . Universidad de Los Andes.
—. 2002. “Historias de democratización anómala. El Partido Liberal en el
sistema político colombiano desde el Frente Nacional hasta hoy.” In F. Gu-
tierrez, ed. Degradación o Cambio : Evolución del Sistema Político Colom-
biano. Grupo Editorial Norma.
—. 2010. “Instituciones y territorio. La descentralización en Colombia.” In
S. Jost, ed. 25 años de la descentralización en Colombia. Konrad Adenauer
Stifttung, pp. 11–54.
133
—. 2007. Lo que el viento se llevó ? Los partidos politicos y la democracia en
Colombia 1958-2006 . Norma.
—. 2006b. “Mas partidos ?” In F. Leal, ed. En la encrucijada. Colombia en
el siglo XXI . Norma.
Gutierrez, F., and A. Davila. 2000. “Paleontólogos o politológos : ¿qué po-
demos decir hoy sobre los dinosaurios ?” Revista de Estudios Sociales , pp.
.
Gutierrez, F., and L. Ramirez. 2002. “Familias, redes y facciones.” Revista de
Estudios Sociales 2.
—. 2004. “The Tense Relationship between Democracy and Violence in Co-
lombia, 1974-2001.” In J.-M. Burt and P. Mauceri, eds. Politics in the
Andes : identity, conflict, reform. Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh.
Hegre, H., and N. Sambanis. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results
on Civil War Onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 :508–535.
Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa : Comparative Lessons in Au-
thority and Control . Princeton University Press.
Hoffman, P. 2012. “Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World ?” The
Journal of Economic History 72 :601–633.
Hoffman, P., and J.L. Rosenthal. 1997. “The Political Economy of Warfare
and Taxation in Early Modern Europe : Historical Lessons for Economic
Development.” In J. Drobak and J. Nye, eds. The Frontiers of the New
Institutional Economics . St. Louis : Academic Press.
Holmstrom, B. 1999. “Managerial Incentive Problems : A Dynamic Perspec-
tive.” Review of Economic Studies 66 :169–82.
134
Hoyos, D. 2007. “Evolucion del sistema de partidos en Colombia 1972- 2000 :
Una mirada a nivel local y regional.” In D. Hoyos, ed. Entre la persistencia
y el cambio. CEPI, Universidad del Rosario, pp. 21–48.
IISS. 2011. “The Farc Files : Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of
‘Raúl Reyes’.” Iiss strategic dossier, International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS).
Imbens, G., and K. Kalyanaraman. 2009. “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the
Regression Discontinuity Estimator.” NBER Working Papers No. 14726,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, Feb.
Imbens, G.W., and T. Lemieux. 2008. “Regression discontinuity designs : A
guide to practice.” Journal of Econometrics 142 :615–635.
Jackson, M.O., and M. Morelli. 2011. “The Reasons for Wars - an Upda-
ted Survey.” In C. Coyne and R. Mathers, eds. Handbook on the Political
Economy of War . Elgar Publishing.
Jia, H. 2008. “A stochastic derivation of the ratio form of contest success
functions.” Public Choice 135 :125–130.
Jia, H., and S. Skaperdas. 2012. “Technologies of conflict.” In M. R. Garfinkel
and S. Skaperdas, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace
and Conflict . Oxford University Press.
Kline, H.F. 2007. Chronicle of a Failure Foretold : The Peace Process of
Colombian President Andrés Pastrana. The University of Alabama Press.
Kuperman, A.J. 2008. “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention :
Lessons from the Balkans.” International Studies Quarterly 52 :49–80.
135
Kydd, A.H. 2010. “Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Reso-
lution.” Annual Review of Political Science 13 :101–121.
Kydd, A.H., and S. Straus. 2013. “The Road to Hell ? Third-Party Interven-
tion to Prevent Atrocities.” American Journal of Political Science 57 :673–
684.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2008. “The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature 46 :285–
332.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. 1998. “Law
and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106 :1113–1155.
Lee, D.S., and T. Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Eco-
nomics.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 :281–355.
Lee, D.S., E. Moretti, and M.J. Butler. 2004. “Do Voters Affect Or Elect Poli-
cies ? Evidence from the U. S. House.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
119 :807–859.
Lizzeri, A., and N. Persico. 2005. “A Drawback Of Electoral Competition.”
Journal of the European Economic Association 3 :1318–1348.
Lopez-Alves, F. 2000. State Formation and Democracy in Latin America,
1810-1900 . Duke University Press.
Mainwaring, S., and T. Scully. 1995. Building Democratic Institutions : Party
Systems in Latin America. Stanford : Stanford University Press.
Maoz, Z. 2005. “Dyadic MID Dataset : http ://psfa-
culty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html.”
136
Maoz, Z., and B. Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Demo-
cratic Peace, 1946-1986.” The American Political Science Review 87 :pp.
624–638.
Martin, P., T. Mayer, and M. Thoenig. 2008. “Make Trade Not War ?” Review
of Economic Studies 75 :865–900.
—. 2012. “The Geography of Conflicts and Regional Trade Agreements.”
American Economic Journal : Macroeconomics 4 :1–35.
Mason, T.D., J.P. Weingarten, and P.J. Fett. 1999. “Win, Lose, or Draw : Pre-
dicting the Outcome of Civil Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 52 :239–
268.
McCrary, J. 2008. “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression
discontinuity design : A density test.” Journal of Econometrics 142 :698–
714.
Medina, L.F. 2012. “Colombia : el desafío de hacer política.” http://
elpais.com/elpais/2012/09/05/opinion/1346870155_498647.html,
Online ; consulted 1 May 2014.
—. 2010. “Ending the Endless War.” Boston Review , May/June, pp. .
Meguid, B. 2008. Party Competition between Unequals : Strategies and Elec-
toral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press.
Ministerio de Defensa. 2009. “Logros de la Política de Consolidación de la
Seguridad Democrática.”
Morelli, M., and C. Pischedda. 2013. “Oil, Federalism, and Third-Party In-
tervention : An Assessment of Conflict Risk in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Working
paper.
137
Moreno, E., and M. Escobar-Lemmon. 2008. “Mejor solo Que Mal Acom-
pañado : Political Entrepreneurs in Colombia.” In S. Morgenstern and
P. Siavelis, eds. Pathways to Power : Candidate Selection and Presenta-
tion. Penn State University Press.
Nasi, C. 2009. “Colombia’s Peace Processes, 1982-2002. Conditions, Strate-
gies, and Outcomes.” In V. M. Bouvier, ed. Colombia : Building Peace in
a Time of War . United States Institute of Peace Press.
—. 2006. “Spoilers in Colombia : Actors and Strategies.” In E. Newman and
O. Richmond, eds. Challenges to Peacebuilding : Managing Spoilers during
Conflict Resolution. United Nations University Press.
OAS. 2010. “OAS Calls for Dialogue and Cooperation in Bilateral Re-
lations between Colombia and Venezuela.” http://www.oas.org/en/
media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-276/10, Online ; consul-
ted 1 May 2014.
O’Brien, P.K., and B. Yun-Casalilla. 2012. The Rise of Fiscal States : A
Global History, 1500-1914 . Cambridge University Press.
Osborne, M.J. 2000. “Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral can-
didates.” Mathematical Social Sciences 40 :41–62.
Pachón, M. 2002. “El partido conservador y sus dinamicas políticas.” In
F. Gutierrez, ed. Degradación o Cambio : Evolución del Sistema Político
Colombiano. Grupo Editorial Norma.
Palacios, M., and F. Safford. 2002. Colombia : Fragmented Land, Divided
Society . Oxford University Press.
Palfrey, T. 1984. “Spatial Equilibrium with Entry.” Review of Economic Stu-
dies 51 :139í156.
138
Pardo, R. 2012. “Colombia’s Peace Gambit.”
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
can-santos-make-peace-with-the-farc-by-rodrigo-pardo, On-
line ; consulted 1 May 2014.
Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 2007. “Electoral Rules and Go-
vernment Spending in Parliamentary Democracies.” Quarterly Journal of
Political Science 2 :155–188.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics : Explaining Econo-
mic Policy , vol. 1 of MIT Press Books . The MIT Press.
Pettersson-Lidbom, P. 2008. “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes ? A
Regression-Discontinuity Approach.” Journal of the European Economic
Association 6 :1037–1056.
Pincus, S., and J. Robinson. 2013. “Do Wars Make States : the British Inter-
ventionist State.” Working papers.
Pizarro, E. 2006. “Giants with feet of clay : Political parties in Colombia.” In
S. Mainwaring, A. Bejarano, and E. Pizarro, eds. The crisis of democratic
representation in the Andes . Stanford University Press, pp. 78–99.
—. 1997. “Hacia un sistema multipartidista ? Las terceras fuerzas en Colombia
hoy.” Analisis Político, pp. .
—. 2002. “La Atomización Partidista en Colombia : el Fenómeno de las Micro-
empresas Electorales.” Working papers No. 292-02, Kellogg Institute for
International Studies, Jun.
Presidencia de Colombia. 2012a. “Alocución del Presidente de la Repú-
blica, Juan Manuel Santos sobre el ‘Acuerdo General para la Termi-
139
nación del Conflicto’.” http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2012/
Septiembre/Paginas/20120904_01.aspx.
—. 2013a. “Declaración del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos lamen-
tando la muerte del Presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez.”
http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2013/Marzo/Paginas/
20130305_08.aspx.
—. 2012b. “Ni un solo día ni un solo minuto vamos a bajar la guardia ante
los actores violentos.” http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2012/
Octubre/Paginas/20121025_01.aspx.
—. 2013b. “Palabras del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos al dar inicio a la Ma-
ratón de Vivienda para los colombianos de menores recursos.” http://wsp.
presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2013/Noviembre/Paginas/20131107_
05-Palabras-del-Presidente-Santos-al-dar-inicio-a-la-Maraton-de-Vivienda.
aspx, Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
—. 2010. “Secretaría de Prensa.” http://web.presidencia.gov.co/fotos/
2010/julio/16/foto1.html.
Primo, D.M., and J.M. Snyder. 2010. “Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and
Government Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 54 :354–
370.
Pruitt, D.G. 2005. “Escalation, Readiness for Negotiation, and Third-Party
Functions.” In I. W. Zartman and G. O. Faure, eds. Escalation and Nego-
tiation in International Conflicts . Cambridge University Press.
Ravenhill, F.J. 1974. “Military Rule in Uganda : The Politics of Survival.”
African Studies Review 17 :pp. 229–260.
140
Revista Semana. 2010. “Por qué Santos.” http://m.semana.com/nacion/
articulo/por-que-santos/117914-3, Online ; consulted 1 May 2014.
—. 2012. “Qué se sabe del proceso de paz.” http://m.semana.com/nacion/
articulo/que-sabe-del-proceso-paz/264009-3, Online ; consulted 1
May 2014.
Reynal-Querol, M. 2005. “Does democracy preempt civil wars ?” European
Journal of Political Economy 21 :445–465.
—. 2002. “Political systems, stability and civil wars.” Defence and Peace
Economics 13 :465–483.
Rico, D. 2013. “¿En qué estado militar están las FARC?” http://www.
razonpublica.com/index.php/conflicto-drogas-y-paz-temas-30/
3685-ien-que-estado-militar-estan-las-farc.html, Online ; posted
21 April 2013, consulted 1 April 2014.
Roland, G., and J.G. Zapata. 2005. “Colombia’s electoral and party system :
proposals for reform.” In A. Alesina, ed. Institutional Reforms : The Case
of Colombia. Washington, DC : The MIT Press.
Roll, D. 2002. Rojo difuso y azul pAlido : los partidos tradicionales en Co-
lombia : entre el debilitamiento y la persistencia. U. Nacional de Colombia.
Rubio, M. 2010. “Agreement, legal confrontation and war with the mafias. Or-
ganized Crime and Political Finance in Colombia.” Working paper, Broo-
kings Institution.
Salehyan, I. 2008. “The Externalities of Civil Strife : Refugees as a Source
of International Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 52 :pp.
787–801.
141
Salehyan, I., K.S. Gleditsch, and D.E. Cunningham. 2011. “Explaining Exter-
nal Support for Insurgent Groups.” International Organization null :709–
744.
Sanchez, G. 2001. “Problems of Violence, Prospects for Peace.” In C. W.
Bergquist, G. Sanchez, and R. Penaranda, eds. Violence in Colombia, 1990-
2000 : Waging War and Negotiating Peace. Wilmington, Del. : SR Books.
Semanario voz. 2013. “Jesús Santrich : “Si no fuera por Chávez, las FARC no
hubieran confiado en acudir al diálogo”.” Online ; consulted 1 April 2014.
Snyder, J.M., and M.M. Ting. 2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political
Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 46 :90–110.
South, A. 2008. Ethnic Politics in Burma : States of Conflict . Routledge.
—. 2012. “The Politics of Protection in Burma : beyond the humanitarian
mainstream.” Critical Asian Studies 44 :175–204.
Tavits, M. 2007. “Party Systems in the Making : The Emergence and Success
of New Parties in New Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science,
pp. .
Taylor, S.L. 1995. “Third Party Activity in Colombia.” XIX International
Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, pp. .
The Guardian. 2014a. “Colombia closes in on a peace deal that could end
world’s longest civil war.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/16/colombia-brink-ending-civil-war-farc, Online ; consulted 1
May 2014.
—. 2014b. “Ukraine crisis : an essential guide to everything that’s
happened so far.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/11/
142
ukraine-russia-crimea-sanctions-us-eu-guide-explainer, Online ;
consulted 1 May 2014.
The New York Times. 2008. “Crisis at Colombia Border Spills Into Diplo-
matic Realm.” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/americas/
04venez.html?_r=1&, Online ; consulted 1 May 2014.
Thies, C.G. 2005. “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America.” Ame-
rican Journal of Political Science 49 :451–465.
Thom, W. 1999. “Congo-Zaire’s 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving
Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence.” Journal
of Conflict Studies 19.
Tilly, C. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 . Ox-
ford : Blackwell.
—. 1975. “Reflections on the history of European state-making.” In C. Tilly,
ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Transparencia por Colombia. 2007. “Observatorios Ciudadanos a Concejos
Municipales.” Cuadernos de transparencia, n. 14, Transparencia por Co-
lombia.
—. 2008. “Primera encuesta nacional sobre prácticas contra el soborno en
empresas colombianas.” Cuadernos de transparencia, n. 15, Transparencia
por Colombia, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
—. 2010. “Segunda encuesta nacional sobre prácticas contra el soborno en
empresas colombianas.” Cuadernos de transparencia, n. 19, Transparencia
por Colombia, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
143
—. 2012. “Tercera encuesta nacional sobre prácticas contra el soborno en
empresas colombianas.” Cuadernos de transparencia, n. 20, Transparencia
por Colombia, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
Valencia, L. 2007. “Los Caminos de la Allianza entre Los Paramilitaries y
los Politicos.” In M. Romero, ed. Para Politica : La Ruta de la Expan-
sion Paramilitar y los Acuerdos Politicos . Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris :
Intermedio.
Vargas, A. 2012. “Explicaciones necesarias sobre la paz.” http://
prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article9416, Online ; consulted 1
May 2014.
Werner, S. 2000. “Deterring Intervention : The Stakes of War and Third-Party
Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science 44 :pp. 720–732.
Yuen, A. 2009. “Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 53 :745–773.
Zartman, I.W. 2000. “Ripeness : The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond.” In
P. Stern and D. Druckman, eds. International Conflict Resolution After
the Cold War . National Academy Press.
144
Annexes
A Proof of main results in Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. In period 2 the incumbent solves the problem :
max
g2
1− (gt + r)η−1 + T +H(g2) +R + (gt + r)(1− η)η−1 (3.6)
subject to g2 ≥ 0 and (gt+r)η−1−T = x2 ≥ 0. Let λg and λx be the Lagrange
multipliers of these restrictions ; then the first-order condition (sufficient since
H ′′ < 0) of (3.6) is given by
H ′(g∗2)− 1 + λg + λxη−1 = 0 (3.7)
with λg ≥ 0, λx ≥ 0, λgg2 = 0 and λx((gt + r)η−1 − T ) = 0. Note that
if λg > 0, then g∗2 = 0. This is not possible since limx→0H ′(x) = +∞. If
λx > 0, we have that (g∗2 + r)η−1− T = 0. Since T = 0 if x2 = 0, this implies
that (g∗2 + r)η−1 = 0, which is also impossible. Then λg = 0 and λx = 0,
which by (3.7) implies (1.7), where we assume that T and r are such that
H ′−1(1) + r − T ≥ 0.
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The probability that the incumbent is reelected is given by
Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ′
)
=
1
2
+ ψ
(
1
ξ
− g1 + r
ξ′(g˜1 + r)
)
(3.8)
where ξ′ is the expected level of honesty of the challenger (note that if ξ = ξ′,
(1.11) and (3.8) are the same). In period 1 the incumbent solves
max
g1≥0
E[v(g1; η)] + Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ′
)
E[v(g∗2; η)] +
(
1− Pr
(
η˜ >
1
ξ′
))
E[w(g∗2; η
′)]
(3.9)
subject to (1.1), (1.7) and (3.8), and also to (gt + r)η−1 − T = x1 ≥ 0. Since
g∗2 does not depend on η, we can write
E[w(g∗2; η
′)] = 1− E
[
1
η′
]
(g∗2 + r) + T +H(g
∗
2)
= 1− ξ′(g∗2 + r) + T +H(g∗2) (3.10)
Additionally, for t = 1, 2,
E[v(gt; η)] = E[w(gt; η)] +R + (ξ − 1)(gt + r)
= 1− ξ(gt + r) + T +H(gt) +R + (ξ − 1)(gt + r)
= 1 + T +H(gt) +R− gt − r (3.11)
Let us define A = R + (ξ′ − 1)(g∗2 + r), then by replacing (3.10), (3.11) and
(1.11) in (1.12) we get
max
g1
1 + T +H(g1) +R− g1 − r + A
(
1
2
+ ψ
(
1
ξ
− g1 + r
ξ′(g˜1 + r)
))
+ E[w(g∗2; η
′)]
(3.12)
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subject to g1 ≥ 0 and ξ(g1 + r)−T = x1 ≥ 0. Let λg and λx be the Lagrange
multipliers of these restrictions ; then the first-order condition of (3.12) is
H ′(g∗1)− 1−
Aψ
ξ′(g˜1 + r)
+ λg + λxξ = 0 (3.13)
with λg ≥ 0, λx ≥ 0, λgg1 = 0 and λx(ξ(g1 + r) − T ) = 0. Again we can
note that λg > 0 is impossible since limx→0H ′(x) = +∞, and that λx > 0
is also impossible since it would imply that T = 0, which does not satisfy
ξ(g1 + r) − T = 0 since by assumption ξ > 1 and r > 0. Then λg = 0 and
λx = 0, and in equilibrium, g∗1 = g˜1. Now I show that this equilibrium exists
and is unique. Replace g∗1 = g˜1 in (3.13), and define the function
f(x) = H ′(x)− 1− Aψ
ξ′(x+ r)
(3.14)
I need to show that there exists an x∗ > 0 such that f(x∗) = 0 (by (3.13) and
(3.14) true in any equilibrium) and that this x∗ is unique. The proof of the
existence is straightforward. First observe in (3.14) that limx→0 f(x) = +∞
and that f(x) is continuous. This implies that it is sufficient to have an x′ > 0
such that f(x′) ≤ 0. Choose x′ = H ′−1(1) > 0. Replacing this value in (3.14)
we get
f
(
H ′−1 (1)
)
= H ′
(
H ′−1 (1)
)− 1− Aψ
ξ′ (H ′−1 (1) + r)
= − Aψ
ξ′ (H ′−1 (1) + r)
< 0 (3.15)
So from (3.15) there exists at least one x > 0 such that f(x) = 0.
For the unicity, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist
at least two numbers a > 0 and b > 0 such that f(a) = f(b) = 0 and
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a 6= b. Without a loss of generality, suppose that a < b < y, where y is any
other number such that f(y) = 0. Since limx→0 f(x) = +∞ > 0 and f(x) is
continuous, there must be a neighbourhood of a, Na, such that f ′(x) < 0 for
all x ∈ Na, and a neighbourhood of b, Nb such that f ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ Nb.
Since b ∈ Nb, this implies that f ′(b) > 0. Differentiating f(x) in (3.14) we
get
f ′(x) = H ′′(x) +
Aψ
ξ′(x+ r)2
(3.16)
and since f ′(b) > 0, by (3.16) we must have that
H ′′(b) +
Aψ
ξ′(b+ r)2
> 0 (3.17)
Multiplying and dividing the first term of (3.17) by b and 1
H′(b) , and using
the definition of κ in (2.27), (3.17) is equivalent to
− κ(b)H
′(b)
b
+
Aψ
ξ′(b+ r)2
> 0 (3.18)
Additionally, since by assumption f(b) = 0, by (3.14) we have Aψ = ξ′(b +
r)(H ′(b)− 1). Thus replacing Aψ in (3.18) and rearranging we get
−κ(b)H
′(b)
b
+
H ′(b)− 1
b+ r
= −κ(b)H
′(b)
b
+
H ′(b)
b+ r
− 1
b+ r
= −H ′(b)
(
κ(b)
b
− 1
b+ r
)
− 1
b+ r
> 0 (3.19)
Since by assumption r > 0, b ≥ 0 and H ′(x) > 0 for all x, (3.19) can only be
satisfied if the expression in parentheses is less than zero. If this is the case,
then
κ(b) <
b
b+ r
< 1 (3.20)
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But (3.20) contradicts (2.27), true for all x, particularly for x = b. Thus
we cannot have a 6= b such that f(a) = f(b) = 0. The solution has to be
unique.
A.2 Proof of corollary 1
Proof. We are interested in seeing how g∗1 changes with respect to the para-
meter ψ. We use the implicit function theorem. Let’s define the function
h(ψ, x) = f(x) = H ′(x)− 1− Aψ
ξ′(x+ r)
(3.21)
Differentiating h(ψ, x) in (3.21) with respect to x, we have that
∂h
∂x
= f ′(x) = H ′′(x) +
Aψ
ξ′(x+ r)2
(3.22)
Additionally, we know that in equilibrium h(ψ, g∗1) = f(g∗1) = 0. As we saw
before, this implies that Aψ = ξ′(g∗1+r)(H ′(g∗1)−1). Replacing this expression
in (3.22), multiplying and dividing the first term by g∗1 and
1
H′(g∗1)
, using again
the definition of κ in (2.27), and rearranging, we have that in equilibrium,
∂h
∂g∗1
= H ′′(g∗1) +
Aψ
ξ′(g∗1 + r)2
= −κ(g∗1)
H ′(g∗1)
g∗1
+
H ′(g∗1)
g∗1 + r
− 1
g∗1 + r
= −H ′(g∗1)
(
κ(g∗1)
g∗1
− 1
g∗1 + r
)
− 1
g∗1 + r
< 0 (3.23)
where in the inequality, as in the proof of the proposition 1, we used (2.27)
(that κ(g∗1) ≥ 1) to show that the term in parentheses in (3.23) is greater
than zero. Additionally, differentiating h(ψ, x) in (3.21) with respect to ψ,
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we have that that in equilibrium,
∂h
∂ψ
= − A
ξ′(g∗1 + r)
< 0 (3.24)
By combining (3.23) and (3.24) and using the implicit function theorem, we
have that
∂g∗1
∂ψ
= −
∂h
∂ψi
∂h
∂g∗1
< 0
B Proof of main results in Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From (2.24) we have that
∂φ
∂α
= E[∆t′O] + E[tF ] + (α∆φF + E[∆tO])
∂p
∂α
(3.25)
with E[tF ] is given by (2.23), and
E[∆t′O] = p(φ
aw
O − φpwO ) + (1− p)(φapO − φppO ) (3.26)
Differentiating (2.20) with respect of α, we have that for p ∈ (0, 1),
∂p
∂α
= − 1
σ
( ∆φF (1− σ2)∆φpO
(α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO])2
)
(3.27)
provided that α∆φF + (1 − σ)E[∆tO] > 0. For the case α∆φF + (1 −
σ)E[∆tO] ≤ 0, or for p ∈ {0, 1}, ∂p∂α = 0.
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In order to simplify the notation, Let’s define
Θ ≡ α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO] (3.28)
Replacing (2.20), (3.27) and (3.28) in (3.25), and rearranging, we have that
for Θ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1)
∂φ
∂α
= φapO − φppO + φapF +
[σΘ− (ασ∆φF − (1− σ)E[∆tO])][∆φaO −∆φpO + ∆φF ]
σΘ
−(α∆φF + E[∆tO])(∆φF (1− σ
2)∆φpO)
σΘ2
(3.29)
which, rearranging, is equivalent to
∂φ
∂α
=
1
σΘ2
[
Θ2(σ(H) + ∆φaO −∆φpO)− σ∆φF
(
Θ2 + α(∆φaO −∆φpO)(1 + σ)Θ + (1− σ2)∆φpOE[∆tO]
)]
with H = φawO − φpwO + φawF . Since ∂φ∂α ≷ 0 depending on the sign of the term in
parenthesis, thus for p ∈ (0, 1) we have that ∂φ∂α ≷ 0 if and only if
σ ≷ σ
[
∆φF
φawO − φpwO + φawF
] [
1 +
α2(1 + σ)(∆φaO −∆φpO)∆φF + (1− σ2)(E[∆tO])2
(α∆φF + (1− σ)E[∆tO])2
]
− (∆φ
a
O −∆φpO)
(φawO − φpwO + φawF )
(3.30)
and with β, γ and κ as defined in (2.26), (2.28) and (2.27), respectively, we have
the result.
For p = 1, replacing this value in (3.25) we have that ∂φ∂α = φ
aw
O − φpwO + φawF ,
which is always positive by (2.7). For p = 0, we have that ∂φ∂α = φ
ap
O − φppO + φapF .
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From (2.46), we have that ∂τ2
∂α
≷ 0 if and only if
− (1− σ)E[∆t′O]− E[tF ]−Θ
∂p
∂α
≷ 0 (3.31)
where E[tF ], E[∆t′O] and Θ are given by (3.26), (2.23) and (3.28) respectively.
Replacing (2.20) and (3.27) in (3.31), and rearranging, we have that for
Θ > 0,
−(1− σ)E[∆t′O]− E[tF ]−Θ
∂p
∂α
=
1
σΘ
[
− σΘ((1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF )
+∆φF
(
ασ∆φF + (1− σ)σ(α(∆φaO −∆φpO) + ∆φpO)
−(1− σ)α(∆φaO −∆φpO)
)]
=
−σ((1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF )− (1− σ)(∆φaO −∆φpO) + σ∆φF
σ
which implies that −(1− σ)E[∆t′O]− E[tF ]−Θ ∂p∂α ≷ 0 if and only if
σ ≶ σ
[
∆φF
(1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF
]
− (1− σ)(∆φ
a
O −∆φpO)
(1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF
(3.32)
and with βσ and γσ as defined in (2.49) and (2.50), respectively, we have the
result.
For p = 1, we have that (2.46) is equivalent to −(1−σ)(φawO −φpwO )−φwF ,
which is always negative by (2.7). For p = 0, (2.46) is equivalent to −(1 −
σ)(φapO − φppO )− φpF
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. I show that there is a σ∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that Σ0 ≥ Σ1 for all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1).
Note that Σ0 ≥ Σ1 implies (3.A) and (3.B). For the case p ∈ (0, 1), recall
that Σ0 and Σ1 were defined in (2.29) and (2.51) as
Σ0 = σβκ− γ (3.33)
Σ1 = σβσ − γσ (3.34)
where κ, β, βσ, γ and γσ are given by (2.27), (2.26), (2.49), (2.28) and (2.50),
respectively. Combining (3.33) and (3.34), note that Σ0 ≥ Σ1 is equivalent
to
σ(βκ− βσ)− (γ − γσ) ≥ 0 (3.35)
In order to simplify the notation, let define
X = φawO − φpwO + φawF (3.36)
Y (σ) = (1− σ)(φawO − φpwO ) + φawF (3.37)
M(σ) = α2(1 + σ)(∆φaO −∆φpO)∆φF + (1− σ2)(E[∆tO])2 (3.38)
Let’s note that
σ(βκ−βσ)−(γ−γσ) = σ
Θ2XY
[
∆φFMY−Θ2[∆φF (X−Y )+φawF (∆φaO−∆φpO)]
]
(3.39)
where Θ is given by (3.28). Let’s define now the function
f(σ) ≡ ∆φFM(σ)Y (σ)−Θ(σ)2[∆φF (X − Y (σ)) + φawF (∆φaO −∆φpO)]
(3.40)
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It is easy to see that (3.35) is satisfied if and only if f(σ) ≥ 0. The idea is to
show that there is a σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that f(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ > σ∗.
In order to do that, first, Let’s note that
lim
σ→1
f(σ) = (α∆φF )
2
[
φapF (φ
aw
O − φpwO ) + φawF (φppO − φapO )
]
≥ 0 (3.41)
where I have used assumptions (2.7) and (2.8). Note that the inequality is
strict if α > 0 and ∆φF > 0, and φapF (φ
aw
O − φpwO ) > 0 or φawF (φppO − φapO ) > 0.
Let’s assume that this happens.
Let’s note now that (3.41) implies that we have only two scenarios. First,
that f(·) never crosses the x-axis. Since limσ→1 f(σ) ≥ 0, and since f(·) is
continuous, we have that f(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ (0, 1). For this case we can
take as σ∗ any σ ∈ (0, 1).
Second, Let’s consider the case that f(·) crosses the x-axis at least one.
Let’s call Ξ the set of points such that this happens, i.e., that f(σ) = 0 for
all σ ∈ Ξ. Let’s take the supremum of Ξ. Let’s call this value σ0 = sup(Ξ).
Note that sup(Ξ) ∈ Ξ if (3.41) is strict. Crucially, the definition of σ0, the
continuity of f(·), and (3.41), implies that f(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ (σ0, 1). Thus,
Let’s just take σ∗ = σ0. Then f(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1), which implies that
(3.35) is satisfied, and equivalently, that Σ0 ≥ Σ1 for all σ ∈ (σ∗, 1).
C Proof of main results in Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We know that r(a) = a and g(a) = a. Thus, war (i.e. (a, a)) is a NE.
We first show that r(p) = p, then that g(p) = p, both implying that peace
(i.e. (p, p)) is a NE too.
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Let’s define the functions l, m and s, as
ρ(G,L) = Z(G)− Z(G− L)− C (3.42)
ζ(G,L, F, φ) = φZ(G− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G)− Z(G− L) (3.43)
η(G,L, F, φ) = φZ(G+ L− F ) + (1− φ)Z(G+ L)− Z(G)− C(3.44)
These functions are constructed directly from Table 3.1, by comparing each
player’s choices. The sign of each function determines the corresponding best
response. Specifically,
r(p) = p ⇔ ρ < 0 (3.45)
g(p) = p ⇔ η < 0 (3.46)
g(a) = p ⇔ ζ < 0 (3.47)
By (3.45) and (3.46), note that (p, p) is a NE when ρ < 0 and η < 0 ; by
(3.3) and (3.47), (a, a) is a NE when ζ > 0 ; and by (3.45) and (3.47), (p, a) is
a NE when ρ > 0 and ζ < 0. Also note that (p, p) can be unique only when,
in addition to ρ < 0 and η < 0, we have ζ < 0.
A close look at ρ(G,L) in (3.42) shows that, with respect to G, ρ is inverse
U-shaped with an unique maximum at L. To see this, note in (3.42) that for
G < L, ρ(G,L) = Z(G) − C ,since Z(x) = 0 for all x < 0. Thus, since by
Assumption 2, Z ′ > 0, we have that ρG(G,L) = Z ′(G) > 0 for all G < L. For
G > L, note that ρG(G,L) = Z ′(G) − Z ′(G − L) < 0, since by Assumption
2, Z ′′ < 0.
Let us now look at r(p) = p, which we noted is implied by Assumption
3. To see this, note first that Pr[R > L] = 1 − Pr[L > R] = 1 − Z(L).
Replacing this expression in Assumption 3.(ii), we get Z(L) − C ≤ 0. Then
observing that since ρ(L,L) = Z(L) − C ≤ 0, and ρ(G,L) has a (unique)
maximum at G = L, we have 0 ≥ ρ(L,L) > ρ(G,L) for all G > L. Thus,
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0 ≥ ρ(G,L), which by (3.45) implies that r(p) = p.
Finally, g(p) = p follows from Assumption 2 and Assumption 3.(ii), by
noting that from both (3.42) and (3.44), we have that ρ(G,L) < 0 ⇒
η(G,L, ·, 0) < 0. Since we already found that ρ(G,L) < 0, by (3.46), we
have the result. To see this, note that η(G,L, ·, 0) < ρ(G,L) if and only if
Z(G+ L) + Z(G− L) < 2Z(G)
and by the strict concavity of Z (Assumption 2), we have that
Z(G+ L)
2
+
Z(G− L)
2
< Z
((G+ L)
2
+
(G− L)
2
)
= Z(G)
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let φ→ 1 in (3.43) and (3.44). First, note that this implies that ζ < 0
and η < 0, because Z ′ > 0 and F > L by Assumptions 2 and 4 respectively.
Thus, by (3.46) and (3.47) we have that : (i) g(p) = p ; this implies that (p, p)
is an equilibrium (since by Assumptions 2 and 3 we know that r(p) = p) ; and
(ii) g(a) = p ; this guarantees that (p, p) is unique (since the other possible
equilibrium was (a, a)).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We show that (p, p) exists, and then we establish the conditions under
which it is unique. The proof for the existence of (p, p) is as follows. Note
that by (3.46), it is sufficient to show that η(G,L, F, φ) < 0, which implies
that g(p) = p, since we know that r(p) = p. Re-writing (3.44), we have that
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η(G,L, F, φ) < 0 is equivalent to
φ >
Z(G+ L)− Z(G)− C
Z(G+ L)− Z(G+ L− F ) (3.48)
Note that (3.48) is always true since the term on the right is negative. To
see this, note that the numerator of the expression on the right is equal to
η(G,L, ·, 0) < 0, and as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, ρ(G,L) < 0⇒
η(G,L, ·, 0) < 0.
I now establish the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of (a, a).
Note that (a, a) exists if and only if g(a) = a, which by (3.47) is equivalent to
ζ(G, φ) ≥ 0. Equivalently, (p, p) is unique if and only g(a) = p which by (3.47)
is equivalent to ζ(G,L, F, φ) < 0. I first show that if φ is large enough, there
exists an unique cut off point G(φ, L, F ) implicitly defined by ζ(G,L, F, φ) =
0, such that ζ(G,L, F, φ) < 0 for all G > G, and ζ(G,L, F, φ) ≥ 0 for all
G ≤ G.
To establish the existence of G, let us define the following threshold for φ
φ = 1− Z(F − L)
Z(F )
(3.49)
I argue that G exists if and only if φ > φ. Note that by (3.44), the condi-
tion φ > φ is equivalent to ζ(F,L, F, φ) < 0. Thus, φ < φ implies that
ζ(F,L, F, φ) ≥ 0. If φ > φ, the proof that there is an unique G such that
ζ(G,L, F, φ) = 0 is as follows.
First, note that ζ(L,L, F, φ) > 0. To see this, note that F > L (true by
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Assumption 4) and Assumption 2 implies that
ζ(L,L, F, φ) = φZ(L− F ) + (1− φ)Z(L)− Z(L− L)
= (1− φ)Z(L)
> 0
Second, note that ζ(G,L, F, φ) is strictly decreasing in G for L < G ≤ F .
This follows directly from the fact that Z(G − F ) = 0 and Assumption 2.
Differentiating ζ(G,L, F, φ) with respect to G, we get
ζG(G,L, F, φ) = (1− φ)z(G)− z(G− L)
and by Assumption 2, z(G− L) > z(G), so ζG(G,L, F, φ) < 0. Third, recall
that φ > φ implies ζ(F,L, F, φ) < 0.
We can now argue that G exists and is unique for φ > φ : ζ(L,L, F, φ) >
0, ζ(F,L, F, φ) < 0, ζG(G,L, F, φ) < 0 for L < G ≤ F and the conti-
nuity of ζ with respect to G implies that there exists a unique G such that
ζ(G,L, F, φ) = 0 for L < G ≤ F . Note that L < G ≤ F . Note also that
ζG(G,L, F, φ) < 0 implies that ζ(G,L, F, φ) < 0 for all G > G.
We have shown that if φ > φ, there is an uniqueG such that ζ(G,L, F, φ) <
0 for all G > G. We now prove that if φ ≤ φ, or if φ > φ but G ≤ G, then
ζ(G,L, F, φ) ≥ 0. The proof is straightforward. Since ζ(G,L, F, φ) is strictly
decreasing for all L < G ≤ F , the fact that L < G ≤ F implies that
ζ(G,L, F, φ) ≥ 0 for all G ≤ G. Now suppose that φ ≤ φ. Note that by
(3.49), this implies that ζ(F,L, F, φ) ≥ 0. For L < G ≤ F , since ζ(G,L, F, φ)
is strictly decreasing with a minimum at G = F , thus ζ(G,L, F, φ) ≥ 0.
We conclude that (i) if G > G and φ > φ, g(p) = p, g(a) = p, r(p) = p,
which implies that (p, p) is unique ; (ii) if φ ≤ φ or φ > φ but G < G, we
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have two equilibria, (a, a) and (p, p).
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For the case L ≥ R, it is trivially true that G > R ; by Assumption
3, G > L for all G, particularly for G. For L < R, it is crucial that G is a
function of φ. Note that φ ≥ φ, since for φ < φ, G might not exists.
Let’s first assume that R < F . Note that in (3.43), taking the limit
when φ → 1, we have, by Assumptions 2 to 5, that limφ→1G(φ, L, F ) ≤
L. Also note that G is strictly decreasing in φ (see proof of Corollary 1).
Then there is a φ′′ ≥ φ such that G(φ′′, L, F ) = F . Thus, since by the
continuity of ζ, G(φ, L, F ) is continuous in φ, and there exists a φ∗ ≥ φ such
that G(φ∗, L, F ) = R. Let’s choose φ′ = φ∗. As a result, since G is strictly
decreasing in φ, for all φ > φ′, we have that G(φ, L, F ) < G(φ′, L, F ) = R
and for all φ ≤ φ′, we have that G(φ, L, F ) ≥ G(φ′, L, F ) = R ; thus, we have
the result. The case R > F is trivial since by Assumption 5, F > G for all
G, particularly G ; in this case, it is sufficient to take φ′ = φ.
C.5 Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
Proof. The proof is a direct application of the implicit function theorem.
Note that by the definitions of ζ(G,L, F, φ) and G,
∂G
∂φ
=
− ∂ζ
∂φ
∂ζ
∂G
=
Z(G)− Z(G− F )
(1− φ)z(G)− z(G− L) < 0
and
∂G
∂L
=
− ∂ζ
∂L
∂ζ
∂G
= − z(G− L)
(1− φ)z(G)− z(G− L) > 0
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and finally, differentiating (3.49), we get
∂φ
∂L
=
z(F − L)
Z(F )
> 0
∂φ
∂F
=
z(F )Z(F − L)− z(F − L)Z(F )
(Z(F ))2
< 0
where the second relation is true since Z ′′ < 0 implies that z(x)
Z(x)
is monotone
decreasing, so the numerator is negative.
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